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ABSTRACT 
 
Purpose: The main purpose of this dissertation is to investigate and test the proposition that 
corporate culture is a necessary component of financial organization effectiveness and to 
examine the notion that a positive relationship exists between certain corporate values and 
financial performance. 
Methodology/Design: The study consists of two linked phases. The first phase is a mixed-
methods study that primarily focuses on developing and constructing cultural profiles. 
Qualitative data were gathered from 27 participants representing 11 different institutions 
through semi-structured interviews. Also, longitudinal data covering a 10-year period were 
collected to examine how each bank performed financially. The second phase, which is 
quantitative in nature, examines the effect of certain cultural values on the two best-performing 
banks (Generalist 1 and 2) using descriptive statistical and regression analyses.  
Findings: The study implies that the five organizational values that emerged from the two best- 
performing banks were strategically important for the success of the two institutions. These 
values were identified as Clarity of Vision and Strategy, Corporate Governance, Customer 
Orientation, Innovativeness and Meritocracy. The regression analyses imply a positive 
relationship between the two generalists’ Net Operating Income (NOI) and Innovativeness. 
Although there is also a positive relationship between Corporate Governance and NOI, it is less 
significant than the aforementioned corporate value. Conversely, Innovativeness is found to be 
negatively related to Return on Average Equity (ROAE); there is also a negative relationship 
between Corporate Governance and Customer Orientation with ROAE.  The study also implies 
that financial institutions that preserved their original corporate culture performed better than 
those that did not, either as a result of a change in CEO, or business strategy.   
Originality/Contribution: To my knowledge, this is the first study in Bahrain that addresses 
corporate culture in financial institutions in general, and Islamic banking in particular. 
Moreover, little research exists on the importance of institutionalization and operationalization 
in Islamic banking in Bahrain and particularly the role that corporate culture plays.  
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CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION 
 
Executive Summary 
This chapter starts with an introductory statement on the purpose and objective of this 
study. A detailed background is then provided on the major issues facing Islamic banks in the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (“GCC”); the study also highlights the importance of this research 
paper to the Bahraini banking industry. The research also emphasises the importance of 
corporate culture to both academic scholars and practitioners in examining the culture-
performance relationship in the context of conventional and Islamic banking environments.  
Finally, the study concludes with academic and practical contributions to this research. 
 
1.1 Background 
Rasheed Al-Maraj, Governor, Central Bank of Bahrain (“CBB”) (CIBAFI Global 
Forum, 2016) stated, 
“I would like to re-emphasise the enormity of the challenges faced by the Islamic 
finance industry today in order to sustain its growth momentum. It has to 
differentiate itself convincingly for its customers by providing them with an 
excellent customer experience while embracing the true spirit of Shari'ah. 
Secondly, it has to invest heavily in its people. The opportunities offered by the 
Islamic finance industry are endless; but the question is, are we up to the 
challenge?”    
In a 2015 Gulf News interview, Hussain Qemzi, CEO of Noor Bank stated,    
“Despite Islamic banking being a fast-growing sector, the pace of innovation has 
been slow. Unless we differentiate ourselves in terms of value - a competitive 
price, innovative products, and high-quality customer service - we will struggle 
to compete with conventional banks.” 
Moreover, based on studies conducted by the financial consultants Booz & Company 
(2008); A.T. Kearney (2010); Oliver Wayman (2009); Ernst and Young (2013, 2014), and 
researchers like Archer and Karim, (2002) and Karbhari et al. (2004), six significant issues 
confront global Islamic banks in general and “Bahraini institutions in particular”. These issues 
also have raised implications for corporate culture, as discussed below. 
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Academics and practitioners recognize the vital importance of corporate culture in 
shaping, stabilizing and revitalizing organizations. Interest in corporate culture dates to the 
1970s, when the sudden rise in Japanese economic prosperity took the Western world by 
surprise. This was perceived as being due to the value Japanese culture places on the way 
employees and resources interact with each (Prasad et al., 2009; Denison, 1984) and their 
unequivocal commitment to Total Quality Management (“TQM”) practices even though the 
TQM concept arose from W. Edwards Deming’s research in the US. Five decades later, interest 
in corporate culture research remains as strong as ever (Sackmann, 2011). 
The notion of corporate culture was introduced to management literature by 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz in The Interpretation of Cultures (1973), but gained greater 
momentum in the management literature of the 1980s. During this period, organizational 
behavioural researchers started to introduce the concept of “corporate culture”; by then, 
Geertz’s cultural definition was among the most cited in management literature. 
From the viewpoint of practitioners, corporate culture is an important theme in today’s 
global business environment for a number of reasons: (a) a strong corporate culture creates a 
healthy and conducive atmosphere; (b) it translates into positive bottom-line for organizations 
(Mahrokian et al., 2010); and (c) it assists in the development of a sustainable business model 
based on strategies that are reflected in corporate practices and actions (Schwartz & Davis, 
1981).  
Schein (2004) argues that the effectiveness of corporate culture rests primarily with the 
ability of the organization’s founder or entrepreneur to articulate his or her beliefs and values to 
new members of the organization. These espoused beliefs, once shown to work, become coded 
work procedures and policies and are ultimately institutionalized as a blueprint.  
Barney (1986) goes one step further by arguing that a firm with a strong culture can also 
develop a competitive advantage if these factors are subtle, valuable and difficult to imitate by 
competitors.  
Because there is typically consensus among the majority of employees about what type 
of culture exists within an organization, detecting the cultural profile or pattern should be 
feasible through the use of both qualitative and quantitative methods (Cameron & Quinn, 2006).  
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In light of the above, and for the purpose of this study, I adopt Schein’s (2004) 
institutional theory to define corporate culture as shared values and beliefs and assumptions. 
These shared values are ultimately translated into behaviours and corporate practices (Schwartz 
& Davis, 1981; Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983). Similarly, I use the Organizational Culture Profile 
(“OCP”) instrument (O’Reilly et al., 1991) to measure each organization’s cultural profile. I 
also apply an organizational ecology framework, such as imprinting (Hannan, 2005) and 
organizational fitness theories (Hannan et al., 2007) to analyse and interpret the qualitative data 
of this study. Collectively, the study uses an “institutional ecology” integrated framework, 
which is a combination of ecological insights and institutional perspectives (Ruef, 2010, cited in 
Baum & Oliver, 1996) to analyse data and test the study hypotheses. 
1.1.1 Competition 
Because of the increasing number of Islamic banks operating in a close vicinity to each 
other in the market centre, competition within the industry has risen noticeably in recent years. 
Consequently, there is a great pressure on profit margins and pricing in general. Moreover, due 
to the prevailing low rate of return on deposits (mudharabah-based profit
1
) nowadays, 
customers are switching to other investment products (such as Islamic mutual funds) that offer 
higher rates of return. This shift in customer preferences affects the ability of Islamic banks to 
identify traditionally cheap funding sources. In addition, with bigger Islamic banks entering into 
the mainstream, and with more conventional banks offering Shari’ah-compliant products 
through windows of Islamic banking products
2
, the competition in this sector is intensifying and 
the distinction between Islamic and conventional banks is slowly disappearing. Ariss (2010) 
argues that in Turkey, Islamic banks are less competitive than conventional banks in terms of 
overall profitability. Similarly, average return on equity in the GCC between 2008 and 2012 
was lower than conventional banks (Ernst & Young, 2014). Therefore, Islamic financial 
institutions need to develop a new way of differentiating themselves beyond the traditional 
practice of being Shari’ah-compliant. Although profitability is in general lower for Islamic 
banks than conventional banks, a number of scholars have argued that financial performance is 
                                                          
1
 Mudharabah-based profit is a contract between the Islamic bank and holder of investment account where the bank 
invests the money based on an agreed profit-sharing arrangement, Archer and Abdel Karim (2002), p. 213. 
   
2
 These are specialized set-ups within conventional financial institutions that offer Shari’ah-compliant products for 
their customers, Archer and Abdel Karim (2002), p. 46.   
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only one dimension of this young industry, and other, non-financial, measures should be taken 
into consideration. This is because Islamic banks bear more social and ethical responsibility to 
sustain the welfare of societies and this may affect the way Islamic institutions conduct their 
business operations (Bedoui & Mansour, 2014).  
1.1.2 Risk Management  
The financial crisis of 2008-2010 cast a shadow on the global economy in general and 
the financial sector in particular (The Economist, 2013). The intensity of this crisis for global 
firms has varied in terms of size, sector, and geography, and Islamic banks operating in the 
GCC were not immune.  
The governments of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”) have injected fresh 
cash into their financial sectors, including Islamic banks, to strengthen their capital bases 
(Khamis et al., 2010). Archer and Karim (2002) assert that financial risk management is more 
developed in conventional than in Islamic banks. 
Some Islamic banks were more affected than conventional banks because of higher real 
estate holdings on their balance sheets. Hassan and Dridi (2010) argue that because some 
Islamic banks experienced weakness in their risk management systems, this led to a large 
decline in their profitability in 2009 and beyond. Although the liquidity situation has improved 
significantly in the aftermath of the financial crisis, it remains a challenging area, especially for 
those Islamic banks that operate in the investment sector (Financial Times, 2010). This is 
mainly due to the mismatch between long-term asset holdings and corresponding short-term 
liquidity liabilities, which causes difficulties for asset-liability management. In particular, risk 
management remains challenging for many Islamic banks because of their relatively higher 
holdings of real estate assets on their balance sheets than conventional banks.     
1.1.3 Rising Regulatory Influence  
Central banks around the world are advocating a tougher stance on financial institutions 
to ensure that lessons learned from the financial crisis are not being ignored. GCC regulators are 
no exception, and have adopted a stricter regulation of the banking industry, including Islamic 
banking. To comply with international banking standards, regulators are demanding that banks 
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in general maintain higher liquidity and a larger capital cushion in case global financial markets 
again become turbulent. This will entail full implementation of the Basel III capital adequacy 
ratio requirements, which will take place in 2019 (Al-Hares et al., 2013). Also, regulators are 
urging more transparency in financial reporting and better corporate governance structures, 
including the appointment of independent members at the board level (CBB Report, 2010).  
1.1.4 Information Technology  
Acceptance of information technology (“IT”) has been mixed, at best, in Islamic banks. 
Banks will need to step up their efforts to enhance efficiency and distribution channels through 
electronic banking services (i.e., e-banking) in order to reach out to different segments of the 
market and serve customers’ needs effectively. Also, banks must use sophisticated software to 
efficiently handle Customer Relationship Management (“CRM”). Improvements in IT are 
essential if Islamic banks are to clearly differentiate themselves from competitors. 
1.1.5 Human Resources (“HR”) 
The rapid growth of Islamic banking institutions has not been matched by recruitment of 
talented bankers, and especially at the senior manager level (Karbhari et al., 2004). This gap has 
not been addressed by many Islamic banks. Recruiting talented managers is one of the key 
factors in the success of the financial sector, since these managers assist in developing and 
enhancing corporate business growth. At present, adequately skilled human resources are in 
short supply in the marketplace for Islamic banks operating in the Gulf region (Booz & 
Company, 2008). This situation exists at all levels in organizations, but in particular at the 
Shari’ah board level. It takes many years of intensive education and practical experience to 
develop a competent Shari’ah board member. Motivating staff is one of the key factors in 
creating a competitive and vibrant environment in an organization. Wallach (1983) argues that 
an employee can be more effective in his or her job when there is a match between his or her 
motivation and organizational culture.  
Equally important to recruiting the right employee is the ability to retain and manage 
him or her within the corporate culture through a well-designed reward system (Kerr & Slocum, 
1987). 
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1.1.6 Product Development and Innovation  
Product development in Islamic banks has made big strides in recent years by 
introducing new sets of products such as tawarruq3, istisna’a4, and Shari’ah-compliant credit 
cards (Ahmed, 1988), but more improvements are needed to cope with the increasingly 
competitive landscape and to satisfy emerging customer and societal needs. For example, 
customers are looking for a return on their high-balance demand deposits that matches the 
returns offered by conventional banks. There is a shortage of products with medium to long-
term maturity, given the lack of depth and scope in Islamic secondary markets (Archer & 
Karim, 2002). A mudharabah-based profit-and-loss-sharing investment account can be 
structured as a viable vehicle to address this particular demand (Ahmed, 1988). Similarly, banks 
need to finance real estate purchases over a long period through the development of Islamic 
mortgages (sukuks) that can ultimately be securitized and sold as income-generating funds in 
the capital market. Also, there is a need to develop Islamic wealth-management services for the 
high-net-worth investors for such products as fixed income and private equity funds. 
 
1.2 Purpose, Objective and Study Hypothesis 
The main purpose of this dissertation is to investigate and test the proposition that 
corporate culture is a necessary part of financial organization effectiveness and to examine the 
notion that a positive relationship exists between certain corporate values and financial 
performance. 
I selected the theme of corporate culture as the main topic of study because little 
research exists on the importance of institutionalization and operationalization in Islamic 
banking in Bahrain, and particularly the role that corporate culture plays. To my knowledge, 
this is the first study in Bahrain that addresses this topic. 
 
The main objectives of this study of the Islamic and conventional banking industries in 
Bahrain are as follows: 
                                                          
3
 Monetization of assets. In Islamic banking this takes the form of buying commodities and selling them to get 
cash, Ahmed (1988), p. 234.    
4
 A contract of sale of specified goods to be manufactured, with an obligation on the manufacturer to deliver them 
upon completion. The seller provides either the raw material or cost of manufacturing the goods, Archer and Karim 
(2002), p. 213. 
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1. Examine the best-performing banks among a group of selected financial institutions in 
terms of key financial ratios based on net operating profit growth and return on equity 
and risk management analysis over a period of 10 years. 
2. Identify and analyse the most important organizational values for the best-performing 
banks. 
3. Examine the relationship that exists between selected corporate values that relate 
positively with financial performance. 
The essence of the study is to test the notion that certain corporate values will positively 
relate to financial performance. The five corporate values identified in this study serve as 
independent variables. These are Clarity of Vision and Strategy; Corporate Governance; 
Customer Orientation; Innovativeness; and Meritocracy. The two financial measurements that 
are applied for this research are Net Operating Income (NOI) and Return on Average Equity 
(ROAE), which will serve as the dependent variables. Therefore, ten hypotheses are examined 
as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Innovativeness is positively related to NOI 
Hypothesis 2: Meritocracy is positively related to NOI 
Hypothesis 3: Clarity of Vision & Strategy is positively related to NOI 
Hypothesis 4: Corporate Governance is positively related to NOI 
Hypothesis 5: Customer Orientation is positively related to NOI 
Hypothesis 6: Innovativeness is positively related to ROAE 
Hypothesis 7: Meritocracy is positively related to ROAE 
Hypothesis 8: Clarity of Vision & Strategy is positively related to ROAE 
Hypothesis 9: Corporate Governance is positively related to ROAE 
Hypothesis 10: Customer Orientation is positively related to ROAE 
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1.3 Significance and Relevance of the Study Topic 
Islamic finance is one of the fastest-growing sectors of the global financial market. In 
some countries, such as the Kingdom of Bahrain and Malaysia, it is strategically important to 
not only be a global leader in this sector, but also to make a significant economic contribution to 
their respective country’s Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”). In other cases, such as Saudi 
Arabia where Islamic finance penetration has reached nearly 54% of the total financial market 
in 2013, it is evident that this sector has become a major force in the economy, and hence too 
big to be ignored (Ernst &Young, 2014). 
While Islamic banking has been on the rise over the past 40 years, it is currently going 
through a consolidation phase in a number of countries’ markets, including Bahrain, and is in a 
progressive phase in other markets, such as Turkey and Indonesia (Ernst & Young, 2014).  It is 
evident that the process of institutionalization and operationalization is becoming a major issue 
in this industry. It has been argued that a successful institution will be one that can establish a 
solid corporate governance foundation (Ginena & Hamid, 2015), with clear differentiation from 
competitors in terms of innovation and efficient distribution channels (Booz & Company, 
2008), but, most importantly, one with a strong and positive corporate culture to achieve 
sustainable financial results. However, the study of corporate culture in financial institutions in 
general and Islamic banking in particular has been limited in the management and economics 
literature.  
This study consists of two phases. The first phase is a mixed-methods study that 
primarily focuses on developing and constructing cultural profiles. Qualitative data were 
gathered through a semi-structured interview format with open-ended questions. A total number 
of 27 interviews were conducted with managers of 11 different financial institutions (six Islamic 
and five conventional). For the majority of institutions, I also collected data covering a 10-year 
period to examine how each bank performed financially. 
In the second phase, which is quantitative in nature, I examine the effects of certain 
cultural values on the best-performing banks, being Generalist 1 and 2, using descriptive 
statistical and regression analyses. A total of 74 managers from the two financial institutions 
participated in this survey. 
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Given that the sample contains only 11 banks, this research could be interpreted as 
limited in terms of breadth and depth. However, this field study should be viewed as 
exploratory and further research is recommended to generalize study findings to a larger 
population.  
1.4 Islamic Banking in the Gulf Region 
The philosophy of Islamic banking is based on offering Shari’ah-compliant banking 
products that conform to Islamic banking laws. Although industry growth has slowed in recent 
years because of the 2008 financial crisis, it has since grown at a pace of 10-15% annually 
(Ernst & Young, 2013). 
Hassan and Dridi (2010) argue that several factors have contributed to the strong growth 
of Islamic finance in general: (a) the strong need for Shari’ah-compliant products in many 
Islamic countries including those in the Gulf region; (b) the increase in the regulatory system to 
deal with the growing demand for Islamic finance; (c) the growing demand from conventional 
investors as means of diversifying their products and services; and (d) the industry’s need to 
develop a number of financial instruments to meet the growing demand of both corporate and 
individual investors. The Islamic finance and banking industry’s value reached US$ 1.9 trillion 
in the first half of 2014 (World Bank and Islamic Development Bank Report, 2015). 
Al Saie (2011) also argues that the growth of Islamic banking in the Gulf region, 
especially during the period 2000-2007, can be attributed to the following factors: (a) an 
abundance of liquidity generated by hydrocarbon prices (see Appendix Exhibit A1.1); (b) 
societal needs, since some segments of the society want to conduct their financial transactions 
in accordance with Islamic banking guidelines; and (c) the establishment of a proper legal and 
auditing framework to cater to the growing number of Islamic institutions. All of these factors 
have enabled Islamic banks in the Gulf region to flourish during this period.    
In 1975, Dubai Islamic Bank in the UAE was the first Islamic institution to be founded 
(Archer & Karim, 2002). This was followed by other financial institutions such as the Kuwait 
Finance House, Kuwait; the Al-Rajhi Bank, Saudi Arabia; and the Bahrain Islamic Bank. All 
early founders of Islamic banks in the Gulf region benefitted from early monopolies within their 
respective home territories and had established a clear competitive advantage in the late 1970s 
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and early 1980s. Regulators in these countries recognized the success of Islamic banking and 
encouraged the issuance of licenses for new entrants to this sector. Therefore, Islamic banking 
established itself not only as a feasible and viable alternative for financial intermediation, but 
also as an efficient and productive way of undertaking financial intermediation between surplus 
and deficit economic establishments (Archer & Karim, 2002).  
Bahrain has established itself as a global leader in Islamic finance by hosting the largest 
concentration of Islamic financial institutions in the Middle East. The Central Bank of Bahrain 
has also established a prudential regulatory framework that is tailor made for the specific needs 
of Islamic banking and insurance companies (takaful
5
). The regulatory framework covers areas 
such as licensing requirements, capital adequacy, risk management, business conduct, and 
disclosure/reporting requirements. In addition to hosting many Islamic financial institutions, 
Bahrain is a hub for a number of organizations that play a central role in the development of 
Islamic finance, including: (a) the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (“AAOIFI”); (b) Liquidity Management Center (“LMC”); (c) The International 
Islamic Financial Market (“IIFM”); and (d) Islamic International Rating Agency (“IIRA (CBB 
Report, 2010). 
In addition, the CBB established the Waqf Fund to finance research, education, and 
training in Islamic finance. This study, which focuses on the corporate culture and performance 
of selected Islamic and conventional banks in the Kingdom of Bahrain, is in line with CBB’s 
support of academic research aimed at developing and enhancing Islamic banking best practices 
but is privately supported and funded. 
1.5 Overview of the Study 
Chapter 1 highlights the importance of corporate culture for organizational 
effectiveness. It also sheds light on the challenges facing the Islamic banking industry and the 
need to address these from the standpoint of creating a prudent corporate culture. This entails 
the establishment of a sound organizational infrastructure that attracts professional human 
capital and fosters a culture of innovativeness.  
                                                          
5
 A Shari’ah-compliant system of insurance in which the participants donate part or all their contributions, which 
are used to pay claims for damages suffered by some of the participants, Archer and Karim (2002), p. 215.  
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Given the relatively short history of Islamic banking in comparison to the conventional 
industry, it would be unfair to compare Islamic banking competitiveness to that of conventional 
banks. Nevertheless, Islamic banks must place more emphasis on building sustainable business 
strategies that focus on long-term growth and innovativeness if they seek to remain competitive 
in the future. 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the progression of corporate culture as a management 
discipline, starting with anthropology and ending with modern management literature. The 
chapter also summarizes the literature of organizational culture, including dimensions of 
national and corporate culture and organizational typologies. Finally, the chapter concludes with 
recommendations on how to fill the gaps in culture-performance research literature. In 
particular, the chapter highlights the relevance of a mixed-methods approach when studying an 
organization’s culture.    
Chapter 3 sheds light on the essence of Islamic banking and its roots in Shari’ah law. 
The Islamic banking industry has carved out its position in the international banking 
environment through legitimation of its Shari’ah-compliant products and with the support and 
advice of regulators and Islamic financial bodies such as AAOIFI and IFSB. The identity of 
Islamic banking is primarily based on ideology, which highlights the strong convictions of its 
employees and customers alike. 
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the methodology design relating to this study through 
two interconnected research phases. Primary and secondary data were examined methodically 
and rigorously to ensure satisfactory reliability and validity results. The corporate values that 
emerged in phase one will be further discussed in detail in Chapter 5 (mixed methods). The 
chapter concludes with a number of relevant ethical issues pertaining to this study. 
Chapter 5 used mixed methods to: (a) categorize and code the qualitative data, (b) 
examine the best-performing financial institutions, and (c) identify the most important 
organizational values for the two best-performing banks. The five organizational values 
identified are Clarity of Vision and Strategy, Corporate Governance, Customer Orientation, 
Innovativeness and Meritocracy. I used the OCP or Q-sort to complement the findings of the 
previously examined qualitative study.  
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Chapter 6 provides relevant background on the descriptive statistical findings, which 
reveals a pattern of consistent correlations among each section of the five corporate values. This 
implies that these cultural values are clear, well understood, and strategically important for the 
success of the two institutions (Generalist 1 and 2). The regression analyses imply a positive 
relationship between the two generalists’ NOI and Innovativeness. Although there is also a 
positive relationship between Corporate Governance and NOI, it is less significant than the 
aforementioned because of lower R
2
. Conversely, Innovativeness is found to be negatively 
related to ROAE; there is also a negative relationship between Corporate Governance and 
Customer Orientation with ROAE.     
1.6 Study Contributions  
This study makes a number of theoretical contributions to our understanding of positive 
corporate culture, as well as practical contributions to knowledge about the effect of culture on a 
financial institution’s performance, as follows:  
1) The study examines the importance of the five evolved cultural values to both 
conventional and Islamic financial institutions, as well as whether they differ by type of 
financial institution and how these results compare with similar studies in other 
countries. Two notable similarities of cultural values exist between the cultural values 
identified in this study and the finding of other studies: (a) Gordon and DiTomoso 
(1992) identified Clarity of Strategy/Shared Goals, Innovation/Risk-taking, and Fairness 
of Rewards, in their study of 11 US insurance companies; (b) Deshpande et al. (1993) 
identified Innovativeness and Customer Orientation in their study of 50 Japanese 
vendors. 
 
2) Results from the study imply a positive relationship between Innovativeness and 
financial performance as measured by Net Operating Income (NOI) for Generalist 1 and 
2, which is consistent with the findings of others in the field (e.g., Deshpande et al., 
1993; Lee & Yu, 2004). Results also imply a positive relationship between Corporate 
Governance and NOI, and, conversely, there is a negative relationship between Return 
on Average Equity (“ROAE”) and Innovativeness, Corporate Governance, and 
Customer Orientation.  
23 
 
3) I extended the OCP (O’Reilly et al., 1991) by adding Clarity of Vision and Strategy, 
Corporate Governance, and Customer Orientation as cultural profiles to the original 54 
cultural profiles; this demonstrates that the OCP is applicable to contexts other than 
those originally studied in the US. 
4) I used the integrated framework of institutional ecology to analyse data and test the 
notion that corporate culture is a vital part of a financial organization’s effectiveness. 
This demonstrates the validity of this approach, as well as the theories that are 
associated with institutional ecology. 
5) Study findings show that the best-performing banks, as measured by net operating 
income and return on average equity over a period of 10 years, were two conventional 
banks. This implies that Islamic banks’ sustainability of profitability in general was 
lower than that of conventional banks during this period. 
6) Study results imply that the majority of Islamic banks that participated in this research 
need to improve their organizational infrastructure, especially in the area of risk 
management and product innovation. 
7) The study implies the non-sustainability of the hybrid model in Islamic banks; some of 
the financial institutions that advocated this type of model have experienced more 
financial turbulence than other segments of the population (e.g., retail). 
8) Preservation of the original corporate culture appears to be important for the 
sustainability of business in general. Study results show that financial institutions that 
preserved their original corporate culture performed better than those that did not, either 
as a result of a change in CEO, or business strategy. 
9) The study of corporate culture in financial institutions in general and Islamic banking in 
particular has been limited in the management/economic literature. This is the first study 
in Bahrain to address this important topic.  
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CHAPTER TWO:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Executive Summary 
This chapter provides an overview and discussion of the various areas of the literature of 
culture and organizations that inform this study. The chapter begins with a general discussion of 
the definition of culture, followed by an overview of organizational culture literature including 
dimensions of national and corporate culture. Finally, the chapter points out the gaps in culture-
performance literature and describes how the findings of this study could fill these gaps.  
2.1 Background 
The term “culture” incorporates many meanings and interpretations, including many 
aspects of life that can be understood tacitly rather than by expressing through words. 
According to Kotter & Heskett, 1992, culture is defined in a broad way:  
“Arts; belief; institutions; and all other products of human work and thought characteristics of a 
community or population (p.4)”.  
The concept of organizational culture had its roots in anthropology (Sir Edward Tylor, 
1871) and Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952), who acknowledged the word "culture" is associated 
with three basic meanings: (a) a high-quality taste for the fine arts and humanities; (b) a 
comprehensive view of human knowledge, beliefs, and behaviour that relies on symbolic 
reflection and social learning; and (c) a set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that 
characterize an institution, organization, or even group. The second and third definitions are 
relevant to organizational studies. 
Modern anthropologist Clifford Geertz provided many definitions of culture and one of 
his notable ones is provided in his book The Interpretation of Cultures (1973) where he states:  
“Culture denotes a historically transmitted pattern of meanings in symbolic 
forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their 
knowledge about and attitudes toward life (p.89)”. 
Clifford Geertz’s interpretations of culture in the 1970s were recognized and transferred 
into the context of organizational science, and consequently to “corporate culture” studies by 
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well-known scholars (Allaire & Firsirotu,1984; Deal & Kennedy 1982; Pettigrew, 1979; 
Schein, 1985; Smircich, 1983). 
According to Schein (2009), there is no consensus on the definition of corporate culture 
because of the plethora of culture definitions in use by many researchers from a number of 
theoretical and research traditions. The majority of scholars, however, are inclined to agree on 
the following characteristics of the corporate culture profile: 
“A pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved 
its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well 
enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the 
correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems (Schein, 
2009, p. 27).”  
Corporate culture as a major topic in management studies proliferated in the 1980s and 
1990s. Early scholars who postulated the absolute claims on culture-performance relationship 
(Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Peters & Waterman, 1982) came under scrutiny by many scholars 
(such as Sackmann, 2011; Saffold, 1988). These scholars demanded more clarity and rigour in 
terms of robust research design and statistical analysis. Much of the early debate on culture and 
effectiveness centred around the arguments made by several scholars who favour the 
phenomenological approach, stressing the qualitative interpretation when examining and 
studying culture (Trice & Beyer, 1993). On the contrary, several scholars saw the need to 
integrate both the phenomenological and functionalist perspectives (Denison, 1990; Denison & 
Mishra, 1995; Hofstede et al., 1990) and presented empirical studies on culture that combined 
both qualitative and quantitative studies. 
According to Alvesson (2011), despite the popularity of corporate culture as a major 
theme in management studies in the early 2000s, closely related subjects started to emerge and 
compete such as organizational discourse (e.g. study of language, metaphors, and stories) and 
organizational identity (e.g. “who we are” and “what we do”). 
Modern scholars like Giorgi et al. (2015) argued that corporate culture has become a 
more diversified theme and identified five integrative frameworks to view and examine culture: 
a) categories (social classifications that provide audiences with a mechanism to judge the value 
and legitimacy of objects, people and practices, e.g. “organizational ecology”); b) frames (filter 
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events to those that influence meaning and actions); c) stories (verbal or written narratives 
linked to sequence of events); d) toolkits (sets of frames or practices that actors draw upon to 
make meaning or take action); and e) values (what we prefer and hold dear). 
Sackmann (2011), who has investigated 55 empirical studies since 2000, claimed that 
there are five general observations concerning the study of culture-performance studies: (a) the 
examination of this relationship became more specialized; (b) the research methodology designs 
became more sophisticated; (c) the interest in this field of study became more internationalized; 
(d) few research studies have emerged based on new validated standardized questionnaires; and 
(e) the measurement of this relationship remains diverse and debatable. 
It is evident that the study of corporate culture has become a more diversified and 
fragmented subject within itself and most likely this phenomenon will continue in the 
foreseeable future. More recent studies on organizational culture have explored such topics as 
visual culture (e.g., Styhre, 2012); gender and organizational culture (e.g., Aaltio & Mills, 
2002); and conflicts between cultures in organizations (e.g., Martin, 2004).  
Despite the large number of theory-based and different approaches and frameworks to 
study and construct culture, all this knowledge has added richness and diversity to the subject. 
Undoubtedly, the study of corporate culture will remain a popular theme in the many years to 
come.   
The next paragraphs will review the relevant aspects of national culture, and the creation 
and assessment of corporate culture. 
2.2 Dimensions of National Culture 
Due to the relevance of Bahrain’s national culture to the topic of this thesis, national 
culture and organizational literature, as well as cross-cultural organizational literature, is 
deemed important.     
Two of the most important early studies in this field were conducted by Hofstede et al. 
(1990, 1993). According to their findings, based on a survey of more than 100,000 IBM middle 
managers in more than 50 countries, five main dimensions (indices) reflect how the concept of 
culture differs from one country to another. These are: power distance; uncertainty avoidance, 
27 
 
individualism vs. collectivism, masculinity vs. feminism, and long-term vs. short-term 
orientation. However, Hofstede et al.’s findings came under strong scrutiny by many 
researchers, including McSweeney (2002), who argues that conceptualizing national culture into 
five dimensional categories is problematic. He stresses that issues of national diversity, non-
cultural issues that are perceived as cultural, and, ultimately, the oversimplification of national 
culture as a whole were not dealt with appropriately in Hofstede et al.’s research. Their work 
was soon superseded by a number of scholars, like Branine (2011); Mead (1998); Trompenaars 
and Hampden-Turner (2004); and Trompenaars and Woolliams (2003).  
A group of researchers headed by House et al. (2002) extended Hofstede et al.’s (1990 
and 1993) findings on national culture by conducting global research on culture and leadership 
in what is known as the Global Leadership and Organizational Behaviour Effectiveness 
(GLOBE) study. The GLOBE researchers advanced the study on national culture, both in terms 
of scope and geographic reach. This research involved the study of more than 17,000 middle 
managers in more than 950 organizations that represented 62 different cultures around the 
world. The GLOBE study stresses how different cultures view leadership attributes. 
Researchers identified six global leadership attributes: charismatic/value-based, team-oriented, 
participative, humane-oriented, autonomous, and self-protective.   
The GLOBE researchers (House et al., 2002) divided the information collected from 62 
countries into 10 cultural clusters, each of which had its own preferences for leadership 
behaviours. This led to the conclusion that each cluster was influenced by its own culture. 
However, there were a number of shortcomings in this research. First, some respondents did not 
easily understand all of the leadership traits used in the study, which could produce inaccurate 
data on these topics. Second, the study does not provide a clear set of propositions under which 
a single theory describes how culture relates to leadership or how it affects the leadership 
process (Northhouse, 2007).    
It could be concluded from the above two studies (Hofstede et al., 1990 and 1993; 
House et al., 2002) that framing culture at the national level is complex, mainly because of each 
organization’s special identity and the characteristics of its society and country; it is difficult, 
therefore, to justify condensing national culture into only a few dimensions. This complexity 
has been acknowledged by a number of scholars in the cross-cultural organizational and 
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management literature that focuses on national cultures, such as Li and Harrison (2008); and 
Ringov and Zollo (2007). 
Culture can manifest itself in three layers, as shown in the pyramid diagram (Figure 2.1) 
below. The lowest level of the pyramid represents the universal meaning of culture, which 
consists of but is not limited to, behaviours, arts, beliefs, and all other products of human work 
and thought as defined by anthropologists Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) and Geertz (1973). 
The middle layer represents the national culture, which includes research conducted by the 
groups mentioned above (e.g., Hofstede et al.’s findings, the GLOBE study of House et al., 
2002 and others). The third layer represents corporate culture, which is at the pinnacle of the 
pyramid. The cultural dimensions include the observable artifacts, basic assumptions, and 
espoused values of an organization; within every institution there are also specific jobs or task 
requirements that need to be filled and performed in order to survive economically. Such 
function is referred to as “occupational culture” and examples of such culture are operator, 
engineering and executive, as defined by Schein (2009). 
       
Figure 2.1 - Layers of Culture 
2.3 Corporate Culture 
“Organizational culture” and “corporate culture” have always been used 
interchangeably, and are based on the same concept and meaning; conceptions of corporate 
culture are derived from the organizational culture literature (e.g., Kotter & Heskett, 1992). It is 
generally recognized that all corporations are organizations, but not all organizations are 
 
 
 Corporate Culture 
National Culture 
Culture 
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corporations. This is because some organizations are nonprofit institutions, government 
agencies, or loose networks.  
The addition of the word “corporate” was introduced to management literature in the late 
1970s and early 1980s by researchers who applied Geertz’s (1973) work in anthropology to 
organizational and corporate culture (e.g., Allaire & Firsirotu, 1984; Pettigrew, 1979). 
Initial interest was focused on national culture and its effect on multinational 
corporations through the work of Hofstede et al. (1990 and 1993), quickly followed by a 
number of scholars like Trompenaars (1994), whose work has superseded that of Hofstede and 
colleagues. The topic quickly became a hot subject in organizational culture through the study 
of best-performing American corporations. This prompted a wave of research that examined the 
relationship between corporate culture and its effects on financial performance in multinational 
companies (Denison & Mishra, 1995; Gordon 1991; Kotter & Heskett, 1992).  
For this study, the functionalist definition of Schein (2004) is adopted in which he views 
corporate culture consisting of three broad categories: observable artifacts, basic assumptions, 
and espoused values. Artifacts consist of an organization’s buildings, offices, awards, products, 
and published mission statement. Espoused values consist of personal values, goals, and 
standards which are championed by the founder of an organization. Basic assumptions include 
those elements of culture that are invisible (hidden, implicit or tacit). These are the founder’s 
beliefs and values that are taught to new members and, if validated by organizational success, 
become assumptions.  
2.3.1 Creation of Corporate Culture  
Schein (2004) argues that the effectiveness of corporate culture rests primarily with the 
ability of the founder or entrepreneurial originator of an organization to articulate his beliefs and 
values to new members of an organization. These espoused beliefs, once proven to work, 
become coded work procedures and policies and are ultimately institutionalized as a blueprint in 
the form of rules, regulations procedures, etc. Barney (1986) goes one step further by arguing 
that a firm with a strong culture can develop a competitive advantage if these factors are subtle, 
valuable, and difficult to imitate by their competitors, a factor demonstrated to be effective over 
a long time at HP before its merger with Compaq (Burgelman & McKinney, 2006). This has led 
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to increased interest in this subject by professional practitioners (e.g., The “HP Way” or the 
“Wal-Mart Way”, The Economist, 2014). The importance of corporate culture is also 
emphasised by Herb Kelleher, CEO and Chairman of Southwest Airlines, who stated, 
“Everything in our strategy our competitors could copy tomorrow, but they can’t copy the 
culture - and they know it” (Harvard Business Review, 2013, p.17). 
Leadership and corporate culture are interconnected. For corporate culture to be 
effective an organization should first develop strong leadership; with poor leadership, it is 
difficult to communicate the organization’s values and business strategy to employees. This 
weakens the corporate culture from the outset. In fact, corporate culture is a historical image 
that mirrors the founder’s beliefs and values (Selznick, 1957). 
2.3.2 Assessment of Corporate Culture  
Corporate culture can be examined through different lenses, and this study only 
considers two relevant different perspectives: functional and interpretive (Allaire & Firsirotu, 
1984; Giorgi et al., 2015). The functionalist approach views culture as a set of values that, if 
validated by organizational success, can assist in creating a positive and vibrant culture 
(Denison & Mishra, 1995; Schein, 2004; Sorenson, 2002). The interpretive school examines 
culture more from the perspective of shared stories, symbols and rituals that are created and 
shared by members of an organization, and can be evaluated and understood (Deal & Kennedy, 
1982). Some scholars argue that framing events or stories could be perceived as a myth and may 
conflict with organizational reality (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983; cited by Giorgi et al., 2015). 
There are ongoing debates regarding the best research method to examine and interpret 
corporate culture. The main point of disagreement is whether a qualitative approach alone is 
appropriate to measure corporate culture profiles in natural settings given the subtle nature of 
culture. Conversely, others argue that using a quantitative approach alone in measuring 
corporate culture’s climate is adequate. The perspective I adopt is that of Chatman and Jehn 
(1994); Denison and Mishra (1995); and Cameron and Quinn (2006), who take the view that the 
two approaches, in the form of mixed methods, allow them to complement each other in terms 
of rigour, depth, scope, and efficiency. The argument for this approach is that since the 
underlying values and assumptions of a corporation are naturally very difficult to measure 
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(tacit), these are ultimately translated into corporate practices and actions (Schwartz & Davis, 
1981) that are observable, and consequently, measurable.  
In the next paragraph, I will point out the gaps in culture-performance literature and 
describe how the findings of this study could fill these gaps. 
2.4 Culture-Performance Relationship 
Reichers and Schneider (1990), cited by Lee and Yu (2004), argue that although cultural 
researchers have committed a great deal of effort to the definition of culture, only limited 
attention has been paid to the study of the relationship between culture and performance. The 
authors acknowledge this deficiency as contributing to the difficulty of constructing and 
framing cultural profiles in the literature of management and organizational behaviour. 
The popularity of books such as In Search of Excellence (Peters & Waterman, 1982) and 
Corporate Cultures: The Rites and Rituals (Deal & Kennedy, 1982) provided a stimulus for 
many scholars and practitioners who were linking corporate culture and performance.  
However, these two books were criticized for a lack of methodological rigour. This is because 
of the weak performance by a number of the so-called strongly performing firms presented in 
both books; it was evident that the weakness in the relationship between culture and 
performance was mainly due to the lack of rigorous and valid empirical data to substantiate this 
relationship. Other sceptics demanded more clarity and rigour in terms of robust research design 
and statistical analysis (e.g., Sackmann, 2011; Saffold, 1988). 
I examined 15 articles from the culture-performance literature between 1982 and 2008 
(Appendix Exhibit A2.1). These research articles and books are among the most popular and 
most cited materials on culture-performance literature in modern times. The study identified 
important gaps in the literature as it relates to the construction of cultural profiles, as described 
below:  
1. Inconsistent definitions of corporate culture, resulting in different approaches in 
assessing and examining culture.  Quite often, the link between culture and performance 
is not well established due to rigorous theoretical and research methodology issues 
(Peters & Waterman, 1982). 
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2. Use of one-dimensional research methods such as a quantitative survey to identify and 
measure culture (Calori & Sarmin, 1991; Gatignon & Xuereb, 1997; Gordon & 
DiTomaso, 1992; Yilmaz & Ergun, 2008).  
3. Over-generalizing cultural traits from specific industries to others (“population”) (Chow 
& Liu, 2007; Denison, 1982; Denison & Mishra, 1995; Fey & Denison, 2003; 
Christensen & Gordon, 1999; Gatignon  & Xuereb, 1997; Lee & Yu, 2004; Ogbonna & 
Harris, 2000; Yilmaz & Ergun, 2008).  
4. Many lack longitudinal data or at least 10 years of data collection on organizations to 
establish more credibility on research findings (Deshpande et al., 1993; Denison & 
Mishra, 1995; Gatignon & Xuereb, 1997; Christensen & Gordon; 1999; Ogbonna & 
Harris, 2000; Sorensen, 2002; Fey & Denison, 2003; Lee & Yu, 2004; Chow & Liu, 
2007; Yilmaz & Ergun, 2008).  
5.  Some lack a cross-sectional study in organizations to gain a deeper understanding of the 
organizational culture constructs. This is because interviews were limited to executive 
management only (Denison & Mishra, 1995; Fey & Denison, 2003; Gatignon & Xuereb, 
1997). 
 
To overcome these gaps and weaknesses, I used the following methods in this study:  
1. I adopt a functionalist view of corporate culture and defined culture as shared values, 
beliefs and assumptions, following Schein (2004). These shared values are ultimately 
translated into behaviours and corporate practices in organizations (Schwartz & Davis, 
1981; Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983). Also, I used the Organizational Culture Profile (OCP) 
(O’Reilly et al., 1991) to capture an organization’s cultural values. Research on 
organizational behaviour examines the shared value and beliefs of an organization and 
operationalizes culture in terms of personal and organizational fit. This has yielded more 
credible, consistent, and reliable measures of corporate culture (Weinzimmer et al., 
2008). 
2. I used a mixed-methods approach, which has been established as credible for examining 
cultural profiles in organizations. The methods used complement each other in terms of 
rigour, depth, scope, and efficiency (Cameron & Quinn, 2006; Chatman & Jehn, 1994; 
Denison & Mishra, 1995).  
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3. For the majority of the study sample, I collected data covering a 10-year period to 
examine how each bank participating in the study performed financially. 
4. I used net operating income (NOI) and return on average equity (ROAE) to measure the 
financial performance of the selected institutions. These two benchmarks are particularly 
relevant to this research study. Also, well-established research in this area has used 
similar performance-measurement tools (Denison & Mishra, 1995; Kotter & Heskett, 
1992).  
5. I used reasonable cross-sectional study analyses of organizational employees, consisting 
of executive, senior and middle-managers that are based on interview and survey 
methods.  
 
In the next paragraph, I will provide relevant background on organizational typologies 
and change. 
2.5 Organizations and Change 
The notion of imprinting is defined by Hannan et al. (2003) as the external 
environmental forces that initially shape the features of an organization during its establishment 
or founding stage. These taken-for-granted characteristics subsequently resist any major 
environmental alterations. This aspect of an organization becomes like a blueprint that, once it 
has been imprinted, will be both risky and costly to change; this includes the organization’s 
culture (Stinchcombe, 1965). Change could also increase the organization’s mortality risk. 
Although Stinchcombe (1965) did not specifically use the word “imprinting,” it became 
synonymous with his research on this subject. Stinchcombe’s (1965) research on organizational 
mortality was expanded to include organizational inertia (which refers to an organization’s 
resistance to change) by Hannan and Freeman (1977, 1984), who argue that if an organization 
decides to undertake a change, four primary issues could affect the reorganization period and 
ultimately increase its mortality hazard. These are referred to as core features:  mission 
statement, form of authority, application of technology, and marketing strategy. 
Another relevant study was conducted by Hannan et al. (2007), who are organizational 
ecologists; they argue that a change in organizational architecture as a result of code alteration 
in feature value (e.g., policies and work procedures) can trigger a cascade of changes in other 
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connected units of the organization’s architecture. Four structural features can prolong the time 
required for an architectural change in an organization: how complex the organizational 
architecture is, how long it takes to implement the change, the opportunity cost of the change, 
and how deep and strong the embedded culture is in the organization.  
As noted above, corporate culture may prove difficult to alter, as Apple illustrated in 
1997 when Gilbert Amelio was appointed CEO. He started by introducing a new culture that 
was based on centralized decision making. Because Apple had always championed individual 
innovation and the freedom of its organizational members, the new culture was viewed as a 
departure from Apple’s historic foundations (Hannan et al., 2003). 
Researchers such as Hannan et al. (2003) also argue that a change in organizational 
culture can affect, for example, the code system, which ultimately triggers cascading changes in 
the overall organizational architecture. How fast an organization recovers from change depends 
on its intricacy (interconnection among different units) and viscosity (sluggishness of response 
among units).  This view is shared by Schein (2004), who argues that organizational practices 
are influenced by assumptions that are deeply rooted in the fabric of an organization and 
translated into actions and deeds. According to Redmon and Mason (2001), a change in 
organizational behaviour requires effective transmission by members of the organization to 
those whose behaviours must change.  
2.6 Organizational Typologies  
Organizational typologies are important for this study, because culture plays a pivotal 
role in terms of organizational identity and direction. Two main models are relevant to the 
discussion: those of Martin (2004); and Cameron and Quinn (2006).  They provide a range of 
types that correspond to the corporate cultural elements of both Islamic and conventional banks 
that I developed for this study.    
2.6.1 Martin’s Typology 
The justification for the selection of Martin’s (2004) typology is because it contains the 
integration perspective which I adopted for this study. The integration perspective established 
more credibility than other perspectives in academic literature because it assumes culture is 
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clear, consistent and shared broadly within the organization (Alvesson, 2011; Cameron & 
Quinn, 2006; Sorensen, 2002).  
Martin (2004) adopts a non-unitary approach to organizational culture and argues that 
organizations can be classified into three types as described below. 
The Integration Perspective  
This type assumes employees’ firm commitment to the organization, and shared values 
and beliefs. Culture is viewed as the social glue that holds the organization together. This 
interpretation is consistent with the views of Smircich (1983) and Schein (2004). Because there 
is consensus among employees about what type of culture exists within an organization, it is 
possible to identify the cultural profile or pattern (Cameron & Quinn, 2006). Many researchers 
view integration as a key element for enhancing organizational performance (Sorensen, 2002; 
Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983).  
The Differentiation Perspective  
This type assumes that culture is not well represented in all layers of the organization 
and that sub-culture units are visible. These units either co-exist in harmony or in conflict with 
the dominant culture.  Major decisions are made through consensus rather than unilaterally. 
Changes in this kind of setting are likely to be triggered by the surrounding environment. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that an advocate of this viewpoint emphasises environment as the 
determining aspect of organizational behaviour. Organizational culture is resisted by diverse 
management groups, who tend to constantly engage in redefining shared values and routine 
management practices. Multinational corporations with overseas branches could develop this 
type of organizational culture due to cross-cultural issues. 
The Fragmentation Perspective  
This type assumes that culture is unclear and difficult to identify. Employees are 
confused about the stability of the overall culture’s theme, and events are managed through 
specific decisions. Fragmentation studies view ambiguity as the overwhelming feature of this 
type of organizational culture; culture has no precise point of origin and is constantly changing.  
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2.6.2 Competing Values Framework  
The updated version of the Competing Values Model (CVM) developed by Cameron 
and Quinn (2006) is one of the most frequently used models in management research. The 
model, which was created in the early 1990s by a group of researchers (Cameron & Freeman, 
1991; Quinn, 1988; cited by Deshpande et al., 1993) has been widely adopted and has 
influenced research by relating values to organizational types. According to scholars in this 
area, most organizational typologies correspond to one of four main types: clan, adhocracy, 
hierarchy, and market. The CVM model is presented to illustrate how to assume a change in 
either the differentiation or fragmentation perspectives as postulated by Martin (2004). A brief 
description of the four types is provided below: 
1) Clan culture (supportive) emphasises building consensus, teamwork, and individual 
development that focuses on flexibility and internal integration. This type of 
organization is likely to be owned and managed by extended families.  
2) Adhocracy culture (also known as entrepreneurial or innovative) emphasises innovation 
and growth with a focus on flexibility and market positioning. Success is measured by 
new products, services, knowledge, and experimentation.   
3) Hierarchical culture (bureaucratic) emphasises internal procedures and a high level of 
formalization. It stresses long-term goals with a focus on stability and control.  
4) Market cultures emphasise specific goal achievement, competitive advantage, market 
share and penetration with a focus on stability and control. The underlying goal here is 
productivity and profitability.  
As a hypothetical case scenario, the CVM is presented below with the profile of a 
corporation that needs a culture change by focusing on a new strategy while solidifying the 
internal integration among the different units of the organization. Historically, the corporation 
has focused more on the hierarchy and market quadrants, as shown by the solid line in Figure 
2.2. This implies that the existing strategy is more focused on market penetration and internal 
control. Based on the new strategy, the new profile is plotted with the dotted line. It is obvious 
that the company wants to focus more on clan and adhocracy quadrants and less on hierarchy 
and market. This implies that the company wants to endow their managers with more authority 
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(decentralizing authority) and to focus more on product innovation and market positioning, but 
with particular attention to flexibility and internal integration. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Quinn and Cameron’s CVM Model 
(Source:  Cameron & Quinn, 2006) 
 
As demonstrated above, a researcher should realize the varieties and complexities of 
organizational typologies when conducting an in-depth assessment of corporate culture. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE FOUNDATIONS OF ISLAMIC BANKING 
 
Executive Summary 
This chapter commences with relevant background on the history of Islamic banking, 
current market size, and key features of the industry. The chapter also highlights the major steps 
in the industry legitimation process, as well as key differences between Islamic and 
conventional banking. The chapter concludes with the reasons why this industry has a special 
identity and authenticity. 
3.1 Background 
The history of Islamic finance dates to the 8
th
 century, when Islamic financiers (known 
as sarraf) founded it. They operated small boutiques that provided financial intermediation and 
an international payment system, and extended trade finance products such as promissory notes 
(Oliver Wyman, 2009).  
In 1975, following the First International Conference on Islamic Economics organized 
by King Abdul Aziz University in Saudi Arabia, the first Islamic institution in the Middle East 
region, the Dubai Islamic Bank was founded. It was followed by the establishment of the 
International Islamic Development Bank (IDB) in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Many private and 
semi-private commercial Islamic banks were subsequently established in Egypt, Sudan, Kuwait, 
and Bahrain (Archer & Karim, 2002). Islamic banking established itself not only as a viable 
method of financial intermediation, but also as an efficient and productive way to conduct 
financial intermediation between the surplus revenues generated by hydrocarbons especially 
between 2001 and 2007 and the deficit economic establishment, as represented by the financial 
sector in the Gulf region; refer to Appendix Exhibit A1.1 (Al Saie, 2011). Today there are more 
than 700 active Islamic financial institutions operating in more than 80 countries worldwide 
(Berg & Kim, 2013). The global Islamic financial market is growing by 10% to 15% annually 
(Ernst & Young, 2013), and reached nearly US$ 1.9 trillion in value for the first half of 2014 
(World Bank and Islamic Development Bank Report, 2015). Total global Shari’ah-compliant 
products and services include the following: Islamic banks (80%); Islamic sukuks (15%); 
Islamic mutual funds (4%); and 1% takaful or Islamic insurance (The Economist, 2014).  
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It will be helpful in discussing the essence of Islamic finance, to highlight some of the 
most important terms such as Shari’ah, Sunnah and Fiqh. For Muslims, Shari’ah is an ethical 
path of life that must be followed, as revealed by God, in order to succeed in this life and 
hereafter (Ginena & Hamid, 2015). Shari’ah law is defined as normative principles as given by 
the Qur’an and Sunnah which contains the teachings of the Prophet Muhammed (pbuh6), and 
embodies all aspects of the Islamic faith, including beliefs and practices (Chapra & Khan, 
2000). 
The word fiqh in Arabic means a deep understanding of something. Because fiqh has a 
broad meaning, Muslim scholars narrowed its definition over time to matters relating to creed, 
morals, and behaviours. Later, fiqh became more restrictive in meaning, as scholars excluded its 
association with creed (Ginena & Hamid, 2015). Islamic finance has evolved based on the 
prevalence of commercial transactions called Fiqh al-Mu’amalat, which are the Islamic rules 
for such transactions (Abedifar et al., 2015). 
Islamic finance takes a broader vision in terms of individual and societal development 
and prosperity through the Maqasid al-Shari’ah (goals of Shari’ah). According to Chapra 
(2008), Imam Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali, a well-known and highly respected reformer in the fifth 
century Haijah (eleventh century Gregorian), outlined the benefits of the maqasid in preserving 
five major pillars: (a) faith of people; (b) human self; (c) posterity; (d) intellect; and (e) wealth. 
Chapra (2008) argued that safeguarding these five principles accrues to the benefit and interest 
of human beings.  
Islamic banking has a unique identity. In essence, Islamic Shari’ah-compliant banking is 
defined as the use of financial products and services that conform to Islamic banking laws and 
Shari’ah practices (Cihak & Hesse, 2008). More specifically, these services must be free from 
the payment and receipt of interest income that is either fixed or predetermined. The prohibition 
of interest is based on a social justice argument which requires both lenders and borrowers to 
share the profit and loss emanating from a business transaction in an equitable manner (Iqbal & 
Mirakhor, 2013). In this context, the industry offers profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) arrangements, 
and the purchase and resale of goods and services (Vogel & Hayes, 1998). In PLS, the rate of 
                                                          
6
 Pbuh stands for “peace be upon him” and inserted after Prophet Muhammed as a sign of respect by Muslims. 
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return on financial assets should not be known or fixed prior to commencement of the 
transaction. However, in the case of a purchase-resale transaction, a mark-up can be determined 
by the prevailing rate in the international markets. One such reference rate is the London 
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR).  
Another characteristic of Islamic banking is the prohibition of trading in certain financial 
transactions (such as derivatives, because such instruments entail a form of gambling) and 
trading in or financing alcoholic beverages, pork, pornography, or any activities connected to 
gambling (Vogel & Hayes, 1998). 
Islamic banks, like many conventional institutions, are exposed to financial losses and 
failures, such as bankruptcies of Islamic money management companies in Egypt in 1988-89, 
the downfall of Ihlas Finance House in Turkey in 2001, the frauds which led to the huge losses 
at Dubai Islamic Bank in 2004-2007 (Ginena & Hamid, 2015) and the Arcapita bankruptcy 
(Chapter 11) in US courts in December 2011 due to the bank’s inability to meet its financial 
obligations (Financial Times, 2012). All of these are examples of financial losses resulting 
either from poor management practices or poor corporate governance implementation.  
In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, regulators worldwide put more emphasis 
on the implementation of good corporate governance, including the Islamic financial sector. 
Archer and Karim (2002) claim that financial risk management is more developed in 
conventional banks than in Islamic banks, and hence all Islamic banks need to improve in this 
area. It is obvious that corporate governance is important for enhancing efficiency, mitigating 
risk, increasing stability, and promoting economic development and wealth.   
Ginena and Hamid (2015) have highlighted five key components for successful and 
prudent governance: Shari’ah compliance, business model, stakeholders’ interests, social 
responsibility, and business ethics and culture. In fact, both Accounting and Auditing 
Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) and the Islamic Financial Services 
Board (IFSB), both domiciled in Bahrain, have emphasised the importance of successful 
implementation of Shari’ah corporate governance (http://aaoifi.com/?lang=en; http://www.ifsb. 
org/standard/IFSB).  
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Failing to address issues relating to corporate governance compliance could increase the 
financial risk for a financial institution. Ginena and Hamid (2015) define Shari’ah compliance 
risk as: 
“The risk of financial losses that an Islamic financial institution may experience 
as a result of non-compliance in activities with Shari’ah precepts, as ascertained 
by the Shari’ah supervisory board or the pertinent authority in the relevant 
jurisdiction”. (p. 97).  
 
Shari’ah risk is not the only risk an Islamic bank can be subject to in the business 
environment; other types of internal and external risks are also present: credit, financial, market, 
legal and compliance, and reputational (Ginena & Hamid, 2015). All of these have negative 
consequences for a bank’s stakeholders and, most significantly, shareholders. 
 
Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004) and Chapra and Ahmed (2002) take a much wider view on 
the definition of stakeholders’ model by including, for example, senior management and 
employees of an organization, depositors, internal, external and Shari’ah audit committee. 
These scholars argue that all stakeholders have the right to participate and engage in corporate 
decision- making because such decisions do affect them financially too. 
  
The key stakeholders of an Islamic bank (as identified by Chapra & Habib, 2002, and 
Ginena & Hamid, 2015) have designated corporate governance responsibilities as set out in 
Table 3.1 below: 
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Table 3.1 - Stakeholders and their Responsibilities 
Stakeholders Key Responsibilities 
1. Government and legislative bodies Promote strong and efficient economic, business and legal 
environments for Islamic and other financial institutions to 
grow and thrive. 
2.  Regulators and central banks Pass banking laws and regulations relevant to the Islamic 
banking sector including corporate governance practices, 
transparency requirements, alignment of stakeholders’ 
interests, and maintain effective supervision practices.    
3.  Islamic Financial Institution Body 
Specific - (AAOIFI and IFSB) 
Provide clear and objective accounting and audit procedures. 
Propose written codes for corporate governance 
implementation. 
4.  Board of Directors  Set business strategies and policies. Adopt solid governance 
standards that manage risk and promote transparency, 
aligning management incentives with stakeholders’ interest 
and closely monitor internal audit and Shari’ah compliance 
reporting. 
5.  Shari’ah Supervisory Board  Issue regular reports to shareholders and other parties. 
Review banks’ transactions and issue their Shari’ah 
compliance reports. Publish them together with relevant 
fatwas based on supportive evidence.   
6.  Shareholders Elect board members and ensure their compliance with the 
institution’s policies and regulations. 
7.  Senior Management and Employees Implement and execute the policies set by the board in a 
satisfactory and responsible manner. 
8.  External Auditors Examine the accuracy and quality of information and 
consequently issue their independent financial reports. Also, 
the auditors should be familiar with Islamic finance 
knowledge so as to report any violation in the financial 
accounts that are not compatible with Shari’ah.   
9.  Shari’ah Audit Committee Ensure compliance with the Shari’ah board verdicts. 
10. Depositors or Customers Monitor the performance of the bank and act responsibly. 
Source: Chapra & Habib, 2002 ; Ginena & Hamid, 2015. 
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Because of the uniqueness of Islamic banking, I provide a comprehensive list of Islamic 
banking products and services and their definitions in Appendix Exhibit A3.1. The main 
difference between Islamic and conventional banks and between interest and profit are 
illustrated in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 below: 
Table 3.2 - Comparing Islamic and Conventional Banks 
Islamic Bank (IB) Conventional Bank (CB) 
Source of funds: Mainly investors who share 
the risk and return with an IB. There is no 
guarantee on the return and it depends on the 
bank’s performance. 
Source of funds: Mainly depositors who 
transfer the risk to the bank. The bank 
guarantees the rate of return to the depositors 
in advance. 
Uses of funds: The IB deploys/invests the funds 
into normal business transactions through 
Mudaraba contracts (acting as agent). The IB 
shares the return and risk with the investors 
according to the contract.  
Uses of funds: The CB lends the money to 
borrowers who are required to return the 
money, together with the interest due, on a 
specified date.  
Source: Hassan & Dridi (2010), p. 8 
 
Table 3.3 - Comparing Interest and Profit 
Interest Profit 
Return on capital Return on project 
Interest is guaranteed Risk of loss is involved 
Fixed return Variable return 
Return on deposit Return on joint ventures 
Source: Asutay (2010), p. 40 
 
3.2 Organizational Identity of Islamic Banks  
Organizational identity, which is the sense of “who we are” and “what we do” as an 
organization (Albert & Whetten, 1985) has a profound impact on many organizational 
behaviours and, therefore, on how the organization functions and achieves its objectives. In a 
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broad sense, organizational identity plays a pivotal role in shaping organizations across the 
spectrum. It reflects the identity and image of an organization (Gioia & Thomas, 1996). Identity 
and culture are interrelated, and can affect each other at different levels of the organization 
(Giorgi et al., 2015). Hatch and Schultz (1997) claim that culture influences identity dynamics 
in organizations. Many researchers adopt a different perspective on this matter, and argue that 
identity affects culture in an organization through the role and influence of the leader (Schein, 
2004; Selznick, 1957). Selznick (1957) states:  
“The leader must specify and recast the general aims of his organization so as to 
adapt them, without serious corruption, to the requirements of institutional 
survival (p. 66)”.  
Albert and Whetten (1985) also view organizational identity from the perspective of its 
members and postulate three characteristics: (a) what members view as pivotal attributes of the 
organization, (b) what makes an organization distinctive and unique in the perception of the 
members of other organizations, and (c) employees’ convictions regarding the organization’s 
sustainability. These three characteristics imply that an organization with a strong identity, as 
perceived by its members, will be more likely to succeed in the long run than other 
organizations.  
Early research on organizational identity focused on the core features of organizational 
mission, forms of authority, core technology, and general marketing strategy (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1977, 1984). However, organizational ecologists have adopted a much wider 
perspective by considering an audience’s involvement in determining the identity of an 
organization. “Audience” is defined here as the stakeholders, customers, regulators, and other 
agencies that influence the organization’s identity and grade of membership (Hannan, 2005; 
Hannan et al., 2007).  
Matters relating to the establishment of legitimation, Shari’ah compliance, coding, and 
conformity with the financial sector’s features and requirements are all aspects of the industry’s 
overall identity, as described below.  
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3.2.1 Legitimation 
According to Hannan et al., (2007), the legitimation of an organization is “the 
conformity of feature value to type or category of an organization,” and increases with the 
consensus of the audience based on the organization’s grade of membership within the class or 
category to which it belongs (e.g., Sony Corporation has a grade of membership in the known 
consumer-electronics segment but also competes in a different grade of membership in the film 
production).  
Legitimation in the Islamic banking system has proceeded in two phases: First, as 
Islamic banking institutions started to grow, prosper, and establish track records, they became a 
substitute for conventional banks, and especially for a segment of the society (customers) who 
wanted to conduct their banking transactions in accordance with Islamic principles. Second, in 
recognition of this kind of banking system, the host regulators of Islamic banks developed a 
regulatory framework within which existing and new Islamic institutions can operate, grow and 
thrive. However, the UK regulatory authorities opted for a “no favour” policy in relation to the 
Islamic banking sector, and the same regulations are applied to all banks uniformly. Moreover, 
the Bank of England granted banking licenses for Islamic banks seeking to operate in the United 
Kingdom; the Islamic Bank of Britain and the European Islamic Investment Bank were 
established in 2004 and 2005, respectively (Huffington Post, 2014).  
3.2.2 Shari’ah Compliance 
From the standpoint of Shari’ah, both Islamic and non-Islamic banks that offer Islamic 
banking services through their windows are required to issue a certificate from their Shari’ah 
boards (which are composed of religious scholars) confirming that all transactions the bank 
enters into will comply with Shari’ah guidelines and practices (Cihak & Hesse, 2008). This 
provides a bank with the necessary legitimacy to continue operating as an Islamic institution. 
Islamic finance is based on the principles established by Shari’ah and by other jurisprudence or 
rulings, known as fatwa, which are issued by qualified Muslim scholars (Hayat & Malik, 2014).  
As such, the first step for any institution that wishes to offer Islamic banking products 
and services is either to appoint a Shari’ah board, or at least a Shari’ah counselor within the 
institution. This is essential in order to provide legitimacy and credibility for the organization 
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and to minimize Shari’ah risk, which could emanate from incompatible interpretations of 
Islamic jurisprudence (Sole, 2007). However, Islamic banks may encounter limitations with 
regard to the enforceability of Shari’ah rulings, because Shari’ah governance practices have not 
been standardized; also, in countries with secular jurisdiction, such as the US and UK, laws can 
vary.  
Many Islamic banks clearly differentiate themselves in terms of Shari’ah compliance to 
attract customers. For example, statements issued by Islamic banks to define their vision, 
mission and values emphasise that the institution pledges to adhere to Shari’ah principles. For 
instance, Qatar Islamic Bank describes itself as follows on its website 
(https://www.qib.com.qa/en/about-us/mission-vision-values.aspx).  
“A leading innovative and global Islamic bank adhering to the highest Shari’ah 
and ethical principles; meeting international banking standards; partnering the 
development of the global economy; and participating in the advancement of the 
society”. 
Clearly, Islamic banking has distinctive characteristics and features. According to El-
Gamal (2007), Islamic finance is first and foremost about religious identity (Financial Times, 
2007), and the identity of an Islamic bank is derived primarily from the legitimacy of its 
Shari’ah board (Ginena & Hamid, 2015). Moreover, a study by Kocak et al. (2015) of 21 
Turkish banks, including four Islamic banks, found that Islamic banks’ relationships with their 
employees are based more on the identity of Islamic ideology than other considerations; this 
implies employees’ strong ideological convictions toward their own organizations. 
3.2.3 Code  
There are many important codes for Islamic banking such as prohibition of interest or 
usury payments as well as trading in unethical items or industries that include but not limited to 
tobacco, alcohol, and pornography. All these codes should be viewed in the context of Maqasid 
al-Shari’ah five primary pillars as mentioned earlier (e.g. preservation of faith, human life, 
posterity, intellect and wealth). Chapra (2008) argues that these five elements represent one of 
the primary objectives of Shari’ah that reflect positively on the well-being of the individual and 
society.  
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3.2.4 Conformity  
Islamic financial institutions are required to meet customer expectations in terms of 
services, product lines, and distributions, and to compete with conventional banks in terms of 
services and pricing. Ahmed (1988) argues that the Islamic financial industry must create new 
products while satisfying the needs of various segments of the market. Of course, the nature of 
the industry dictates that the new entrant should first ensure that its products conform to 
industry and incumbents’ standards; otherwise it will be unable to penetrate and compete in the 
market effectively. 
3.2.5 The Form of Financial Institutions 
The creation of an organization, in this case a financial organization, starts with 
regulators’ (agents’) actions in assigning labels to appropriate clusters. The agent then attaches a 
label to convey the type and feature value of membership in the category (e.g., whether a retail 
or investment bank; Hannan et al., 2007). 
In its earliest forms, Islamic financial institutions were solely concentrated in the commercial 
banking sector. Retail banking licenses were first issued in the late 1970s; subsequently, 
licenses were issued for other forms, such as investments and takaful institutions. Islamic 
banking products through Islamic windows started to grow among conventional banks (Sole, 
2007). More diverse products and services evolved later, mainly to cater to different segments 
of the society and customers’ needs. Islamic banks’ identity categories usually correspond to 
organizational forms (Kocak et al., 2015). In this context, and according to Ginena & Hamid 
(2015), typical Islamic banking customers can be divided into four market categories: (a) 
religiously driven customers, who appear to remain loyal to an Islamic bank irrespective of its 
uncompetitive financial returns to investors; (b) ethically motivated customers, who tend to 
agree with general Islamic banking practices, but do not have religious motives; (c) 
economically focused customers, who are mainly concerned with the bank’s performance and 
financial returns;  and (d) both religiously and economically motivated customers. Although the 
last type is driven by religious values, he or she is likely to change between Islamic banks based 
on financial returns benchmarks.        
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  According to Archer and Karim (2002), regulators classify the Islamic financial industry 
according to the following general categories: 
a. Fully fledged Islamic commercial banks 
b. Islamic investment banks and companies 
c. Islamic windows (offered through conventional bank outlets) 
d. Islamic mortgage companies 
e. Takaful companies (Islamic insurance institutions) 
 
The next paragraph will examine the definition of authenticity in management literature as well 
as the Islamic finance definition of authenticity. 
 3.3 Authenticity 
Authenticity in management literature means heritage (Peterson, 1997), real and 
transcendent conception of value (Caroll, 2014; Podolny & Hill-Popper, 2004). Authenticity is 
an important organizational feature, because an organization incorporates its unique 
authenticity, identity and cultural blueprints that govern codes, work procedures, and employee 
relationships (Hannan et al., 2006). This, in essence, promotes reliability and accountability in 
organizations and enhances their survival rate (Hannan & Freeman, 1984).  
Baron (2004) defines authenticity as follows: 
“Authenticity refers to the power of the organization’s commitment to clientele 
and mode of relating to its constituencies, not simply to the stability of its 
product offerings, clientele, and mode of operating. The most authentic identities 
- or credible commitments are ones that invoke a non-economic logic of action, 
inasmuch as they require that actors do certain things that cut against their 
narrow self-interest and not do certain things that might further their own 
interest” (p.12).     
 
Podolny and Hill-Popper (2004) argue that organizations that try to gain an opportunity 
through “authentic identity” usually focus on a superior conception of the value of their 
products or services; some consumers prefer to buy products that are manufactured based on 
tradition and authenticity, as opposed to mass production. 
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Chapra (2008) also defines the word “authenticity” as “genuine” or conformity between 
“word and deed” which is similar to the conventional management literature definition. 
However, the scholar has a different interpretation of authenticity in the context of Islamic 
finance. He argues that authenticity means the full implementation of not only the rules or 
verdicts of Shari’ah rules but also its true spirit to fully realize and cherish the objective of 
Maqasid al-Shari’ah. He argues that the present Islamic banking system needs to make 
significant progress in many deficient areas in order to gain more credibility in the banking 
industry as well as with their mass customers. Chapra (2008) stated: 
“The way the Islamic financial system has progressed so far is only partly, but 
not fully, in harmony with the Islamic vision. It has not been able to come out of 
the straitjacket of conventional finance” (p. 11). 
  
Chapra (2008) identified at least 10 important areas where Islamic banks need to 
improve in order to fully realize the authenticity of Islamic finance. A number of these areas 
have been mentioned in Table 3.1- Stakeholders and their Responsibilities (e.g. establishment 
of Shari’ah audit, the need for the external auditors to be familiar with the Islamic finance 
products and Shari’ah rulings, the establishment of a legal framework by the central bank for 
Islamic banks to operate and prosper based on Shari’ah principles, and the need to hire a 
competent management team to manage and operate Islamic institutions more effectively). I 
will only shed light on the remaining dimensions as identified by Chapra (2008) as set out in 
Table 3.4 below: 
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Table 3.4 – New Body Dimensions  
Body Roles 
Centralized Shari’ah Board Acts like the Supreme Court; provides verdicts on Shari’ah 
conformity and assists in standardizing the offered products by 
Islamic banks.  
Credit Rating Agencies Although such institutions exist in the industrial countries for 
conventional banks, there is a need to establish similar set-ups 
exclusively to rate banks in the Islamic banking sector. 
Depositors’ Association There is a need to establish a mechanism to protect depositors’ own 
interest in a PLS system. This could be achieved through electing a 
representative on behalf of depositors on the bank’s board of 
directors and a voice in the shareholders’ meetings.  
Islamic Financial Market There is a need to establish a secondary market for Islamic financial 
instruments in order for Islamic banks to manage their liquidity 
more effectively. The establishment of the Liquidity Management 
Centre (LMC) in Bahrain is a right step in this direction and more 
similar institutions are needed. 
Lender of Last Resort Islamic banks may need an urgent banking facility to overcome 
liquidity crisis due to unforeseen circumstances. Such a facility is 
available on conventional terms by central banks. There is a need to 
offer a similar Islamically structured facility.  
Stock Market  Reforming the stock market by prohibiting short sales and 
derivative products is necessary to bring stability and minimize 
fluctuation caused by speculative forces.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
Executive Summary 
The methodology design of this study consists of two linked phases. In the first phase, I 
collected, examined, and categorized raw qualitative data using a deductive coding procedure. 
Subsequently, data were tested for reliability and validity purposes. In the second phase, I 
examined the two best-performing banks in terms of key financial ratios and identified and 
analysed their most important corporate values. The corporate values that emerged were used to 
create a questionnaire that was later tested for validity and reliability. Finally, the questionnaire 
was administered to obtain respondents’ feedback on these corporate values.    
4.1 Background  
The purpose of this study of the Islamic and conventional banking industries in Bahrain 
is threefold: (a) to examine the best-performing banks among a group of selected financial 
institutions in terms of key financial ratios based on net operating profit growth and return on 
equity over a period of 10 years; (b) to identify and analyse the most important organizational 
values for the best-performing banks; and (c) to examine the relationship between selected 
corporate values that relate positively with financial performance.  The nature and scope of this 
study conforms to Saffold’s (1988) recommendation to perform contrasting comparison 
between two populations when assessing the culture-performance relationship. The population 
in this study is divided into generalist, specialist, and hybrid institutions. All of these are 
examined in the context of the Islamic and conventional banking industries.  
This study has two phases. The first phase is a mixed-methods study that primarily 
focuses on developing and constructing cultural profiles. The study also collected data that 
covers a period of 10 years for majority institutions to examine how each bank had performed 
financially. The second phase, which is quantitative in nature, examined the effects of five 
evolved cultural values, which will be discussed thoroughly in Chapter 5, on selected banks’ 
performance using descriptive statistical and regression analysis. The five cultural values are the 
independent variables for this study. For more information on the methodology and research 
design, refer to Appendix Exhibit A4.1.  
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Assessment of Corporate Culture 
There has been ongoing debate as to the best research method for examining and 
interpreting corporate culture. Disagreement mainly rests on whether a qualitative approach 
alone is appropriate to measure corporate culture profiles in a natural setting, given the nature of 
what culture consists of (e.g., beliefs, values, behaviours; Carroll & Harrison,1998).  Some 
argue that using a quantitative approach alone in measuring corporate culture is indeed 
adequate, because it only measures the respondents’ perceptions of their organization’s 
‘climate’ (Denison, 1996). I adopt the perspective of Chatman and Jehn (1994); Denison and 
Mishra (1995); and Cameron and Quinn (2006), who assert that the two approaches, in the form 
of a mixed-methods approach, complement each other in terms of rigour, depth, scope, and 
efficiency, although there are a few scholars, such as Symond and Gorard (2010), who do not 
favour the use of mixed methods.   
The argument for the suitability of the mixed methods approach rests with the fact that a 
corporation’s underlying values and assumptions are difficult to measure, since they are mostly 
tacit and are ultimately translated into corporate practices and actions (Schwartz & Davis, 
1981), which, in contrast, are observable and, consequently, measurable. Defenders of the 
mixed-methods approach argue that this type of research design is valid, as long as the mixed 
methods are applied methodically and rigorously (Bryman & Bell, 2007).  
Martin (2004) asserts that for corporate culture to be effective and sustainable, 
employees must be firmly committed to the organization based primarily on shared values and 
beliefs. This is what she refers to as the ‘integration’ perspective; she assumes culture to be the 
social ‘glue’ that forms organizations and is responsible for holding them together. This 
interpretation of culture is consistent with Schein’s (2004). In addition, in this study I assume 
that the corporate cultures of the best-performing banks will remain stable for a relatively long 
time (i.e., through the 10-year data collection period).  
4.2 Mixed Methods and Data Collection  
Data for phase one were gathered through both primary and secondary sources. 
Qualitative data were gathered through semi-structured guided interviews with open-ended 
questions. According to Martins and Terblanche (2003), a study based on Schein's (1985) model 
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of values, norms, and beliefs plays a positive role in influencing individuals and group 
behaviours in terms of creativity and innovation in organizations.  
Five questions were used to form the backbone of the qualitative research study. The 
research questions and wording were carefully selected and mainly derived from well-known 
research papers and textbooks (Brown, 1998; Bryman & Bell, 2007; Parker, 2012; Chatman & 
Jehn, 1994; Kotter & Heskett, 1992; Schwartz & Davis, 1981), all of which are relevant to this 
study. The research questions conform to the need to enquire about the interviewee’s 
organization and his or her attitudes, beliefs, and knowledge (Bryman & Bell, 2007). Appendix 
Exhibit A4.2 contains the list of questions.  
The first question was designed to identify the key challenging issues, as viewed by the 
respondent. The second question was designed to obtain the respondent’s perception of the 
reasons for the success of certain conventional and Islamic financial institutions. The third 
question was intended to investigate the main factors that enhance an organization’s ability to 
execute its business plans and/or strategies effectively. The fourth question sought to investigate 
the relationship between the business plan and/or strategy and the corporate culture. The fifth 
question aimed to identify each institution’s uniqueness in terms of narrative impressions about 
organizational values and traditions. 
4.2.1 Sample Selection 
Three relevant institutional population types (generalist, specialist, and hybrid) were 
chosen for this study to provide variation among the selected population as well as a means of 
labeling them. Brief descriptions of the three types are listed in Table 4.1 below: 
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Table 4.1 - Audience Definition 
Category Definitions 
Generalist A generalist is a financial entity with a commercial banking license that focuses 
on a wide niche of the market comprising both retail and wholesale segments. A 
typical conventional generalist offers a wide range of retail and corporate 
banking products and services, such as operating current accounts, term 
financing, and treasury products. An Islamic generalist also offers operating 
banking accounts but in addition extends Shari’ah-compliant products such as 
Murabaha (mark-up financing), Mudaraba (trustee finance contract), Ijara 
(lease finance structure) and Istisna (deferred financing structure for the 
industrial sector). Typical generalist customers include the mainstream 
individuals, corporations, and government agencies.  
Specialist A specialist is a financial entity with an investment banking license that focuses 
on a narrow niche of the market. Investment banking activities include real 
estate, private equity, and infrastructure and venture capital investments. A 
typical Islamic specialist offers investment products much like the conventional 
specialist but these products must be structured to comply with Shari’ah 
guidelines. Customers participate in these investments via Musharaka (unit trust 
or equity participation). Typical specialist customers include high net worth 
individuals, insurance (takaful) companies, and sovereign wealth funds.   
Hybrid In addition to their retail core business, a number of Islamic banks also engage in 
investment banking activities, such as trading, real estate development, and 
private equity investment. One of the early adopters of this model was the 
Kuwait Finance House. 
 
The aim of the qualitative study is to select an equal number of Islamic and conventional 
banks, circa 10-12 institutions from both the retail and investment banking sectors, with a view 
to conducting 3 interviews per each institution with their senior and executive managers. The 
selection and reliance on the top management team for this study is essential because they are 
directly responsible for executing their institutions’ business and strategic plans. The selection 
of the participating institutions is based on the following criteria: first, the sample to represent 
an equal number of Islamic and conventional institutions and similarly a mixture of retail, 
investment and hybrid institutions; second, the need to maintain a minimum of 3 years and 
ideally 10 years of audited financial accounts. The administration of the qualitative study is 
summarized in the following steps: 
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1. Before starting to conduct the interview phase, first I collected financial data on the 
targeted sample institutions to satisfy the financial criteria of the study.  
2. I approached 14 financial institution that conform to the above criteria and only 11 
financial institutions (six Islamic and five conventional, representing four retails, three 
hybrids and four investment banks) agreed to the interview process, and the 3 remaining 
institutions took longer to respond and eventually dropped out. 
3. The majority of the interviews were selected by me, and I scheduled each interview at 
least three weeks prior to the actual date, depending on the interviewee’s availability and 
all interviews were conducted on a first-come-first-served basis.  
4. Before each interview, I provided an introduction to the project and highlighted the 
general aim of the study. All the interviews were conducted at the interviewees’ offices. 
5. Five major questions guided the interview and follow-up questions were used to obtain 
further information on each of the five dimensions. 
6. All interviews were audio recorded and kept in safe custody. Each interview was 
transcribed within 7-10 days, mostly with the help of a qualified typist. All interviews 
were completed within 8 weeks from the start of the project.  
7.  Of the total of 27 interviews conducted, 11 were CEOs and 16 were senior managers. 
All interviews, which lasted for 30-45 minutes, were transcribed. 
4.2.2 Organizational Culture Profile  
The Organizational Culture Profile (OCP or Q-sort; O’Reilly et al., 1991) has been 
widely used in culture-performance studies (Chatman & Jehn, 1994; Lee & Yu, 2004), and 
especially in research that emphasises person-organization fit in the organizational behaviour 
(OB) literature. For the OCP, the respondents are handed 54 ‘value statements’ that capture 
organizational values and asked to sort them according to their relevance to the characteristics 
of the respondent’s organization. There are two advantages to using the OCP to examine 
organizational culture compared to other instruments. First, Q-sort provides an accurate and 
realistic reading for dimensions, since each item is categorized according to its significance for 
a specific organization. Second, the rating is based on each member’s perception of culture as 
opposed to a researcher imposing his/her crafted organizational typologies on interviewees; for 
example, from the value most characteristic of a firm’s culture to the value least characteristic. 
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The 54 cards are divided into nine categories that contain 2, 4, 6, 9, 12, 9, 6, 4, and 2 cards each. 
The respondent places each card into the category he or she considers most relevant. Based on 
the rating preferences generated, a profile of an organization’s culture is created and analysed. 
Another advantage of the OCP is the ability to cross-check and reinforce the findings of 
qualitative interviews as they relate to the organizational values that emerge. 
I modified the OCP by adding seven cultural values and amending two. Corporate 
Governance, Customer Orientation, Delegation, Follower, Open Door Policy, Passion, and 
Strict Dress Code were added, while OCP value 36 was amended by adding the word 
‘Meritocracy’, and similarily value 52 was amended by adding the word ‘Strategy’. For more 
information, refer to Appendix Exhibit A4.3; added and amended values are in bold type. The 
modifications I made to the OCP were a result of the feedback received from the interviewees, 
since they stated that the added/amended values were more reflective of their cultural values. 
Based on this, the now 61 cards were again divided into nine categories: 2, 5, 7, 10, 13, 10, 7, 5, 
and 2. This was done to maintain equal distribution.  
The OCP was administered immediately after conducting the interview described above. 
Interviewees were given the 61 OCP cards and asked to insert each under the category the 
respondent considered most relevant. The OCP was administered to 23 out of a total 27 
participants who had completed the semi-structured interview. Ten out of 11 organizations were 
represented by at least one participant; one institution did not participate in the OCP due to time 
constraints.   
Q-sort data were analysed using factor analysis, which is a statistical interpretation 
technique mostly used in psychological studies to simplify and organize otherwise complex data 
into understandable form. Essentially, it is used to reduce a dataset to new variables by 
establishing a linear relationship among variables that are highly correlated (Adams et al., 
2014). Kline (1994) stipulates that confirmatory factor analysis is said to exist if the number of 
factors and the loadings of measured variables on them conform to what is expected on the basis 
of pre- established theory.   
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4.2.3 Coding Strategy 
According to Zhang and Wildemuth (2009), coding categories and coding plans can be 
drawn from previous research and theories or from a coding plan that is developed either 
inductively or deductively. Additionally, a coding manual should be established to provide 
consistency of category names and definitions. 
A rigorous and reliable deductive coding manual was developed for the qualitative phase 
of the study and is presented in Appendix Exhibit A4.4. Coding categories were mainly drawn 
from previous studies. For example, Hax and Majluf (1991) provide a clear definition for 
Business Strategy: ‘A coordinated set of business action programmes intended to secure a long-
term sustainable business advantage’ (p. 405). This code was used to list all emerging sub-
categories that fell under this master category. However, in some cases I modified the coding 
strategy. For example, the International & Regional Accounting Reporting Bodies category is 
not based on the definition used in the literature, but instead reflects the sub-category that 
includes the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and guidelines for regional 
organizations, such as the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI).  
Fourteen coding categories were established to encompass all respondents’ feedback in 
the qualitative study (refer to Appendix Exhibit A4.4). 
4.3 Research Method – Data Analysis 
4.3.1 Reliability 
According to Krippendorff (2013), it is important to maintain reliability and consistency 
when conducting content analysis. He defines stability as ‘the extent to which coding procedure 
yields the same results on repeated trials.’ (p. 270). I created a Likert scale based on 
respondents’ feedback on the five interview questions, with scores ranging from 1 to 5 
(1=Strongly Disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=Indifferent; 4=Agree; 5=Strongly Agree). Scoring was 
based on the relevance of the reply and the soundness of the respondent’s argument when 
answering the question. In this data analysis, I converted the feedback of the respondents into 
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quantified data. It should be realized that due to using personal judgement to rate respondents’ 
feedback, an element of bias could be associated with this exercise.    
For example, when asked about the key challenging factor(s) facing his bank today, 
Respondent 23 attributed the challenge to corporate governance. He says: 
“BoD that do not represent the shareholding structure of the business, that are 
overweight, certain minority shareholders that have disproportionate influence 
on the board, extended longevity of directors, and absence of external pressure 
from other shareholders to force the board to look at developing the value of 
business”. 
Corporate governance was categorized in the coding manual. Because of the strong 
argument the respondent made for his response, it was rated as 5 (Strongly Agree).    
Based on the feedback of 26 respondents (one participant did not answer one of the five 
primary interview questions, and his feedback was omitted), reliability testing yielded a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 82%. This is well above the 70% threshold required to be considered 
satisfactory (Bryman & Bell, 2007). A complete assessment of this exercise is provided in 
Appendix Exhibit A4.5. 
4.3.2 Validity 
Creswell (2009) defines validity as ‘whether or not a measure is measuring what it is 
supposed to measure’ (p. 49). Based on the five research dimensions and the definition of the 
coding categories, I found a valid and constant relationship. Furthermore, two qualified 
reviewers assessed the validity. The first, a professional accountant who holds a PhD, agreed 
with 75% of the content; the second, who is also a professional accountant and consultant, 
agreed with nearly 90% of the content. The majority of both reviewers’ remarks were 
incorporated into the coding manual. 
4.3.3 Selection of Organizational Values  
Respondents’ feedback on the five-dimensional construct was reviewed to determine 
whether it should be included in my analysis. First, if the respondent was a CEO and the 
feedback concerned strategic issues, his feedback was given priority over other interviewees 
59 
 
from the same organization, because the CEO is directly responsible for strategic issues that 
relate to business prosperity and sustainability. Second, if at least two respondents from the 
same institution reached consensus on a specific issue, I included their feedback. In addition, 
even if feedback did not satisfy either criterion, it could be included based on the respondent’s 
assertiveness about his or her feedback.       
After completing the assessment of the five-dimensional constructs for each interviewee, 
five organizational profiles were selected from a list of the 54 OCP value statements, plus the 
seven that were added, based on feedback from the 27 interviewees (see Appendix Exhibit 
A4.3).  
4.3.4 Financial Performance Measurement  
I also collected data that covered a period of 10 years for the majority of institutions to 
examine how each of the 11 institutions performed financially. Initially, I selected three 
financial measurements and retained two:  
a) Net Operating Income (NOI) adopted;  
b) Return on Average Shareholders’ Equity (ROAE) adopted; 
c) Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) dropped.  
 
Performance Indicators 
I considered a number of measures for assessing an institution’s financial performance, 
and in particular, the financial benchmarks that are most critical to the banking industry: Net 
Operating Income (NOI), Return on Average Shareholders’ Equity (ROAE) and analysis of risk 
management. Rosenberg (1982, p. 350), defines NOI as ‘Net current operating income after 
minority interest and taxes but before securities (investments) gains and losses and preferred 
dividends for the closing financial period”.  
 Return on average equity (ROAE) is an adjusted version of the return on equity (ROE) 
measure of company profitability, in which the denominator, shareholders' equity, is changed to 
average shareholders' equity. Return on Equity measures an institution’s profitability by 
disclosing how much income a bank generates with the money shareholders have invested and 
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is calculated by dividing net income over the book value of total shareholders’ equity (Sharp & 
Alexander, 1990, p. 810; Rosenberg, 1982, p. 436).  
Data for the 11 different financial institutions that covers a 10-year period (2003-2012) 
were obtained from the participating financial institutions’ websites (audited annual reports) and 
Zawya Financial Services https://www.zawya.com/mena/en/companies/. Many culture-
performance studies have used similar financial performance benchmarks (Calori & Sarnin, 
1991; Christensen & Gordon, 1999; Denison & Mishra, 1995; Fey & Denison, 2003; Kotter & 
Heskett, 1992; Lee & Yu, 2004; Sorenson, 2002).  
The third measurement, CAR, was dropped due to the difficulty of establishing a 
criterion for this measurement. For example, although a high CAR may imply good financial 
performance, it could also imply inefficient asset utilization, and consequently result in poor 
profitability. Therefore, only NOI and ROAE were selected for the study. The two financial 
indicators are the dependent variables for this study.  
Financial Performance Rating 
In order to rank the participating financial organizations in terms of key financial 
performance indicators based on profitability and growth-rate ratios over a period of 10 years, 
three ratings were used, as shown in Table 4.2 below: 
Table 4.2 - Performance Ranking 
Rank Description 
Class A Strong and sustainable financial performance 
Class B Moderate but satisfactory financial performance 
Class C Lacklustre and mediocre financial performance 
 
4.4 Quantitative Study 
In the second quantitative phase, I examined the effects of five cultural values that 
emerged from phase one - Innovativeness, Meritocracy, Clarity of Vision and Strategy, 
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Corporate Governance, and Customer Orientation on selected banks’ performance using 
descriptive statistical and regression analysis. A total of 74 employees of two different 
(generalist) financial institutions participated in the primary survey. The process started with the 
formation of the questionnaire and later tested for validity and reliability through the pilot 
survey exercise. Finally, the questionnaire was administered to obtain respondents’ feedback on 
these corporate values. 
4.4.1 Formation of Questionnaire  
Questions were mainly derived from well-known studies and books in the literature. 
Amendments were made in terms of style and presentation. Table 4.3 provides a summary of 
the cultural values from the literature and their corresponding studies:  
Table 4.3 - Cultural Values & Relevant Studies   
Cultural Values Questions Literature Studies 
1. Innovativeness 1-7 Deshpande et al., 1993; 
Homburg & Pflesser, 2000; 
Denison et al., 2006   
2. Meritocracy 1-5 Cameron & Quinn, 2006 
3. Clarity of Vision & 
Strategy 
1-6 Hax & Majluf, 1991; Denison et 
al., 2006; Kotter & Heskett, 
1992 
4. Corporate Governance 1-6 Clarke, 2007 
5. Customer Orientation 1-7 Deshpande et al., 1993; 
Homburg & Pflesser, 2000  
 
All data relating to phase one were gathered through primary sources.  I used a 5-point 
Likert scale to examine respondents’ feedback on five cultural traits (1=Strongly Disagree, 
2=Disagree, 3=Indifferent, 4=Agree and 5=Strongly Agree). Scoring was based on assessment 
of the respondent’s perception of his/her own organization. The instrument initially contained 
31 questions that were divided into five sections to reflect the five organizational values. A 
reverse type of question was included in almost every section to minimize the risk of respondent 
bias and to increase the validity and reliability of the instrument (Bryman & Bell, 2007). 
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Instrument Validation 
The instrument was cross-checked for validation with two experts in academic/scientific 
research. The first is the Director of Scientific Research at the Higher Education Council, 
Bahrain, and the second is the Head of the Assessment & Development Centre at the Bahrain 
Institute for Banking & Finance (BIBF). They recommended a number of changes and the 
majority were incorporated, including omitting certain questions altogether. 
4.4.2 Pilot Survey 
A pilot survey was conducted to test the questionnaire’s scale for validity and reliability. 
Other objectives were: (a) to ensure that the questionnaire would be clear to all respondents and 
could be completed easily and b) to identify any negative feedback if certain questions appeared 
to be problematic for respondents (Adams et al., 2014). The pilot survey was administered 
through sending a soft copy of the questionnaire by e-mail simultaneously to three contact 
managers at three different financial institutions, representing one conventional and two Islamic 
financial institutions (two from the investment sector and one from the retail sector; none of 
these banks participated in the primary survey). I collected hard copies of the questionnaire 
from the three contact managers after one week from the start of the pilot survey. A total of 18 
respondents participated in the pilot survey, of which fifteen participants were Bahraini and the 
remaining three were non-Bahraini. Seven participants held positions at the executive level, 
seven at the senior level, and four from middle management. 
4.4.3 Instrument Reliability 
In addition, each section of the instrument was tested for reliability, as shown below in 
Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4 - Cronbach’s Alpha for Each Scale 
Scale Number of Items Cronbach’s Alpha 
Innovativeness 7  0.870 
Meritocracy 5 0.860 
Clarity of Vision & Strategy 6  0.732 
Corporate Governance 6  0.715 
Customer Orientation 7  0.836 
     Total  31   Average: 0.802 
 
Following the feedback of respondents on the pilot test, three questions were omitted 
from the final version of the survey questionnaire due to lower means and high standard 
deviations (‘SDs’), but, more importantly, to improve the overall reliability ratio of 0.802. 
Table 4.5 lists the questions that were deleted from the instrument.     
 
Table 4.5 – Instrument Amendments 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Item       Question Number 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
a) Section A - Innovativeness     4 
b) Section C - Clarity of Vision & Strategy    5* 
c) Section E - Customer Orientation    4 
____________________________________________________________________ 
* This was a reverse type of question. 
a) Section A – Innovativeness (question number 4)  Q: Your organization is not afraid to test new products/services for the 
sake of improving the overall customer service 
b) Section C - Clarity of Vision & Strategy (question number 5) Q: Short-term thinking often compromises our long-term 
vision 
c) Section E - Customer Orientation (question number 4) Q: Your organization conducts periodic market research with the 
aim of serving their customers more effectively 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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4.4.4. Administration of the Primary Survey 
The administration of the primary survey was conducted through the following steps: 
1. I contacted the two CEOs of Generalist 1 and 2 to explain that, based on the study 
analysis, their organizations were selected to participate in the primary survey because 
they were the best-performing banks in terms of the two key financial ratios, NOI and 
ROAE, from 2003 to 2012. Both welcomed the idea and nominated their secretaries as a 
focal point to assist in administering the survey operation. 
2. I stressed to both secretaries the need to complete the entire questionnaire including the 
profile of the respondent. Also, I emphasized the need to obtain a minimum sample 
number of 35, represented by their executive, senior and middle-management in order to 
have a reasonable cross-sectional of respondents’ categories. I also mentioned that 
completing the entire questionnaire would take a maximum time of 10 minutes. 
3. A soft copy was distributed to all targeted respondents in both institutions including a 
brief introduction regarding the study, and recommendations on how to complete the 
entire questionnaire. A deadline of one week was given to all respondents to complete 
the document. 
4. Within two weeks, the secretaries collected hard copies of the questionnaires and they 
were hand delivered to me.  
5. A total of 74 individuals participated in the primary survey representing two different 
financial institutions (Generalist 1 & 2). Forty-nine employees participated from 
Generalist 1 and 25 employees from Generalist 2; the latter stressed that only qualified 
managers were targeted to provide valuable feedback on the questionnaire. 
Once all questionnaires were received, I started conducting the descriptive statistical and 
regression analysis for this study. 
Reliability  
Cronbach’s alpha for all 71 respondents’ replies (three were disqualified due to non- 
completion of the entire questionnaire) was high at 0.939, as shown below in Table 4.6. 
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Table 4.6 – Cronbach’s Alpha for Each Scale 
Scale Number of Items Cronbach’s Alpha 
A. Innovativeness 6  0.872 
B. Meritocracy 5  0.814 
C. Clarity of Vision & Strategy 5  0.839 
D. Corporate Governance 6  0.700 
E. Customer Orientation 6  0.870 
     Total        28   Overall:  0.939 
Complete assessment of the reliability test is provided in Appendix Exhibit A4.6  
4.5 Ethical Issues  
Study ethical issues are summarized below: 
1. The anonymity and confidentiality of all participants and their respective financial 
institutions was preserved. Only fictitious names are used for the participants in this 
study. 
2. All audio recordings of the participating interviewees were kept in safe custody.   
3. I selected the majority of the interviewees, but a number of participants were chosen by 
their respective organization’s executive management. 
4. Since I have worked in the banking sector for nearly 25 years, a number of interviewees 
are either friends or ex-colleagues. To the best of my knowledge, I conducted the 
research project in a professional manner and in line with the codes and ethics of 
scholarly research.  
5. On three questionnaires, the respondent did not complete one part of the secondary 
profiling (e.g., ‘How many staff members reports?’). In those cases, I made an 
intelligent guess based on the respondent’s overall feedback. 
6. Because I used personal judgements to convert all respondents’ feedback in the 
qualitative study into quantified data based on the five main questions, there could be an 
element of bias associated with this exercise. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: MIXED METHODS 
 
Executive Summary 
Mixed methods were used in this study to: (a) collect and categorize the raw qualitative 
data using a coding procedure, (b) examine the two best-performing financial institutions 
among a group of selected financial institutions, (c) identify and analyse the most important 
organizational values for the two best-performing banks, and (d) use the OCP to complement 
the cultural values that emerged from the interviews. These values served as independent 
variables for the study; the financial ratios of net operating income and return on average equity 
were the dependent variables for this study. 
Popularity of Mixed Methods 
Mixed-methods research has been widely endorsed (Bryman 2009; Bryman & Bell, 
2007; Creswell, 2009; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Johnson et al., 2007). Two newly 
established journals, Mixed Methods Research and the International Journal of Multiple 
Research Approaches have published articles in a broad range of disciplines, and the use of 
mixed methods in the social sciences literature tripled between 1994 and 2003 (Bryman, 2009). 
5.1 Qualitative Study 
Of the 27 interviewees, 26 were male and one was female; 11 were CEOs and 16 were 
senior managers. All of the interviews, which lasted for 30-45 minutes, were transcribed. 
Appendix Exhibit A5.2 presents participant profiles. Phase one is depicted in Figure 5.1 below.  
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Figure 5.1 - Phase One Methodology Diagram 
 
Five questions formed the backbone of the qualitative research study. Questions were 
carefully selected and worded, and were mainly derived from well-known studies and textbooks 
relevant to this study (Brown, 1998; Bryman & Bell, 2007; Parker, 2012; Chatman & Jehn, 
1994; Kotter & Heskett, 1992; Schwartz & Davis, 1981). Research questions satisfied the 
requirement of enquiring about the respondent’s institution and his/her attitudes, beliefs, and 
knowledge (Bryman & Bell, 2007). The list of questions is attached in Appendix Exhibit A 4.2. 
The main purpose of the semi-structured interviews was to develop and construct cultural 
profiles by eliciting narrative stories.  
Five dimensions of the construct were used, as listed below in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1 – Five-Dimensional Construct 
Dimension Construct 
1. Challenge and Reality This dimension was selected to elicit interviewees’ perceptions of the 
key challenges facing his financial institutions in particular, and how 
each interviewee’s bank not only addressed the challenges relevant to 
their own banks in terms of priorities, but, more importantly, how they 
had been dealt with. Parker (2012) argues that leaders should first 
examine their business challenges and later deal with them 
appropriately. 
2. Thought and 
Rationale 
This dimension sought to obtain respondents’ opinions about why 
certain financial institutions, both conventional and Islamic, had been 
successful and to explore strategic factors related to business 
sustainability, such as market lucrativeness and barriers to entry, 
monopoly positions of incumbent players, and distinct competitive 
advantages. 
3. Vision, Reality, and 
Execution 
This dimension was selected to identify (a) the main factors that can 
assist an organization in executing its business and/or strategy 
effectively and (b) the issues related to clarity of vision, realistic 
ambitions, and resources. I also sought to obtain narrative feedback on 
how each interviewee’s organization crafted its business plan. 
4. Goals, Behaviour, 
Leadership, and 
Integration 
The purpose of this dimension was to explore, in terms of each 
interviewee’s perceptions of his or her organization, (a) the intensity of 
the relationship between its business plan/strategy and corporate culture 
and (b) how well the two were aligned (Schwartz & Davis, 1981). This 
entailed eliciting perceptions of the organization’s shared goals, the role 
of leadership in reinforcing the organization’s vision and culture, and 
communication within the organization.  
5. Organizational 
Values and 
Perception 
The goal here was to investigate each institution’s uniqueness in terms 
of the interviewee’s narratives about organizational values, attitudes, 
vocabulary, traditions, rites, and rituals (Brown, 1998). Also, the 
dimension examines whether the culture in each remained the same or 
has changed over time due to CEO turnover, mergers, or acquisitions.  
 
Follow-up questions were used to obtain additional information relevant to each 
dimension, using an open-ended format to elicit the narrative (interpretive story) from 
respondents’ feedback. 
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5.1.1 Measurement of Financial Performance  
The purpose of measuring financial performance was to identify the two best-
performing of 11 financial institutions. This was accomplished using net operating income 
growth, return on average equity, and analysis of risk management. Financial data were 
collected to examine how each of the 11 institutions performed financially. The two financial 
indicators, NOI and ROAE, served as the dependent variables for this study. 
Financial Performance Rating 
Each participating financial institution’s performance was ranked, as shown in Table 
5.2.  
Table 5.2 - Performance Ranking 
Rank Description 
Class A Strong and sustainable financial performance 
Class B Moderate but satisfactory financial performance 
Class C Lacklustre and mediocre financial performance 
 
Ten-year average financial ratios for NOI and ROAE were computed for the 11 financial 
institutions, as shown in Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3 - Summary of Financial Performance Indicators 2003-2012  
Audience ROAE %* Growth in NOI %* Category 
Generalist 1 16.1 10.4 A 
Generalist 2 12.4 20.8 A 
Generalist 3 0.4 6.1 C 
Islamic Generalist  11.9 20.5 B 
Specialist 1 -5.5 -94.6 C 
Specialist 2 6.9 39.6 B 
Islamic Specialist 1 11.8 -151.6 C 
Islamic Specialist 2 9 -11.5 C 
Hybrid 1 9 5.9 B 
Hybrid 2 14.7 26.6 B 
Hybrid 3 2.3 66.1 C 
*Average over 10-year period 
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As shown above in Table 5.3, the four best-performing financial institutions in terms of 
ROAE and NOI are:  
1. Generalist 1 (16.1% and 10.4%)  
2. Generalist 2 (12.4% and 20.8%)  
3. Islamic Generalist (11.9% and 20.5%)  
4. Hybrid 2 (14.7% and 26.6%) 
For more information on the statistical trend on the above institutions refer to Appendix Exhibit 
A 4.6.   
Both the Islamic Generalist and Hybrid 2 were ranked as Class B, rather than Class A, for 
the following reasons:  
1. The Islamic Generalist’s financial standing was downgraded by Standard & Poor’s from 
BBB- to BB+ (junk status) in August 2013. This was mainly due to the increased 
sovereign and economic risks in the Middle East and North Africa regions, where the 
institution operates (Reuters, 2013), and the implications for the bank’s risk 
management portfolio.  
2. The Hybrid 2 delivered strong financial results from 2003 to 2007, but subsequently 
(2008-2011) became lacklustre. In addition, the bank increased its capital base by nearly 
20% through the issuance of rights issue shares to its shareholders in 2012; in order to 
strengthen the bank’s capital base because of its heavy reliance on volatile investment 
income (Zawya and Reuters, 2012). 
 
For the same period, Generalist 1 and 2 delivered consistent financial results. Also, they 
were rated BBB by Fitch and BBB
+
 by Standard & Poor’s, respectively; both ratings qualify as 
investment grade. More financial analysis of 11 financial institutions is provided in Appendix 
Exhibit A5.1.  
Since the financial data are summaries from the financial institutions’ historical financial 
results, I assume that the corporate cultures of the two best-performing banks (e.g. Generalist 1 
and 2) will remain stable for a relatively long time (e.g. through the entire 10-year financial 
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period). This is important when conducting a multiple regression analysis between the five 
cultural traits and the financial data for the two banks.  
5.1.2 Method of Analysis  
Because the essence of the study was to examine the notion that financial institutions 
with strong corporate culture are likely to demonstrate more sustainable financial performance, I 
performed deductive content analysis on the primary data. Krippendorff (2013) states:  
“The rationale of deductive inference is to proceed from a general proposition 
that is considered true, to specific propositions that are logically implied and are 
therefore considered true as well. (p. 383)”. 
A coding procedure was used to organize the data, by which raw data were condensed 
into categories or themes based on valid inference and interpretation (Zhang & Wildemuth, 
2009). Interview transcripts were analysed line-by-line using the content analysis method to 
answer research questions, as depicted in Figure 5.2: 
 
Figure 5.2 - Content Analysis Diagram (adopted from Krippendorff, 2013, p. 83). 
Data were grouped into sub-categories by emergent themes and later classified under 
final headings. A rigorous and reliable deductive coding manual was created to ensure 
consistency of category names and definitions, as listed in Appendix Exhibit A4.4. 
I used deductive reasoning to examine and test the hypothesis of this study, and I also 
used deductive coding manual to analyse the qualitative data. For example, a number of coding 
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categories used in this study are derived from the Harvard IV Dictionary Categories such as 
Doctrine and Economic (Weber, 1990), management literature such as Generalist and Specialist 
(Caroll, 1985), and from the definition of organization functional terminology such as Business 
Strategy (Hax and Majluf, 1991) and Corporate Governance (Clark, 2007). These generated 
coding categories are not only relevant and applicable to the analyses of respondents from 
western type financial institutions, but also for global institutions, including those who 
participated in this study from Bahrain. Moreover, these coding categories were established to 
encompass all respondents’ feedback whether they are from conventional or Islamic institutions.      
One example of the coding category definition that is derived from the literature relates 
to Hax and Majluf (1991). The scholars define business strategy as ‘a coordinated set of 
business action programs intended to secure a long-term sustainable business advantage’ (p. 
405).  
Fourteen coding categories were established that reflected the emerging feedback of all 
respondents in the qualitative study, as illustrated in Appendix Exhibit A4.4. In addition, I 
analysed respondent feedback in terms of reliability and validity. A complete assessment was 
performed, as described in Sections 4.1.4 and 4.1.5 of Chapter 4.  
5.2 Discussion 
5.2.1 Dimension 1 - Key Challenging Factors 
Q1: What are the key challenging issues that conventional/Islamic banks face today? 
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Figure 5.3 - Challenging Factors 
Based on respondents’ feedback, as shown above in Figure 5.3, corporate governance 
and adverse economic conditions were identified as the top two key challenging factors facing 
interviewees’ banks today (26% each). The inability to access liquidity and an increase in 
regulatory influence followed, with 11% each.  
Class A 
Generalist 1  
The bank labeled Generalist 1 was represented by three participants. A profile of these 
individuals is provided in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4 - Generalist 1 Respondent Profile 
Respondent Number 6 7 8 
Position CEO GM - 
Operation 
GM – 
Banking 
Age Above 50 Above 50 Above 50 
Gender Male Male Male 
Number of years with bank 12 30 7 
26% 26% 
11% 11% 
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Respondent 6 stressed the need to preserve and safeguard the bank’s assets in light of 
the adverse economic conditions as a top priority. He stated: 
“The main challenges that are faced by all banks in Bahrain are basically to 
safeguard the quality of its assets on one hand, and on the other to continue 
business activity”. 
Generalist 2 
The bank labeled Generalist 2 was represented by two participants. A profile of the two 
individuals is provided in Table 5.5.  
Table 5.5 - Generalist 2 Respondent Profile  
Respondent Number 23 24 
Position CEO Deputy CEO 
Age Above 50 Above 50 
Gender Male Male 
Number of years with bank 12 10 
 
Respondent 23 of Generalist 2 identified the key challenge as one of corporate 
governance:  
“This challenge is reflected by the BoD that does not truly represent the 
shareholding structure of the business, minority influence of certain shareholders 
on the board, and extended longevity of directors”.  
These issues are considered to be impediments to future business growth. It will be 
interesting to see how Generalist 2 will deal with this issue, in light of the constant changes in 
the BoD’s composition as a result of the bank’s frequent acquisition strategy.  
Class B 
Respondent 14 of Islamic Generalist 1 considers that corporate governance is a key 
issue, especially for selective Islamic banks. These institutions were founded by pioneering 
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individuals who wanted to create institutions with proper corporate governance. (Complete 
profiles of participants are provided in Appendix Exhibit A5.2.) The same is supported by 
Respondent 27 of Conventional Specialist 2, who believes that disclosure of the Knowing Your 
Customer (KYC) document, especially in the Middle East region, is an important issue. The 
KYC, which the opening bank must complete, contains full information on a prospective 
customer who wishes to open a new bank account and is required by regulators.   
Respondent 17 of Hybrid 1 views adverse economic conditions as the main challenge; in 
essence, the difficulty of maintaining an acceptable credit risk in turbulent market conditions. 
Respondent 4 of Hybrid 2 regards the increase in regulatory influence as a key challenge due to 
capital adequacy ratio requirements (Basel III). In this context, the bank’s capital adequacy ratio 
(CAR) was tight at the end of 2012 (13%, with a 12% minimum). The bank has made a sizable 
provisioning in the past three years against its investment portfolio (mainly real estate). It is not 
surprising that the bank has asked its shareholders to increase the capital base through the 
issuance of rights issues (Zawya and Reuters, 2012). This raises the question of whether the 
hybrid model is a sustainable business model over time.   
Respondent 19 of Islamic Specialist 2 considers regaining investor confidence to be the 
main challenge. The bank started operations in late 2009, which is regarded as a difficult time 
for investment boutiques in light of the 2008 financial meltdown. Because many investors have 
suffered significant losses to their investment portfolios, regaining investors’ confidence is seen 
as a challenging issue, especially for banks that do not establish robust track records. 
Class C 
Respondent 10 of Conventional Generalist 3 stated that local market competition is the 
biggest challenge. Hybrid 3 considers corporate governance to be the biggest challenge, based 
on the feedback from Respondent 1 (a former CEO of the bank), who argued that most Islamic 
banks are not fully institutionalized and that implementation of this particular issue is rather 
‘weak’. This view is shared by many industrial practitioners. This problem could hamper the 
growth of newly established Islamic banks if it is not addressed effectively. 
The situation is different for the bank labeled Islamic Specialist I, which has suffered 
from a tight liquidity condition since late 2008. Consequently, the bank was unable to raise 
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enough liquidity to meet its financial obligations over time, and therefore could not satisfy its 
creditor banks’ demand that it reschedule its US$ 1.1BN Murabaha facility. Subsequently, the 
bank filed for bankruptcy (Chapter 11) in US courts in December 2011. This appears to 
demonstrate the inability of the bank’s management to quickly address the liquidity issue and 
adapt to emerging market conditions. 
Respondent 15 of Conventional Specialist 1 viewed the adverse economic conditions as 
the most challenging factor, given the sizable net losses the bank had suffered since 2008 due to 
write-downs of its investment portfolio. The bank has gone through a major restructuring in an 
effort to adapt to the new market conditions. The key question is whether the bank can refocus 
on its business lines and remain profitable after a major restructuring exercise, which could 
trigger code violations. This supports Hannan et al.’s (2003) argument that the longer the 
reorganization period, the higher the opportunity cost (opacity) for the organization. 
5.2.2 Dimension 2 - Sustaining Financial Performance 
Q2: What are the reasons for the sustained financial success of certain retail/investment and 
conventional/Islamic banks over the years? 
 
Figure 5.4 - Sustaining Financial Performance 
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As shown in Figure 5.4, the largest share of respondents (26%) attributed the success 
and sustainability of certain financial institutions to corporate governance, followed by the 
monopoly position (15%). Other less significant factors were the low cost of finance or ‘fund’ 
(11%) and government support and clarity of vision and/strategy at 7% each.  
In terms of the monopoly position, this was achieved by early movers in the Islamic 
banking sector, which have occupied some type of monopolistic position for a number of years. 
The banks that have benefited from this position are Al-Rajhi in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait Finance 
House in Kuwait, and Dubai Islamic Bank in the UAE. These banks are perceived as depending 
heavily on non-core revenue to increase their overall profitability. One could question, however, 
whether this strategy is sustainable in the long term, due to increased competition and a fast-
changing environment. 
Class A 
Respondent 6 of Generalist 1 believes that access to a low cost of finance (i.e., customer 
deposits) is a key factor. This rationale is based on the hefty margin that retail banks generate 
when they advance financing to customers. He stated: 
“I think the most important reason for the sustained financial success in the 
conventional banks is the cheaper source of funding, and that is the customer 
deposit”.  
Respondent 23 of Generalist 2 identified clarity of vision as a key factor; he argued that banks 
can use good times to develop sustainable lines of business:   
“If they have clarity, then banks use good times to develop two or three lines of 
business. And if they have selected well, then they would be strong enough to 
resist when the problem arises. Lack of clarity of vision prompted banks to try 
many products, and when one product fails, they try to do different things. There 
is a saying that you are the jack of all trades but the master of none”. 
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Class B 
The adoption of proper corporate governance was regarded as the most important factor 
by Respondent 12 of Islamic Generalist 1, who claimed that risk management is one of the key 
reasons banks prosper or fail today. This view was echoed by Respondent 19 of Islamic 
Specialist 2. From the perspective of Respondent 27 of Conventional Specialist 2, customer 
orientation is an important factor, and especially for those who operate in the private banking 
industry. The bank believes that sustaining profitability and long-term value for shareholders is 
centred on client focus. Respondent 4 of Hybrid 2 argues that the Islamic hybrid is the best 
banking model, because it prohibits them from entering into risky transactions (e.g., 
derivatives). It also provides the opportunity to invest in non-core business segments (e.g., real 
estate and others). 
Class C 
Respondent 9 of Generalist 3 believes that the reputation of the brand is an important 
factor, while Respondent 25 of Hybrid 3 views government support of certain financial 
institutions as a key factor. Respondent 20 of Islamic Specialist 1 considers aligning 
management’s incentives to a long-term plan is important for the success and sustainability of 
financial institutions.   
5.2.3 Dimension 3 - Successful Business Plan 
Q3: What are the main factors that can assist a bank to execute its business plan more 
effectively? 
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Figure 5.5 - Execution of Business Plan   
As shown in Figure 5.5, the majority of respondents (39%) named clarity of strategy as 
the most important factor in executing an effective business plan, followed by clarity of vision 
and having a realistic plan (19% each). Competent management was named by only 8%. 
In crafting business plans, a mixed approach in which management, directors, and staff 
members reach consensus and a top-down approach were each named by 36% of respondents, 
followed by a bottom-up approach at 28%. There is no clear advantage, therefore, for any of the 
approaches, as this depends on management style and market requirements. However, a 
majority of Generalist bank respondents favoured a bottom-up approach.  
Class A 
Respondents from the best-performing banks (Generalist 1 and 2) emphasised the 
importance of the key components of the business plan and strategy. For example, Respondent 6 
of Generalist 1 highlighted the clarity of the bank’s strategy, which is based on diversifying 
their income stream from the GCC markets and away from problematic international markets. 
Respondent 23 of Generalist 2 argued that the bank’s strength is not its size, but rather the 
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clarity of vision. He defines its strategy as growth by acquisition, and this is evident in the 
bank’s website.  
It could be argued that since both organizations have clearly identified their respective 
visions and strategies, this has assisted them in delivering strong and sustainable financial 
performance over the past 10 years.  
Class B 
Respondent 12 of Islamic Generalist 1 underlined the need to first understand your 
business model and the market you are serving. Respondent 26 of Hybrid 1 stressed the 
importance of also adopting a clear vision, strategy, and realistic goals; the bank’s vision is to 
increase its market share non-organically through acquisitions and mergers. Conventional 
Specialist 2 has been downsizing its investment banking division and focusing more on its 
private banking activities since the financial crisis of 2008. Respondent 27 of the bank 
emphasised the importance of vision in striving to be the bank known for its financial 
performance. This target could only be achieved through customer orientation.  
Class C 
Respondent 10 of Generalist 3 stated that the bank is in a transition period due to the 
bank’s shift in strategy, which is to focus more on local retail activities instead of wholesale 
regional business. Also, the bank has had at least three CEOs in the past 10 years. Together with 
the shift in the bank’s strategy, high CEO turnover has clearly impacted the bank’s performance 
during this transition. Hybrid 3 is also in a transition following a shift in its business model from 
investment to retail activities. These findings are in line with studies by Hannan & Freeman 
(1977, 1984) and Hannan et al., (2006), who argue that changes in an organization’s blueprint 
and CEO have negative effects on the organization’s performance. 
Islamic Specialist 1’s business model came under scrutiny after 2008, when it was 
unable to adapt to new market conditions and was forced to file for bankruptcy. This is 
supported by Hannan & Freeman’s (1977) findings, which demonstrate that specialists 
(investment banks) cannot operate well in an unstable business environment. 
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Similarly, Conventional Specialist 1 has gone through extensive restructuring and 
downsizing since 2008, which has since impacted the organization’s financial performance 
significantly.  
5.2.4 Dimension 4 - Relationship between Business Plan/Strategy and Corporate Culture 
Q4: How strong is the alignment between the institution’s business plan/strategy and its 
corporate culture? Can you elaborate? 
 
Figure 5.6 - Business Plan/Strategy & Corporate Culture 
As shown in Figure 5.6, in terms of intensity of the relationship between business 
plan/strategy and corporate culture, 70% of respondents indicated that the relationship is 
important, while 26% stated that the relationship is strong. Only one participant described the 
relationship as ‘weak’.  
Class A 
Schwartz & Davis (1981) underline the need to harmonize and integrate corporate 
culture and business strategy if an organization wants to be successful in the future. 
Respondents from Generalists 1 and 2 stated that the relationship is strong and supported their 
opinions with examples. For instance, Respondent 7 of Generalist 1 emphasised the importance 
of corporate governance and leadership in enforcing the corporate culture: 
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“The performance of any organization has a lot to do with the internal culture as 
well as proper leadership, reading the market, implementing proper risk 
management, understanding your risk, transparency with everybody, including 
your customers, shareholders and regulators”.  
Respondent 23 of Generalist 2 emphasised the importance of clarity of vision, hard 
work, meritocracy, communication, and integration among the organizational units. He stated: 
“So step one in ensuring the vision is clarity. We work hard, we are a 
meritocracy and we have no preferences for people based on religion, sex, 
nationality, etc. We give out the highlights of our investment policy to all staff”. 
It could be argued that the CEO’s leadership style in Generalist 2, through his 
articulation of clarity of vision and strong conviction of interdepartmental cooperation, has 
positively affected the organization’s performance. This conforms to Wilderom et al.’s (2012) 
findings on the correlation between charismatic leadership and firm performance.  
Class B 
Respondent 14 of Islamic Generalist 1 emphasised the importance of clear strategy and 
customer profiling to fit the culture and business plan, while Respondent 19 of Islamic 
Specialist 2 stressed the role of aligning performance to remuneration. Respondent 18 of Hybrid 
1 highlighted the need to first define organizational goals as set by the management, then lead 
by example through senior managers’ behaviour. This is reflected in the bank’s performance; he 
believed that corporate culture has a high degree of correlation with the business plan. 
Respondent 4 of Hybrid 2 pointed out the need to create a workable, achievable, and realistic 
strategy backed by competent management and right leadership, while Respondent 27 of 
Conventional Specialist 2 stressed the need to focus on client requirements and strategy 
integration.  
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Class C 
Respondents from financial institutions in this category did not provide a compelling 
narrative for how this relationship is founded, integrated, and solidified. Coincidentally, there 
was only one respondent from this category who stated that this relationship was ‘weak’. 
5.2.5 Dimension 5 - Organizational Values and Perception 
Q5: Are there specific ways of doing things, traditions, vocabulary, artifacts, rites, and rituals in 
your organization? 
In this section, I will only highlight the organizational values as portrayed by the best-
performing groups, namely Classes A and B.   
Class A 
The three respondents from Generalist 1 (6, 7, and 8) attributed the bank’s financial 
success to its strong emphasis on corporate governance, innovativeness, customer orientation, 
and clear strategy implementation. Further, the bank has a strong cultural tradition that was 
established by a former CEO who is currently serving as the bank’s chairman. The bank 
embraces these organizational values and considers them to be the cornerstone of its 
organizational establishment. Respondent 23 from Generalist 2 stressed the importance of being 
a greenfield organization and said that the bank had only had one CEO since its inception. This 
has helped the bank to establish strong cultural values, as set out by the founding CEO. 
Respondents 23 and 24 stated that the bank’s values are focused on clarity of vision and 
strategy, meritocracy, customer orientation, and internal communication. For more details on 
this section, refer to Appendix Exhibit A5.1. 
Class B 
Despite the fact that the bank operates in 13 countries, Respondents 12, 13, and 14 of 
Islamic Generalist 1 emphasised the importance of institutionalization through corporate 
governance, social responsibility, consensual agreement, and customer orientation. Respondents 
17, 18, and 26 of Hybrid 1 attributed its success to strong corporate governance, an open-door 
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policy, teamwork, and clarity of vision, while Respondents 4 and 5 of Hybrid 2 focused on 
ethical banking, staff socialization, confidentiality, and a friendly environment. 
Respondents 19 and 22 of Islamic Specialist 2 highlighted the importance of 
performance-related pay, an open-door policy, cultural fit, and alignment with shareholders’ 
values, while Respondent 27 of Conventional Specialist 2 stressed the importance of corporate 
governance, customer orientation, the bank’s reputation, and confidentiality.        
Based on the above, five organizational values were selected, as shown below in Table 5.6. 
These values were selected from the top three named by respondents from Class A banks (i.e., 
Generalist 1 and 2), as listed below:   
1. Clarity of Vision and Strategy 
2. Corporate Governance 
3. Customer Orientation 
4. Innovativeness 
5. Meritocracy 
These values were selected based on the following proposition: 
a) The selected values were clearly emphasised by interviewees from Generalist 1 and 2 
banks.  
b) A significant portion of respondents from Class B banks also emphasised the importance 
of these organizational values.  
 
Table 5.6 - Selection of Organizational Values  
Organizational Values Generalist 1 Generalist 2 Class B  
Clarity of Vision & 
Strategy 
√ √ √ 
Corporate Governance √  √ 
Customer Orientation  √ √ 
Innovativeness √   
Meritocracy  √  
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5.3 Organizational Culture Profile (OCP) Analysis 
The OCP was used as a secondary research instrument and to complement the findings 
of the previously conducted qualitative study as they relate to the five organizational values 
(Clarity of Vision & Strategy, Corporate Governance, Customer Orientation, Innovativeness, 
and Meritocracy). For more information on OCP values, refer to Appendix Exhibit A4.3. 
Rotation of Factors 
 There are several methods of extracting factors in factor analysis; one is rotation of 
factors. This important step enhances interpretability and offers better discrimination of which 
factor loads more significantly with which indicator. Several rotation procedures are available; I 
chose varimax rotation to prduce a cleaner set of loadings as near as possible to 0, -1, or +1; this 
obviously facilitates easy interpretation of factors (Buglear, 2014). If factor loading is high, e.g., 
absolute value greater than 0.5, this indicates that the factor is loading significantly on the 
corresponding variable. In Buglear’s (2014) study, a factor loading of nearly 0.50 or higher is 
considered significant. 
 Based on feedback of the 23 participants, I generated the Scree plot shown in Figure 5.7 
. 
 
Figure 5.7 – Scree Plot Diagram 
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Interpretation  
 Based on orthogonal varimax rotation analysis (Figure 5.7), there are 17 factors of 
interest before the slope curve changes to zero. The top five factors were selected representing 
56.8% of observed variance. This is considered to fall within an acceptable statistical range. 
Furthermore, there are 15 allowable organizational values of interest based on significant 
loading at a level of approxmately 0.50, as highlighted in bold type (refer to Appendix Exhibit 
A5.4). Among the top 15 factors, five values are of interest, as these were chosen as important 
cultural traits based on the qualitative study. The  five important values are highlighted below in 
Table 5.7. 
 
Table 5.7 - Factor Analysis Loading 
Values Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 5 
1.Meritocracy -0.843    
2.Clarity of Vision - 0.703    
3.Innovativeness  - 0.444   
4.Customer Orientation    0.459 
5.Corporate Governance   -0.101  
 
 Both Meritocracy (-0.843) and having a Clarity of Vision (-0.703) had the largest 
loadings. The negative loadings for these variables reflect the fact that they were rated as 
relatively low by participants. The third and fourth values, Innovativeness (-0.444) and 
Customer Orientation (.459), had similar loading ranges, but are neverthless considered 
important. The positive loading for the fourth value suggests that this variable is rated relatively 
high by participants. The fifth value, Corporate Governance, had a low loading of -.101. Both 
Customer Orientation and Corporate Governance were not available in the OCP list, and 
specifically not for the initial three interviewees, since they were later added to the list based on 
feedback from participants in the qualitative study.    
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Discussion 
Out of the 23 interviewees who completed the OCP, four were from Class A banks 
(three from Generalist 1 and one from Generalist 2) and the remaining 19 were from banks in 
Classes B and C. Based on participants’ feedback, Customer Orientation was the most 
important value, followed by Corporate Governance, Innovativeness, Clarity of Vision and 
lastly Meritocracy. The low ratings for the first three values as shown in Table 5.7 implies that 
the majority of respondents, who mainly represented Classes B and C, did not rate the first three 
values to be the most characteristic of their institutions. Meanwhile, Corporate Governance had 
a low negative rating, which reflects this value’s neutrality. Although both Corporate 
Governance and Customer Orientation were only added to the OCP list after completion of the 
three interviews, the former showed a nearly significant loading, which implies that 
interviewees assigned a relatively high rating to this organizational value.     
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CHAPTER SIX: QUANTITATIVE STUDY 
 
Executive Summary 
The second phase of this study relates to the examination of five cultural values: a) 
Clarity of Vision and Strategy; b) Corporate Governance; c) Customer Orientation; d) 
Innovativeness; and e) Meritocracy. These organizational values are tested with the two best-
performing banks in terms of NOI and ROAE, using descriptive statistical and regression 
analysis. A total of 74 managers representing two different financial institutions participated in 
the final primary survey. 
6.1 Descriptive Statistical Analysis 
6.1.1 Data Frequency and Profile 
A total number of 74 respondents participated in the survey study based on the 
questionnaires (see Appendix Exhibit A6.1). Profiles of the participants are listed in Table 6.1 
below: 
Table 6.1 - Profile of Participant Matrix  
Item Gen 1 Gen 2 Bahraini 
Non-
Bah Male Female Executive Senior Middle 
Participant 49 25 
       Nationality 
  
51 23 
     Gender 
    
56 18 
   Position 
      
17 25 32 
 
Of the total 74 respondents, 49 represented Generalist 1 banks and the remaining 25 
Generalist 2. Fifty-one of the participants were Bahraini and 23 were non-Bahraini; 56 were 
male and 18 females. Seventeen of the 74 respondents were executives, 25 seniors, and the 
remaining 32 managers. This represents a reasonable cross-section of all levels of management 
in both institutions. Therefore, the data collected for this study are representative in terms of 
nationality, gender, and bank management. It is known that sample size affects the significance 
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of statistical testing and, hence, the final results. According to Hair et al. (2006), multiple 
regressions require a minimum sample size of 50 and, ideally, 100. In this study, the collected 
sample size was 74, and therefore is within the set parameter.   
6.1.2 Section A: Clarity of Vision and Strategy 
Table 6.2 – Scale Reliability Testing Results : Clarity of Vision and Strategy 
Construct Items  Cronbach’s Alpha Mean Standard Deviation 
Clarity of Vision & 
Strategy  
5 0.839 3.952 0.778 
 
As shown in Table 6.2, internal reliability for Section A is 0.839 and the mean is 3.952.  
The SD is relatively low, at 0.778. 
 
Table 6.3 - Mean, SD, and Correlation : Clarity of Vision and Strategy 
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 
Sc1 3.96 0.786 1     
Sc2 4.49 0.602 0.251  1    
Sc3 3.58 0.844 0.566** 0.406  1   
Sc4 3.92 0.856 0.579** 0.476** 0.654**  1  
Sc5 3.81 0.822 0.488** 0.410 0.536** 0.737**  1 
 
N: 74; ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Discussion 
As shown above in Table 6.3, the overall pattern of correlations indicates an overall 
positive relationship and a degree of consistency among all five questions. This is illustrated by 
the satisfactory ratio of reliability of 0.872.  
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Significant correlations exist between Sc4 and Sc5 at 0.737 (the second-highest in the 
study), as shown below: 
Sc4: Your organization’s business strategy is well thought out and is based on realistic goals; 
Sc5: Your organization’s business strategy is based on a balance between ambitions and 
available resources.  
Naturally, there is a link between setting realistic organizational goals and a business 
strategy based on a balance between ambitions and available resources. 
Another notable correlation is found between Sc3 and Sc4 at 0.654. Significant 
relationships are found in seven of the 10 correlations, which represent 70% of this section at 
the 0.01 level. 
6.1.3 Section B: Corporate Governance 
Table 6.4 - Scale Reliability Testing Results : Corporate Governance 
Construct Items  Cronbach’s Alpha Mean Standard Deviation 
Corporate 
Governance 
6 0.702 4.271 0.780 
Although reliability (0.702) is the lowest of the five sections, it remains satisfactory and 
within the accepted threshold of 0.70 level (Bryman & Bell, 2007). Meanwhile, the mean, at 
4.271, is the highest of the five sections, while the SD is relatively low at 0.780. 
Table 6.5 – Mean, SD, and Correlation  : Corporate Governance 
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Sd1 4.31 0.739 1      
Sd2 4.68 0.576 0.305  1     
Sd3 4.55 0.724 0.186 0.305  1    
Sd4r* 4.07 0.915 0.070 0.173 0.192   1   
Sd5 3.79 0.897 0.286 0.269 0.409 0.237   1  
Sd6 4.23 0.837 0.393 0.356 0.217 0.392 0.432  1 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
N = 74; * Sd4r represents a reverse question. 
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Discussion 
Since the internal reliability of this section is the lowest of the five sections, I generated 
Table 6.6 (below) to illustrate how the overall reliability ratio changes if a certain question is 
deleted. 
Table 6.6 – Reliability Improvement : Corporate Governance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown above in Table 6.6, Sd5, with the lowest ratio, has the most influence on the 
reliability ratio, and Sd6 has the least influence.    
As illustrated above in Table 6.5, the overall pattern of correlations for the six questions 
indicates an overall positive relationship, but without any significant ratio at the 0.50 level for 
all six questions. 
6.1.4 Section C: Customer Orientation 
Table 6.7 - Scale Reliability Testing Results : Customer Orientation 
Construct Items  Cronbach’s Alpha Mean Standard Deviation 
Customer 
Orientation 
6 0.870 4.113 0.822 
 
Internal reliability for Section C is found to be 0.870, which is satisfactory. The mean is 
4.113, and the SD is relatively low at 0.822. 
 
Values Cronbach’s Alpha 
if Item Deleted 
Sd1 0.675 
Sd2 0.663 
Sd3 0.666 
Sd4r 0.626 
Sd5 0.602 
Sd6 0.692 
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Table 6.8 – Mean, SD, and Correlation Matrix : Customer Orientation 
Variables Mean SD  1  2 3 4 5 6 
Se1 4.01 0.842  1      
Se2 4.22 0.750 0.479**  1     
Se3 4.12 0.798 0.494** 0.627**  1    
Se4 4.01 0.790 0.417 0.627** 0.768**   1   
Se5 4.18 0.805 0.283 0.463** 0.505** 0.476**  1  
*
Se6r 4.14 0.947 0.538** 0.661** 0.547** 0.628** 0.386 1 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
_ 
N = 73; * Se6r represents a reverse question; ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Discussion 
As shown above in Table 6.8, the overall pattern of correlations for the six questions 
indicates an overall positive relationship and a high degree of consistency among all six 
questions. This is illustrated by the satisfactory ratio of 0.870. A significant relationship exists 
between Se3 and Se4 at the 0.768 level (the highest of the five sections), as listed below: 
Se3: Your organization understands how the entire business can thrive through creating 
customer value; 
Se4: Customers’ feedback is treated with respect and with careful thought.  
The above illustrates the relationship between the selection of customer value as a 
strategic choice and the need to treat customers’ feedback with high regard and consideration.  
Another notable significant relationship exists between Se2 and Se6r at 0.661.  
Significant relationships are found in 12 of the 15 correlations, representing 80% of this 
section at the 0.01 level; this is the highest of the five sections. This implies the importance of 
this value to the majority of respondents. 
  
93 
 
6.1.5 Section D: Innovativeness 
Table 6.9 - Scale Reliability Testing Results : Innovativeness 
 Construct Items  Cronbach’s Alpha Mean Standard Deviation 
 Innovativeness 6 0.872 3.904 0.867 
 
I computed the internal reliability test for Section D, as shown in Table 6.9; it contained 
six questions and had the highest rate (0.872) of the five constructs. The mean was 3.90 (the 
lowest of the five) and the standard deviation (SD) was 0.867, indicating a relatively low 
volatility rate. 
 
Table 6.10 - Mean, SD, and Correlation : Innovativeness 
Variables Mean SD       1       2      3    4 5 6 
Sa1 3.77 0.786 1      
Sa2 3.77 1.00 0.611** 1     
Sa3r* 3.99 1.02 0.549** 0.674** 1    
Sa4 4.22 0.641 0.420 0.223 0.345 1   
Sa5 3.93 0.861 0.630** 0.619** 0.613** 0.461** 1  
Sa6 3.77 0.869 0.684** 0.513** 0.513** 0.356 0.534** 1 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
N = 73; because one respondent did not complete this section; * Sa3r represents a reversed question; ** Correlation is 
significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Discussion 
As shown above in Table 6.10, the pattern of correlations for the six questions reveals a 
high degree of consistency among all six questions. This is indicative of the satisfactory 
reliability ratio of 0.872. Notably high correlations exist between Sa1 and Sa6 at 0.684, as 
highlighted below: 
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Sa1: Your organization comes up with new creative ideas relating to financial products 
and services;  
Sa6: Your organization is a dynamic and entrepreneurial place.  
Apparently there is a relationship between the need to come up with innovative 
products/services and the entrepreneurial culture of an organization. Another important 
correlation is found between Sa2 and Sa3r at the 0.674 level. Significant relationships at the 
0.50 level and above are found in 11 of the total 15 correlations, which represent 73.3% of this 
section at the 0.01 level of significance. This implies the importance of this corporate value to 
the majority of respondents. 
 
6.1.6 Section E: Meritocracy 
Table 6.11 - Scale Reliability Testing Results : Meritocracy 
 Construct Items Cronbach’s Alpha Mean Standard Deviation 
 Meritocracy 5 0.814 4.016 0.845 
 
The internal reliability test for Section B is 0.814, as shown in Table 6.11. The mean 
and SD are 4.016 and 0.845, respectively.  
Table 6.12 - Mean, SD, and Correlation : Meritocracy 
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 
Sb1 4.18 0.782 1     
Sb2 4.16 0.811 0.647** 1    
Sb3 4.04 0.784 0.347 0.291 1   
Sb4 3.72 0.958 0.524** 0.659** 0.471** 1  
Sb5r* 3.986 0.944 0.422 0.486** 0.241                 0.571** 1 
_____________________________________________________________________________
_ 
N = 74; * Sb5r represents a reversed question; ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Discussion 
As shown in Table 6.12, the pattern of correlation for five questions indicates a degree 
of consistency among them. Notably high correlations are found between Sb2 and Sb4 at 0.659, 
as listed below:  
Sb2: The organization emphasises competitive actions and achievements with 
measurable goals and objectives; 
Sb4: Your organizational reward system is primarily tied to individual performance. 
Obviously, there is a link between setting organizational goals and objectives and the 
need for a correspondingly appropriate reward system. 
Another important correlation is found between Sb1 and Sb2 at 0.647. Significant 
relationships are found in six of the 10 correlations, which represent 60% of this section at the 
0.01 level. 
 
6.2 Factor Analysis 
Based on orthogonal varimax rotation analysis, as shown below in Figure 6.1, there are 
three factors of interest before the slope curve level changes to zero. 
 
Figure 6.1 Scree Plot 
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 The selected  top three factors represent nearly 48% of the observed variance. This is 
considered as an acceptable statistical range. There is no benefit in dividing the loadings into 
more sub-factors to extract more meaningful variables. This is due to the highest-ranking 
variables reported in the first three factors and, more precicesly, from the first factor. Twenty-
eight allowable values are of interest based on significant loading of approximately 0.50 level or 
higher; I will concentrate solely on the five organizational values, as reported in factor 1, as 
shown below in Table 6.13. Results of all six factors can be found in Appendix Exhibit A6.2.  
Table 6.13 - Factor 1 Analysis  
Label Innovativeness Meritocracy Clarity of Vision 
and Strategy 
Corporate 
Governance 
Customer 
Orientation 
Sa1 0.785     
Sa2 0.690     
Sa3r -0.690     
Sa4 0.495     
Sa5 0.727     
Sa6 0.673     
Sb1  0.585    
Sb2  0.532    
Sb3  0.640    
Sb4  0.669    
Sb5r  -0.543    
Sc1   0.666   
Sc2   0.534   
Sc3   0.761   
Sc4   0.808   
Sc5   0.683   
Sd1    0.460  
Sd2    0.404  
Sd3    0.371  
Sd4r    -0.484  
Sd5    0.549  
Sd6    0.681  
Se1     0.474 
Se2     0.643 
Se3     0.664 
Se4     0.754 
Se5     0.475 
Se6r     -0.730 
97 
 
 As observed, four of the top 10 positive variables, which are underlined, are located 
under the Innovativeness value; it is not surprising that this organizational value reported the 
highest internal reliability of  0.872. Clarity of Vision and Strategy reported three variables, 
with the highest, 0.808, in Sc4; the remaining two variables came from the Customer 
Orientation value, with the highest value, 0.754, in Se4. The remaining variable, Sd6 (0.681) 
came from Corporate Governance. Although none of Meritocracy variables are represented in 
the top 10, it did report  significant loadings, as four of of its five loadings are above the 0.50 
level. The reason why a number of loadings are reported in negative numbers (e.g., Sa3r, Se6r, 
etc.) is because of the reverse order of questions. The above findings imply the importance of 
the five organizational values for participants, since nearly 75% of the overall loadings, either 
positive or negative, were above the 0.50 mark.    
 I also conducted  a separate factor analysis for each of the five organizational values as 
shown in Appendix Exhibit A6.2. As shown, the slope curve for all five values’ scree plot 
drops significantly after the first factor. This implies that the significant loading of variables is 
reported in the first factor.   
6.3 Regression Analysis 
6.3.1 NOI as Dependent Variable 
 Regression analysis is used to identify the effects of the independent variable on the 
dependent variable and ultimately develop this relationship into a statistical model (Adams et 
al., 2014).  
 In this regression analysis, I am testing the relationship among the five organizational 
values as independent variables with NOI as dependent variables by taking the 10-year averages 
for Generalist 1 and 2.  Therefore, five hypotheses are examined, as listed below: 
Hypothesis 1: Innovativeness is positively related to NOI 
Hypothesis 2: Meritocracy is positively related to NOI 
Hypothesis 3: Clarity of Vision & Strategy is positively related to NOI   
Hypothesis 4: Corporate Governance is positively related to NOI 
Hypothesis 5: Customer Orientation is positively related to NOI 
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Table 6.14 - NOI (Dependent Variable) 
Independent Variable Constant B Significance 
Adjusted 
R
2
 F 
A. Innovativeness (Sa) 11.478 0.877 0.003** 0.102 9.213 
B. Meritocracy (Sb) 12.828 0.516 0.12 0.02 2.474 
C. Clarity of Vision & 
Strategy (Sc) 13.286 1.393 0.245 0.005 1.372 
D. Corporate Governance 
(Sd) 11.167 0.875 0.043* 0.043 4.238 
E. Customer Orientation 
(Se) 13.495 0.338 0.324 0 0.985 
_______________________________________________________________________   
N =73;  * p ≤ 0.05;  **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001. 
 
Result - Hypothesis 1 
As observed, Innovativeness is positively related to NOI at 0.003, as a significant 
relationship is found at the p ≤ 0.01 level. This relationship takes the shape of a nearly nonlinear 
relationship and is illustrated in Figure 6.2 below. 
 
Figure 6.2 - Innovativeness vs. NOI 
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The influence of the independent variable on the dependent variable can be expressed in 
the following regression equation: 
Y = a + b*x  (Equation 1) (Source: Buglear, 2014) 
where: 
Y is the dependent variable (NOI)   
a  is a constant coefficient 
b  is the beta coefficient 
  x  is the independent variable    
Using the above equation and inserting the regression findings from Table 6.14, the 
equation can be written in the following format: 
NOI = 11.478 + 0.877 * Sa  (Equation 2)  
where:  
 Sa is the independent variable (Innovativeness) 
This relationship indicates that for a unit change in Sa (Innovativeness), there will be 
0.877 times change in NOI. This implies that Innovativeness has a positive relationship with 
NOI.  
Hypothesis 2: No evidence that this hypothesis is true. 
Hypothesis 3: No evidence that this hypothesis is true. 
Hypothesis 4: There is evidence that this hypothesis is true at 0.043. However, this relationship 
is relatively low at the p ≤ 0.05 level, as shown in Table 6.14. The relationship is less significant 
than the one generated from Innovativeness and NOI (i.e., at the p ≤ 0. 01 level).   
Hypothesis 5: No evidence that this hypothesis is true. 
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6.3.2 ROAE (Dependent Variable) 
In this regression analysis, I tested the relationships between the five organizational 
values (independent variables) and ROAE (dependent variables) for the two conventional 
generalists. Therefore, I investigated five hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 6: Innovativeness is positively related to ROAE 
Hypothesis 7: Meritocracy is positively related to ROAE 
Hypothesis 8: Clarity of Vision & Strategy is positively related to ROAE   
Hypothesis 9: Corporate Governance is positively related to ROAE 
Hypothesis 10: Customer Orientation is positively related to ROAE 
 
Table 6.15 - ROAE (Dependent Variable) 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 N = 74; *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001.  
 
Using equation 1 and inserting the regression findings from Table 6.15, the equation can 
be written in the following format: 
ROAE = 24.367 - 2.723 * Sa  (Equation 3) 
where:  
 Sa is the independent variable (Innovativeness). 
Independent Variable Constant B Significance 
Adjusted 
R2 F 
A. Innovativeness (Sa) 24.367 -2.723 0.001** 0.123 11.202 
B. Meritocracy (Sb) 20.119 -1.596 0.095 0.025 2.871 
C. Clarity of Vision & 
Strategy (Sc) 19.119 -1.529 0.126 0.019 2.395 
D. Corporate  
 Governance (Sd) 26.134 -2.908 0.017* 0.063 5.917 
E. Customer  
 Orientation (Se) 19.218 -1.328 0.012* 0.012 1.901 
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This relationship stipulates that for a unit change in Sa (Innovativeness), there will be 
negative 2.7 times change in ROAE. 
Result 
Hypothesis 6 
As observed, Innovativeness is negatively correlated with ROAE at 0.001, as a 
significant relationship is found at the p ≤ 0.001) level. This takes the shape of a nearly 
nonlinear relationship, as illustrated in Figure 6.3 below.  
 
Figure 6.3 - ROAE as Dependent Variable 
 Unlike the positive relationship between Innovativeness and NOI, the relationship 
between Innovativeness and ROAE is expressed in negative terms. This could be interpreted as 
suggesting that if a bank invests in innovative products or services, the monetary result would 
be a negative return on shareholders’ value in the short term. This is logical, because any 
investment will be deemed as cash outflow and have a negative and immediate impact on 
shareholders’ value. Because Innovativeness is negatively related to ROAE, there is no 
evidence that hypothesis 6 is true.  
Hypothesis 7: No evidence that this hypothesis is true. 
Hypothesis 8: No evidence that this hypothesis is true. 
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Hypothesis 9: No evidence that this hypothesis is true. There is evidence that Corporate 
Governance is negatively related to ROAE at 0.017. However, this relationship is relatively low 
at the p ≤ 0.05 level, as shown in Table 6.15.  
Hypothesis 10: No evidence that this hypothesis is true. There is evidence that Customer 
Orientation is negatively related to ROAE at 0.012 level. However, this relationship is relatively 
low at the p ≤ 0.05 level as shown in Table 6.15.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1 Discussion 
The study results show the applicability of using deductive reasoning together with a 
functionalist perspective which views corporate culture not only as shared values and beliefs but 
also as a set of variables that can be tested and quantified (Denison & Mishra, 1995; Kotter & 
Heskett, 1992; Sorensen, 2002). The two theories are used to validate the notion that a positive 
relationship exists between certain corporate values and financial performance. The study 
finding should add to the findings of many culture-performance researchers that culture is a 
vital component of organizational effectiveness. Given the fact that the sample contains only 11 
banks, this study could be interpreted as limited in terms of scope and depth. Therefore, this 
field study should be viewed as exploratory work and further research is recommended to 
generalize study results to a larger sample size. 
In terms of research methodologies, the use of institutional ecology, which is a 
combination of ecological insights and institutional perspective, allowed me broader flexibility 
to analyse and interpret the qualitative data. Similarly, the use of mixed methods allowed for a 
wider and deeper interpretation of the whole data analysed than either research method (e.g., 
quantitative or qualitative) could do separately. A concluding observation is that a researcher 
should maintain an open mind when selecting one or more research theory and/or methodology 
if this proves to be beneficial in terms of providing more flexibility and insight to data analyses. 
One of the challenges I faced in undertaking this study is the close relationship that I 
have with many of the interviewees since these are either friends or ex-colleagues, given my 
previous employment background with this sector for more than 25 years. I tried to conduct this 
study in a manner in line with conventional codes and ethics of scholarly research. A notable 
issue regarding data analysis for the qualitative study is that I relied on personal judgement to 
rate respondents’ feedback on the five primary interview questions using the Likert scale for the 
reliability test. As with all self-judgement rating tests, there is always a possibility of bias 
affecting this type of exercise.  
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The undertaking of the pilot survey was an important step to execute the primary survey 
successfully, and was essential in terms of validating the questionnaire and ensuring that it is 
within the acceptable range of reliability. The participation of 25 participants from Generalist 2 
in the primary survey fell short of the study target number of 35, and, therefore, must be 
regarded as one of the limitations of this study.  
The use of the Organizational Culture Profile (OCP) test not only provided me with an 
additional dimension to analyse respondents’ feedback in the semi-structured interview, but also 
showed that these cultural values are applicable to contexts other than the one for which it was 
developed (e.g. the US market). Meanwhile, administering the OCP proved a challenging task 
from an administration and technical standpoint. Only 23 of 27 interviewees accepted to take 
this test. This is because the test was administered immediately after the interview session; the 
interviewees who did not take this test felt it was time consuming and hence elected to pass on 
this exercise. Also, analysing 61 “value statements” based on the feedback of 23 participants 
proved to be a lengthy process as this entails feeding and consequently analysing the output data 
from the statistical software SPSS. Nevertheless, this exercise was a learning curve and 
rewarding experience for me. Moreover, there is inconsistency between the five cultural values 
identified by the best-performing banks of Generalists 1 and 2 and the OCP results. Data 
analyses from the OCP test showed that four of the five cultural values identified in this study 
(Clarity of Vision and Strategy, Corporate Governance, Innovativeness and Meritocracy) were 
not highly rated by the OCP test. This discrepancy seems to be logical because while the five 
organizational values were important to the best-performing banks, the same values were not 
highly rated by the OCP test with the exception of Customer Orientation. This implies that the 
majority of respondents, mainly represented by Class B and C, did not rate the remaining four 
values to be most reflective of their institutions. 
Although the Islamic banks who participated in this study may have their own cultural 
values such as strict dress code and being socially responsible, a number of these institutions 
also share the same cultural values identified in this study (e. g. Corporate Governance, Clarity 
of Vision and Strategy, and Customer Orientation).     
Two notable similarities of cultural values exist between the cultural values identified in 
this study and the finding of other studies: (a) Gordon and DiTomoso (1992) identified Clarity 
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of Strategy/Shared Goals, Innovation/Risk-taking, and Fairness of Rewards, in their study of 11 
US insurance companies; (b) Deshpande et al. (1993) identified Innovativeness and Customer 
Orientation in their study of 50 Japanese vendors. Also, study results showed the importance of 
an entrepreneurial environment as a strategic choice for financial institutions, and implied a 
positive relationship between Innovativeness and financial performance which is consistent with 
the findings of others in the field (e.g., Deshpande et al., 1993; Lee & Yu, 2004). 
Finally, the scope of this study focused on the internal culture values that affect a 
financial institution’s performance and did not cover other contextual forces that might also 
impact corporate culture. To name a few, banking regulation and business environment are two 
factors that had a significant impact on the behaviour of financial institutions, especially in the 
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. These two subjects are a suggested avenue for future 
research, in addition to other avenues as mentioned in Section 7.6 Future Research. 
7.2 Conclusion 
Much of the literature relevant to this study emphasises the relationship between cultural 
values and organizational performance (Calori & Sarnin, 1991; Chatman & Jehn, 1994; Denison 
& Mishra, 1995; Gordon & DiTomaso, 1992; Kotter & Heskett, 1992; Lee & Yu, 2004; 
Sorensen, 2002; Yilmaz & Ergun, 2008). I have taken a similar philosophical approach in this 
study, but I used an integrated framework based on institutional theory and organizational 
ecology to analyse and interpret the data.  Also, I focused more on the financial industry’s 
specific requirements and needs when measuring the financial performance of the participating 
financial institutions. 
The “institutional ecology” integrated framework I applied in this study to analyse 
qualitative data and test the research hypotheses was introduced in the 1990s by a group of 
scholars at Stanford University; these include Ruef (2010) (cited in Baum & Oliver, 1996) and 
Scott et al. (2000). Ruef (2010) argues that the cross-fertilization of organizational theories has 
yielded a new paradigm for analyzing and examining organizational studies, and predicts that 
this approach will continue to grow in popularity.         
In the first phase of this study, I collected raw data from 27 interviewees. This 
qualitative data was later subjected to analytical and refinement processes using content analysis 
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and deductive coding. I also examined the two best-performing banks in terms of key financial 
ratios. In this context, five organizational values emerged from the two banks, which I later 
tested for reliability and validity. In the second phase, the corporate values that emerged were 
used to create a questionnaire that was administered to 74 participants to obtain feedback on 
these organizational values. Finally, feedback from the 74 managers who participated in the 
primary survey was tested using the NOI and ROAE of the two banks by employing descriptive 
statistical and regression analysis. 
The descriptive statistical findings show a pattern of consistent and positive correlations 
among each of the five corporate values. This suggests that these cultural values are clear and 
strategically vital for the success of these two institutions. 
The regression analyses imply a positive relationship between the two generalists’ NOIs 
and Innovativeness and Corporate Governance. Conversely, Innovativeness, Corporate 
Governance, and Customer Orientation were found to be negatively related to ROAE. This 
implies that any investment the bank makes is regarded as a cash outflow and would then have a 
negative return on shareholders’ value.  
The study findings reveal the importance of the entrepreneurial environment and 
innovativeness as a strategic choice for all financial institutions. Study methodology model is 
summarized in Figure 7.1 below. 
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Figure 7.1 – Study Methodology Model 
 
7.3 Implications for the Bahrain Economic and Banking Sector 
 The study results have a number of implications for Bahrain’s economic and banking 
sector, as outlined below:  
1. The study findings reveal the strategic importance of the five cultural values, not only to the 
two best-performing banks but also to the majority of the participating institutions (both 
conventional and Islamic). Moreover, two of the identified cultural values in this study 
(Innovativeness and Customer Orientation) were clearly emphasised by both Mr. Rasheed 
Al-Maraj, Governor of the Central Bank of Bahrain, and Mr. Hussain Qemzi, CEO of Noor 
Bank, at the outset of Chapter 1. Both gentlemen stressed the need to improve on these two 
cultural values if Islamic banks are to remain competitive in the prevailing banking 
environment. 
 
2. The Islamic finance industry is not only strategically important for the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
but also provides significant economic contribution to its GDP. As such, investing in this 
industry’s infrastructure and regulatory framework is important to enhance Bahrain’s 
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economic prosperity as well as position the country as one of the premier Islamic finance 
centres in the world. Bahrain is already a hub for a number of organizations such as 
AAOIFI, LMC, IIFM and IIRA, and more similar institutions are needed in the future to 
strengthen the industry base. 
 
3. The study implies that the majority of Islamic banks and a number of conventional banks 
need to improve in the area of risk management. This improvement can be achieved by 
expanding and strengthening the role of the risk management committee in order to monitor 
the banks’ assets and liabilities more effectively.  
 
4. The study also implies the non-sustainability of the hybrid model in Islamic banks. Banks 
that adopted this strategy were exposed to higher volatility in their profitability than other 
participating banks, because of the higher holding of real estate investments on their 
balance sheets. Hybrid institutions need to alter their business model by concentrating more 
on sustainable core business opportunities. The regulator also needs to impose a cap on all 
financial institutions that invest heavily in real estate assets. Such a limitation is necessary 
to reduce the volatility trend in banks’ year-to-year profitability. 
 
5. The study reveals the importance of establishing an independent body to provide faster 
verdicts on Shari’ah conformity and assists in standardizing the products offered by Islamic 
banks (Chapra, 2008; Karbhari et al., 2004). One product that needs immediate 
standardization is the Murabaha agreement among Islamic banks. Standardizing this 
product will not only ensure faster, but also higher trading volumes among financial 
institutions.  
 
6. Only one senior female out of 27 interviewees participated in the semi-structured interview 
study and only eighteen females out of 74 participants took part in the survey study. 
Although the overall female participation in this study is not necessarily a true reflection of 
their workforce percentage in the overall banking industry, it appears that only a few 
women occupy executive positions in the Bahraini banking sector. Enabling more talented 
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women to take more executive roles in the banking industry is essential to realize their full 
potential and contribution to this sector and to society at large 
7.4 Recommendations 
This study makes a number of contributions to our understanding of a positive corporate 
culture, along with theoretical and practical contributions to our understanding of the effect of 
culture on a financial institution’s performance.  
 
Theoretical Contributions 
1. The study examines the importance of the five evolved cultural values to both 
conventional and Islamic financial institutions, as well as whether they differ by type 
of financial institution and how these results compare with similar studies in other 
countries. Two notable similarities exist between the cultural values identified in this 
study and the findings of other studies: (a) Gordon & DiTomoso (1992) identified 
Clarity of Strategy/Shared Goals, Innovation/Risk-taking, and Fairness of Rewards in 
their study of 11 US insurance companies; (b) Deshpande et al. (1993) identified 
Innovativeness and Customer Orientation in their study of 50 Japanese vendors. 
2. Results from the study imply a positive relationship between Innovativeness and 
financial performance, which is consistent with the findings of others in the field (e.g., 
Deshpande et al., 1993; Lee & Yu, 2004). Conversely, there is a negative relationship 
between ROAE and Innovativeness, Corporate Governance, and Customer 
Orientation. 
3. I expanded the Organizational Culture Profile (OCP) (O’Reilly et al., 1991) by adding 
Clarity of Vision and Strategy, Corporate Governance, and Customer Orientation as 
cultural profiles to the original 54 cultural profiles; this demonstrates that the OCP is 
applicable to contexts other than those originally studied in the US. 
4. I used the integrated framework of institutional ecology to analyse data and test the 
notion that corporate culture is a vital part of a financial organization’s effectiveness. 
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This demonstrates the validity of this approach, as well as the theories that are 
associated with institutional ecology. 
 
Practical Contributions 
1.  Study findings show that the best-performing banks, as measured by net operating 
income and return on average equity over a period of 10 years, were two conventional 
banks. This implies that Islamic banks’ profitability was lower than that of 
conventional banks during this period. 
2. Study results imply that the majority of Islamic banks that participated in the research 
need to improve their organizational infrastructure, especially in the areas of risk 
management and product innovation. 
3. The study implies the non-sustainability of the hybrid model in Islamic banks; some of 
the financial institutions that advocated this type of model have experienced more 
financial turbulence than other segments of the population (e.g., retail).  
4. Preservation of the original corporate culture appears to be important for the 
sustainability of business in general. Study results show that financial institutions that 
preserved their original corporate culture performed better than those that did not, 
either as a result of a change in CEO or business strategy. 
5. The study of corporate culture in financial institutions in general and Islamic banking 
in particular has been limited in the management/economic literature. This is the first 
study in Bahrain to address this important topic. 
7.5 Strengths and Limitations  
This study has a number of strengths that can be summarized as follows. (1) This was a 
field study, in which I concentrated on current employees in the financial sector in Bahrain. The 
executives and senior managers I interviewed were at least partly responsible for setting and 
implementing their banks’ business strategies. The five organizational values found to be 
important for Generalist 1 and 2, and implied a positive effect on their financial performances. 
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(2) The use of mixed methods allowed for a broader interpretation of the data analyzed than 
either research method (i.e., quantitative or qualitative) could do separately. (3) The use of data 
covering a 10-year period allowed for more depth and insight regarding cultural dynamics in 
Generalist 1 and 2 institutions. 
The study has several limitations. (1) Because the sample consisted of only 11 financial 
institutions, the study could be viewed as narrow in terms of scope. Nevertheless, this research 
should be viewed as exploratory; further research is recommended to generalize study findings 
to a larger sample size. (2) Only 25 employees from Generalist 2 participated in the primary 
survey, because the bank asserted that only qualified managers could provide valuable feedback 
on the questionnaire. (3) Study participants were limited to employees on the executive, senior, 
and middle-management level. A more cross-sectional study of organizational employees would 
have been preferable if that had been possible. (4) The study plan necessitated the participation 
of three interviewees from each organization; however, for logistical reasons, some institutions 
were not able to supply three participants. (5) The transcribed interviews provided a rich 
material to develop an inductive grounded theory based narrative analysis of this study should I 
opt in the future to use this theory to interpret the qualitative data. (6) I collected data covering a 
10-year period for the majority of the participating institutions, but because the remaining 
institution had not completed 10 years of banking operations, the supply of such financial 
records was not possible.    
7.6 Future Research 
Culture plays significant and varying roles in different organizations, and therefore no 
single study can capture all levels and dimensions of organizational culture (Sackmann, 2011). 
Therefore, a researcher should be clear and precise about his or her study aim, parameters, 
financial measurement, data collection, and applied research methods.  
Three avenues are suggested for future research. The first is to replicate this study using 
a larger sample population and with more geographic reach. It would be interesting to see 
whether the cultural values that emerge are shared among different employees in different 
financial institutions. The second would be to examine the role business strategy plays in 
influencing corporate culture; for instance, Schwartz and Davis (1981) argue that corporate 
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culture can be more effective if aligned with business strategy. It would be worthwhile to 
conduct a study that treats business strategy as a mediator, with cultural values as independent 
variables and financial measurements as dependent variables. The third avenue relates to the 
influence and effect of leadership on corporate culture; in this case, leadership traits can be 
viewed as either independent or dependent variables.  
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APPENDIX EXHIBIT A1.1 - ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE GCC 
 
YEAR (2001-2009) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
(Amount in US$) 
(Population in 
millions) 
 
           
Gulf States Economic Structure 
Bah Nominal GDP 
             
7,929  
             
8,448  
             
9,579  
           
10,303  
           
13,004  
           
15,852  
           
18,472  
           
22,157  
           
19,319  
 
Population  0.68 0.70 0.71 0.73 0.74 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.10  
GDP per head 11,660 12,070 13,490 14,170 17,480 23,344 24,069 24,599 25,552  
            
 
Kuwait Nominal GDP 
           
34,062  
           
38,122  
           
46,202  
           
55,718  
           
72,452  
         
101,550  
         
114,627  
         
148,013  
         
109,482  
 
Population  2.31 2.42 2.55 2.75 2.86 3.20 3.40 3.40 3.50  
GDP per head 
 
14,750             15,760             18,150             20,240             25,310             37,729             37,952             41,706             39,630              
            
 
Qatar Nominal GDP 
           
17,741  
           
19,707  
           
23,604  
           
28,451  
           
36,588  
           
60,497  
           
80,751  
         
100,407  
           
96,800  
 
Population  0.60 0.62 0.64 0.74 0.80 1.10 1.30 1.60 1.60  
GDP per head  29,720            31,890             37,110             38,290             46,410             58,367             59,775             58,747             61,832              
            
 
KSA Nominal GDP 
         
183,016  
         
188,552  
         
214,573  
         
250,557  
         
301,734  
         
356,630  
         
384,942  
         
476,305  
         
375,766  
 
Population  22.10 22.70 23.33 23.95 24.60 24.00 24.70 25.50 26.30 
 
 
GDP per head 
 
8,200              8,310               9,200               10,460             12,270             21,817             22,212             22,935             22,574              
            
 
UAE Nominal GDP 
           
69,227  
           
74,297  
           
87,599  
         
103,120  
         
117,806  
         
175,222  
         
206,406  
         
254,394  
         
248,925  
 
Population  3.49 3.75 4.04 4.32 4.67 5.30 5.90 6.80 6.50  
GDP per head            
29,720  
           
31,890  
           
37,110  
           
38,290  
           
40,000  
           
28,715  
           
27,884  
           
26,848  
           
27,330  
 
            
            
Sources: Economic Structure of the Gulf States (excluding Oman), Economic Intelligence Unit (Dec. 2010)   
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APPENDIX EXHIBIT A2.1 - UPDATE OF RELEVANT STUDIES ON CULTURE-
PERFORMANCE (1982-2008) 
 
Researchers and 
Origin of Study 
Year Defined Cultural Dimensions  Sector & Research 
Methodology 
1. Peters and 
Waterman, USA 
1982 Customer orientation, autonomy, entrepreneurship, 
motivation and “shared value” 
Diversified, case study – no 
empirical analysis 
2. Denison, USA 1984 Set of values and beliefs – core of organization 
culture, reinforced by practices 
Diversified, qualitative and 
quantitative (“mixed 
methods”) 
3. Calori and 
Sarnin, France 
1991 Values and management practices Single business, case study 
(quantitative approach) 
4. Gordon and 
DiTomaso, USA 
1992 Adaptability as a value and culture strength Insurance sector, case study 
(quantitative) 
5. Kotter and 
Heskett, USA 
1992 Customers, employees and stakeholders’ orientation Diversified, quantitative 
approach 
6. Deshpande, 
Farley & 
Webster, Japan 
1993 Customer orientation, innovativeness, and corporate 
culture (market strategy) 
Diversified, mixed methods 
7. Denison and 
Mishra, USA 
1995 Involvement, consistency, adaptability, and mission Diversified, case study 
followed by mixed methods 
8. Gatignon and 
Xuereb, USA 
1997 Customer, competitive and technological orientation Diversified, quantitative 
approach 
9. Christensen and 
Gordon, USA 
1999 Widespread cultures that are industry specific Diversified, mixed methods 
10. Ogbonna and 
Harris, UK 
2000 Assumptions, values and artifacts that are commonly 
shared in an organization  
Diversified, case study 
(quantitative approach) 
11. Sorensen, USA 2002 Coordination and control, goal alignment of 
members and employee effort 
Diversified, quantitative 
method  
12. Fey and 
Denison, Russia 
2003 Denison and Mishra’s four cultural traits Diversified, mixed methods 
in tandem 
13. Lee and Yu, 
Singapore 
2004 Innovation, supportive, team oriented, humanistic 
and task orientation 
Diversified, mixed methods 
analysis 
14. Chow and Liu, 
China 
2007 HR- organizational culture and business strategy fit Diversified, mixed methods 
15. Yilmaz and 
Ergun, Turkey 
2008 Mission and involvement strategy Diversified, quantitative 
approach 
    
 
Source: Originally cited from (Weinzimmer et al., 2008) with major updates.  
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APPENDIX EXHIBIT A3.1 - ISLAMIC BANKING BASIC DEFINITIONS 
Term Explanation 
 
Amana 
(Demand Deposits) 
Deposits held at the bank for safekeeping purpose. They are guaranteed in 
capital value, and earn no return.  
Bay mu’ajal 
(Pre-delivery, Deferred 
Payment) 
The seller can sell a product on the basis of a deferred payment, in 
installments or in a lump sum.  The price of the product is agreed upon 
between the buyer and the seller at time of the sale, and cannot include 
charges for deferring payment.  
Bay salam 
(Pre-payment, Deferred 
Delivery) 
The buyer pays the seller the full negotiated price of a product that the seller 
promises to deliver at a future date. 
Ijara 
(Instant Delivery, Deferred 
Payment) 
A party leases a particular product for a specific sum and a specific time 
period.  In the case of a lease purchase, each payment includes a portion that 
goes toward the final purchase and transfer of ownership of the product.  
Istisna 
(Deferred Payment, 
Deferred Delivery) 
A manufacturer (contractor) agrees to produce (build) and to deliver a certain 
good (or premise) at a given price on a given date in the future.  The price 
does not have to be paid in advance (in contrast to bay salam).  It may be paid 
in installments or part may be paid in advance with the balance to be paid 
later on, based on the preferences of the parties.  
Kifala  
(Pledge) 
It is a pledge given to a creditor that the debtor will pay the debt, fine or 
liability.  A third party becomes surety for the payment of the debt if unpaid 
by the person originally liable. 
Mudaraba  
(Trustee Finance Contract) 
Rabb-ul-mal (capital’s owner) provides the entire capital needed to finance a 
project while the entrepreneur offers his labour and expertise.  Profits are 
shared between them at a certain fixed ratio, whereas financial losses are 
exclusively borne by rabb-ul-mal.  The liability of the entrepreneur is usually 
limited only to his time and effort.  
Murabaha  
(Instant Finance, Deferred 
Payment) 
Sale of goods with an agreed-upon profit mark-up on the cost. The Islamic 
bank typically purchases the goods against the customer’s promise to 
repurchase the item from the institution based on deferred payment terms. 
Musharaka 
(Equity Participation) 
The bank enters into an equity partnership agreement with one or more 
partners to jointly finance an investment project.  Profits (and losses) are 
shared strictly in relation to the respective capital contributions. 
Qard Hassana 
(Beneficence Loans) 
These are zero-return loans that the Qur’an encourages Muslims to make to 
the needy.  Banks are allowed to charge borrowers a service fee to cover the 
administrative expenses of handling the loan.  The fee should not be related 
to the loan amount or maturity. 
Sources: Archer and Karim (2002); Hassan, & Dridi (2010)  
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APPENDIX EXHIBIT A4.1 - RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
 
     
  
  
 
  
The Project 
Two Phases 
Qualitative Study 
Semi-structured 
Quantitative Study 
Financial Measurement 
Mixed Method 
Content / Deductive 
 
 
Cultural Values 
Independent Variables 
Questionnaire 
The Instrument 
Pilot Study 
Reliability & Validity 
Financial Measurement 
Dependent Variables 
Cultural Result 
Correlation Analysis 
Culture – 
Performance 
Result - Regression 
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APPENDIX EXHIBIT A4.2 - QUALITATIVE STUDY QUESTIONS 
 
1. What are the key challenging issues that conventional/Islamic banks face today? 
2. What are the reasons for the sustained financial success of certain retail/investment and 
conventional/Islamic banks over the years? 
3. What are the main factors that can assist a bank to execute its business plan more 
effectively? 
4. How strong is the alignment between the institution business plan/strategy and its 
corporate culture? Can you elaborate? 
5. Are there specific ways of doing things, traditions, vocabulary, artifacts, rites and rituals 
in your organization? 
  
119 
 
APPENDIX EXHIBIT A4.3 - ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE PROFILE (OCP)  
1 Flexibility 31 Achievement Oriented 
2 Adaptability to External Environment 32 Being Demanding 
3 Predictability 33 Taking Individual Responsibility 
4 Innovative 34 Having High Expectation for Performance 
5 Opportunistic 35 Emphasising Growth Strategy 
6 A Willingness to Experiment 36 Performance-related Pay (Meritocracy) 
7 Risk Taking 37 Job Security 
8 Being Careful 38 Offers Praise for High Performance 
9 Autonomy 39 Low Level of Conflict 
10 Being Rule Oriented 40 Confronting Conflicts Directly 
11 Being Analytical 41 Friendly Environment 
12 Paying Attention to Detail 42 Cultural Fit 
13 Being Precise 43 Teamwork 
14 Team Oriented 44 Emphasising Motivation 
15 Sharing Information Freely 45 Working for Long Hours 
16 Emphasising a Single Culture Throughout the 
Organization 
46 Not Constrained by Many Rules 
17 Being Employee Oriented 47 Quality Orientation 
18 Fairness 48 Being Distinctive from Others 
19 Respect for Individual Rights 49 Having a Good Reputation 
20 Tolerance 50 Being Socially Responsible 
21 Informality 51 Being Results Oriented 
22 Easy-going 52 Having a Clear Vision and Strategy 
23 Being Calm 53 Being Competitive 
24 Being Supportive 54 Being Highly Organized 
25 Being Aggressive 55 Follower 
26 Stability 56 Customer Orientation 
27 Decisiveness 57 Passion 
28 Action Oriented 58 Strict Dress Code 
29 Taking Initiative 59 Delegation 
30 Being Reflective 60 Corporate Governance 
  61 Open Door Policy  
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APPENDIX EXHIBIT A4.4 - CODING MANUAL 
ACCT International & Regional Accounting Reporting Bodies: Disclosure of 
accounting reporting for financial institutions as per the guidelines set by 
international regulatory bodies such as the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) and regional organizations such as the Accounting and 
Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI). 
BUS Business Strategy:  A coordinated set of business action programmes intended 
to secure a long-term sustainable business advantage (Hax & Majluf, 1991).  
CHAL Key Challenging Issues: A set of challenging factors that could impede the 
growth of business. These could be economic, political, regulatory, or others.  
COMP   Regulators and Shari’ah Compliance: Compliance of all transactions and 
services with regulatory and Shari’ah guidelines. 
CORP CUL Corporate Culture: Consists of three broad categories which are observable 
artifacts, basic assumptions, and espoused values (Schein, 2004). Also, 
includes a list of 54 ‘value statements’ from the Organizational Culture Profile 
(OCP) originally developed by O’Reilly et al. (1991). The list was further 
expanded to 61 values based on feedback received from the 23 interviewees in 
the study.  
CORP GOV Corporate Governance: The relationship between the company’s management 
and its board, shareholders, and other stakeholders. This relationship is based on 
creating a clear framework within which objectives of a company are 
established, then monitoring those objectives through the company’s 
performance on a regular basis (Clarke, 2007). 
DOCTR Doctrine:  Organized systems of beliefs or knowledge. Includes all formal belief 
systems (Christianity, Islam, and others) as well as bodies of knowledge (e.g. 
Islamic banking; Weber, 1990).   
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ECO Economic: All words that relate to economic, commercial, and industrial 
matters. Includes all economic roles, acts, and symbols (Weber, 1990). 
GEN Generalist: A population type that relies on a wide range of environmental 
resources to survive.  An organizational generalist can be a daily newspaper or 
mainstream bank. For the purpose of this study, I define a mainstream retail bank 
as a Generalist (Carroll, 1985).  
HYBR Islamic Hybrid Model: An Islamic Generalist that also engages in investment 
banking activities, such as real estate. 
LEAD Leadership Role: The ability to attain organizational goals and induce 
compliance and change (Bass, 2008). 
MKT PSY Market Psychology: This includes market behaviours, phenomena, and 
sentiment.  
POP Population: The population that is associated with the audience segment’s 
category or label. This would include customers, regulators, stakeholders, and 
others (Hannan et al., 2007).  
SPEC Specialist: In contrast to the Generalist, a Specialist institution focuses on a 
narrow market range. For the purposes of this study, I define an investment bank 
as a Specialist (Carroll, 1985). 
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APPENDIX EXHIBIT A4.5 – RELIABILITY TEST 
RELIABILITY 
  /VARIABLES=Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
  /SCALE ('ALL VARIABLES') ALL 
  /MODEL=ALPHA 
  /STATISTICS=DESCRIPTIVE CORR 
  /SUMMARY=MEANS CORR. 
Reliability 
Notes 
Output Created 28-Oct-2014 06:49:30 
Comments   
Input Data C:\Users\Sony\Documents\OCP Excel 
Sheet rating.Final.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 27 
Matrix Input  
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Cases Used Statistics are based on all cases with valid 
data for all variables in the procedure. 
Syntax RELIABILITY 
  /VARIABLES=Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
  /SCALE('ALL VARIABLES') ALL 
  /MODEL=ALPHA 
  /STATISTICS=DESCRIPTIVE CORR 
  /SUMMARY=MEANS CORR. 
 
Resources Processor Time 00 00:00:00.015 
Elapsed Time 00 00:00:00.016 
 
[DataSet1] C:\Users\Sony\Documents\OCP Excel Sheet rating.Final.sav 
Scale: ALL VARIABLES 
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Case Processing Summary 
 N % 
Cases Valid 26 96.3 
Excluded
a
 1 3.7 
Total 27 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the 
procedure. 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized 
Items N of Items 
0.822 0.832 5 
 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Q1 4.46 0.811 26 
Q2 4.19 0.801 26 
Q3 4.31 0.838 26 
Q4 4.27 0.604 26 
Q5 4.46 0.582 26 
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Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Q1 1.000 0.412 0.548 0.389 0.463 
Q2 0.412 1.000 0.564 0.633 0.489 
Q3 0.548 0.564 1.000 0.304 0.518 
Q4 0.389 0.633 0.304 1.000 0.657 
Q5 0.463 0.489 0.518 0.657 1.000 
 
Summary Item Statistics 
 
Mean Minimum Maximum Range 
Maximum / 
Minimum 
Item Means 4.338 4.192 4.462 0.269 1.064 
Inter-Item Correlations 0.498 0.304 0.657 0.353 2.160 
 
 
Summary Item Statistics 
 Variance N of Items 
Item Means 0.014 5 
Inter-Item Correlations 0.011 5 
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APPENDIX EXHIBIT A4.6 - PRIMARY SURVEY RELIABILITY TEST  
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
0.939 0.939 28 
 
Item Statistics 
 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
Your organization comes up with 
new creative ideas relating to 
financial products and services 
3.7887 0.75433 71 
Your organization fosters an 
innovative environment where staff 
members are encouraged to 
generate new ideas 
3.7887 0.98439 71 
Your organization pays attention to 
new products/services offered by its 
competitors 
4.1831 0.63942 71 
Your organization considers 
innovativeness as a strategic choice 
3.9155 0.89037 71 
Your organization is a dynamic and 
entrepreneurial place 
3.7746 0.86515 71 
Your organization fosters a sense of 
competitiveness where members 
are expected to perform at high level 
of achievements 
4.1972 0.68909 71 
The organization emphasises 
competitive actions and 
achievements with measurable 
goals and objectives 
4.1831 0.78029 71 
Your organization hires individuals 
with distinguished academic/ 
professional degrees and with high 
personal expectations 
4.0282 0.79232 71 
Your organizational reward system 
is primarily tied to individual 
performance 
3.7324 0.94048 71 
Your organization clearly articulates 
its vision and mission to all levels of 
the company 
3.9718 0.77408 71 
A successful implementation of your 
organizational business strategy will 
enhance its financial results 
4.4930 0.60647 71 
Your organizational vision creates 
excitement and motivation for its 
employees 
3.5915 0.82076 71 
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Your organization business strategy 
is well thought out and is based on 
realistic goals 
3.9296 0.83365 71 
Your organization business strategy 
is based on a balance between 
ambitions and available resources 
3.8310 0.79257 71 
Your organization clearly defines the 
internal process perspective 
measures (i.e. risk management, 
internal audit committee, procedures 
& policies and others) 
4.3099 0.74817 71 
Your organization strives to comply 
with domestic regulatory directives 
4.6761 0.58002 71 
Your organization considers the 
completion of  Know Your Customer 
(KYC) format as a key part of 
business compliance before 
entertaining new business with 
prospective customers 
4.5493 0.73268 71 
Independent board members at your 
organization provide a neutral 
element  among other members  
3.8028 0.87210 71 
Your organization considers the 
transparency issue as an important 
element in building and maintaining 
credibility with the various 
stakeholders 
4.2394 0.85297 71 
Your organization is more customer 
focused than your competitors 
4.0141 0.85345 71 
Your customers’ needs are treated 
with priority 
4.2254 0.75965 71 
Your organization understands how 
the entire business can thrive 
through creating customer value 
4.1127 0.80266 71 
Customers’ feedback is treated with 
respect and with careful thoughts 
4.0000 0.79282 71 
Your organization considers 
customers’ interests as very 
important, and a key element in 
sustaining present and future 
business 
4.1972 0.80391 71 
Sa3r1 3.9718 1.02778 71 
Sb5r1 4.0000 0.92582 71 
Sd4r1 4.0563 0.92408 71 
Se6r1 4.1549 0.92037 71 
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APPENDIX EXHIBIT A5.1 - SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSIS 
(refer to Appendix Exhibit A4.2 – Qualitative Study Questions) 
 
Conventional Generalist 1 
Financial Highlights - Amount in US$ millions 
Highlight 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Net 
Operating 
Income 
123.4 138.0 144.4 168.9 212.8 280.1 218.9 232.5 272.6 273.9 
Net 
Income 
62.0 68.3 77.9 87.2 79.5 71.8 93.1 104.0 84.8 113.0 
ROAE% 19.4 18.2 17.7 18.2 14.1 12.1 15.9 16.6 13.3 16.1 
CAR 16.7 18.8 19.6 16.2 23.3 20.1 17.5 18.6 14.9 14.3 
Source: Zawya Financial Services 
Financial Interpretation 
The bank was able to deliver consistent and steady performance, as measured by ROAE, 
with an overall average of 16.2% over the past 10 years. Average CAR stood at 18% (minimum 
required 12%), although this ratio showed a decline in the past two years. Average Operating 
Income and Net Income have been growing annually at rates of 10.4% and 19%, respectively, 
indicating sustainable performance over the past 10 years.  
In view of the above, the bank is ranked Class A.     
Data Interpretation 
The following is based on the feedback of three interviewees. One is the CEO and the 
others are senior managers. Complete profiles on all three interviewees are provided in 
Appendix Exhibit A5.2. 
Dimension 1  
According to Respondent 6, the key challenge is ‘basically to safeguard the quality of its 
assets on one hand, and on the other is to continue business activity’.   
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The key challenging factor is the ‘adverse economic conditions’ 6, 8 and the second is ‘the 
increase in regulatory influence’ 7, 8. 
Dimension 2  
Respondent 6 said, ‘I think the most important reason for the sustained financial success 
in the conventional banks is the cheaper source of funding, and that is the customer deposits’.  
The most important factor is ‘the access to low cost of funding’6 and the second is 
‘adapting to external environment’ 8. 
Dimension 3  
Respondent 6 stated, ‘The most important factor, I would say, is to have a clearly set 
strategy, especially in difficult times’.  
Respondent 7 stated, ‘First defining what is the strategy, and what is your plan’.  
The most important factor is ‘clarity of strategy’ 6, 7 and the second is ‘adequate risk 
management policy’8.  
The bank is adopting a bottom-up approach when preparing its business plan. 
Dimension 4  
Respondents emphasised the important role of internal procedures, corporate 
governance, and leadership in reinforcing its corporate culture. Also, there is a tradition of 
preserving the original culture of the organization. Respondent 7 stated, ‘The performance of 
any organization has a lot to do with the internal culture as well as proper leadership, reading of 
the market and proper risk management, understanding your risk, transparency with everybody, 
including your customers, shareholders, and regulator’.  
Respondent 6 stated, ‘Because the corporate culture and corporate governance was so 
strong and strict in our bank, we have managed to stay away from many problems. You know 
that our bank has for the second time won the corporate governance award in the entire GCC. 
Our corporate culture is supervised by the corporate governance in the bank’.  
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Respondent 6 stated that this corporate culture started with previous CEOs and their 
leadership. He said, ‘Luckily our bank has gone through a number of leaders who had a strong 
and positive culture that has been implanted in the majority of the staff and they sort of gained 
or accepted that culture’. 
Respondents from the bank described the relationship between the business plan/strategy 
and its corporate culture as ‘very strong’. 
Dimension 5   
1. Corporate Governance
6, 7
; 2. Innovativeness
7, 8 
3. Clarity of Vision and Strategy 
6, 7
 4. 
Customer Orientation
6, 7, 8
. 
 
Conventional Generalist 2  
Financial Highlights - Amount in US$ millions 
Highlight 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Net 
Operating 
Income 
172.5 198.2 291.0 461.2 579.8 758.9 697.5 703.1 785.4 831.3 
Net 
Income 
87.1 106.5 189.8 257.8 359.8 309.7 226.1 292.2 335.8 377.7 
ROAE% 10.5 11.4 14.5 15.0 16.1 12.3 9.1 11.0 11.9 12.4 
CAR 20.6 23.7 16.4 14.8 16.3 13.8 15.1 14.1 16.0 15.6 
Source: Zawya Financial Services 
Financial Interpretation  
The bank has been delivering a consistent performance, as measured by the ROAE 
(range 10% -16%), with an overall average of 12.4% for the last 10 years. Meanwhile, the CAR 
stood at a satisfactory level of 15.6% at the end of 2012. Average Operating Income and Net 
Income have been growing at rates of 20.7% and 21.3%, respectively, over a 10-year period, 
demonstrating a strong financial performance. As such, the bank is ranked Class A.  
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Data Interpretation 
The following is based on the feedback of two interviewees, the CEO and a senior 
manager. Complete profiles on the two interviewees are provided in Appendix Exhibit A5.2. 
Dimension 1 
Respondent 23 provided examples of the challenging corporate governance issues: ‘BoD 
that do not represent the shareholding structure of the business, that are overweight, certain 
minority shareholders that have disproportionate influence on the board, extended longevity of 
directors, and absence of external pressure from other shareholders to force the board to look at 
developing the value of business’. 
The key challenging factor is ‘corporate governance’23 and the second is ‘adverse in 
economic conditions’ 24. 
Dimension 2 
Respondent 23 stressed the importance of clarity of vision and its definition. He said, ‘If 
they have clarity then banks used good times to develop two or three lines of business. And if 
they have selected well, then they would be strong enough to resist when the problems arise. 
There is a saying that you are a jack of all trades but a master of none’.  
Respondent 24 stated, ‘We were able to adopt a clear strategy and that has helped us 
weather this particular storm’. 
The most important factor is ‘clarity of vision and strategy’, and the second is the 
‘stability of the shareholders’ and management relationships’ 23.  
Dimension 3 
Again, clarity of vision and business strategy/plan, and alignment of remuneration with 
goals (meritocracy). Respondent 23 stated, ‘We see our vision as our main strength; our strength 
is not our size. This has been crystal clear and we put it in our website. We defined our strategy 
to be growth by acquisition - buying investments, and then making them work together as one 
bank’.  
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The most important factor is ‘clarity of the vision and business strategy’23 and the 
second is ‘attention to details’23.  
The bank uses a top-bottom approach to craft its business plan. The senior management 
agrees with the BoD, then relays it down to the middle-management level and beyond. 
Dimension 4  
Respondents from the bank stressed the importance of hard work, quality, meritocracy, 
clear strategy, and internal communication and integration among units to achieve their desired 
goal. Respondent 23 stated, ‘Our bank is greenfield and 10 years old. We work hard, we are a 
meritocracy and we have no preferences for people based on religion, sex, nationality, and we 
align the remuneration to goals. We are very keen on communication and integrating people 
across the organization’. 
Respondents from the bank described the relationship between the business plan/strategy 
and its corporate culture as ‘very strong’. 
Dimension 5  
1. Clarity of vision and strategy
23, 24
, 2. Meritocracy 
23, 24
, 3. Customer orientation
24
, 4. 
Internal communication and integration
23
. 
 
Conventional Generalist 3 
Financial Highlights - Amount in US$ millions 
Highlight 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Net 
Operating 
Income 
n.a. n.a. 17.0 19.2 14.5 -3.6 -14.0 -26.6 -4.0 0.60 
Net 
Income 
n.a. n.a. 10.9 13.6 13.0 -8.0 -45.0 -70.5 -9.0 1.3 
ROAE% n.a. n.a. 17.0 19.2 14.5 -3.6 -14.0 -26.6 -4.0 0.60 
CAR n.a. n.a. 13.1 13.9 13.1 20.3 21.8 19.7 19.4 18.4 
Source: Zawya Financial Services 
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Financial Interpretation  
The bank has been posting inconsistent and rather poor financial performance since 
2008. This is evidenced by the negative Net Income during the period 2008-2011. The bank has 
changed CEOs at least three times since 2005, and currently is embarking on a new strategy that 
focuses on local retail business instead of regional wholesale business (the previous strategy).  
In view of the above, the bank is ranked Class C.  
Data Interpretation 
The following is based on the feedback of three interviewees. One is the CEO and the 
remaining two are senior managers. Complete profiles of the interviewees are provided in 
Appendix Exhibit A5.2. 
Dimension 1   
Respondent 9 stated, ‘I think the main challenge is the market size, because it is a small 
market. There is saturation in the market because there are so many players in the market’.  
Respondent 10 said, ‘The main challenge we face in Bahrain is the number of 
conventional banks available on the island given the size of the population’.  
The most challenging factor is ‘market competition’, 9, 10 and the second is ‘adverse 
economic conditions’10.  
Dimension 2  
Respondent 9 stated, ‘I think this has to do with the credibility of the brand’.  
The most important factor is the ‘reputation of the brand,’9 and the second is the 
‘monopoly position’11. 
Dimension 3  
Respondent 10 stated, ‘The business plan is really about how you can expand your 
market share. Now the strategy has changed and we are focusing on the local market and trying 
to build up our brand name’.  
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Respondent 10 considers adopting ‘a clear strategy’10, 11 the most important factor, and 
‘customer orientation’11 the second most important. 
The bank uses a ‘bottom-up’ approach when crafting its business model.   
Dimension 4  
Respondent 10 emphasises the importance of communication among staff and the need 
to build a brand name. Respondent 10 stated, ‘The situation here is different and we need to 
satisfy our internal customers through training them and trying to sell the idea of where the bank 
is now and where we are trying to reach’. 
Respondent 9 said, ‘The culture is the main driver for us in gaining market share, 
building a brand, and being profitable, because without it, we cannot do it’.  
This implies that the bank is in the process of modifying its original culture in light of 
the new management team and the change in the organization’s strategy. 
Respondent 10 describes the relationship between the business plan/strategy and its 
corporate culture as ‘important’. 
Dimension 5 
1. Open-door policy 
9, 10
, 2. Reputation
9
 , 3. Staff socialization
10
, 4. Customer orientation
11
 . 
Islamic Generalist  
Financial Highlights - Amount in US$ millions 
Highlight 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Net 
Operating 
Income 
185.9 171.8 254.2 334.6 444.3 585.8 633.5 658.5 740.9 896.6 
Net 
Income 
39.3 54.1 102.9 123.7 200.8 201.0 167.4 193.2 212.3 235.2 
ROAE% 8.1 10.2 15.4 12.5 14.4 12.9 10.1 10.9 11.8 12.5 
CAR n.a. n.a. n.a. 31.1 33.6 22.8 22.8 19.7 20.7 17.3 
Source: Zawya Financial Services 
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Financial Interpretation 
The bank has been delivering moderate but consistent performance as measured by the 
ROAE (overall average of 11.4%) over the past 10 years. CAR remained in a comfortable range 
of 17% at the end of 2012 (minimum 12%). Both Operating Income and Net Income have been 
growing at an average rate of 20.2% and 24.7%, respectively, over the past 10 years. The only 
year in which profitability declined was in 2009; after that it recovered well. The bank is 
regarded as a moderate performer, and therefore ranked as Class B. 
Data Interpretation 
The following is based on the feedback of three interviewees. One is the CEO and the 
other two are senior managers.  Complete profiles of the three interviewees are provided in 
Appendix Exhibit A5.2. 
Dimension1  
Respondent 13 said, ‘The challenge which is facing the Islamic banks in the coming 5-
10 years is Basel 3’. Meanwhile, Respondent 14 stated, ‘You have the challenge of corporate 
governance, which is always one of the main issues. I believe that Islamic banks - which were 
started by individuals who felt that they had a mission to open this up, like Sheikh Saleh Kamil 
or Prince Mohamed Al Saud - these people created institutions, but then they have to draw back 
and give them the chance to be true institutions, and what that means is that they have to have 
good corporate governance’.  
The key challenging factor is corporate governance
13, 14
,
 
and the second is to regain 
confidence in the banking sector in the aftermath of 2008 crisis 
14
. 
Dimension 2  
Respondent 12 stated, ‘The sustained financial success of some retail banks, the very 
fact that it is a retail bank in today’s world is itself a success, provided they manage their risk 
properly. So, risk management is one of the key reasons for why banks can succeed or fail 
today’.  
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The most important factor is ‘corporate governance’12, 13, and the second is ‘low cost of 
funds’14. 
Dimension 3  
Respondent 12 stated, ‘First, I would say, is a solid understanding of your existing 
business model. Second, you need to understand your markets very clearly. Even if you do 
predict, let me tell you the best predictions are 50%. Nobody can be accurate. If your decisions 
are 50% correct, you are brilliant’. 
The most important factor is ‘clarity of your strategy and the market you are serving’12. 
The bank adopts a consensual approach between the BoD and management to prepare its 
business plan. 
Dimension 4  
Respondent 14 said that the bank always emphasises on having a clear strategy based on 
select customers’ segmentation. He stated, ‘From day one, from the beginning of this bank there 
was a clear strategy laid down, approved by the directors and my input as Risk Manager. We 
have some big clients, but our clients are either retail or SMEs who own small businesses and 
with whom we work closely. That culture and that customer base fits our culture, and therefore 
fits our business plan.’ 
Respondent 13 stated, ‘You cannot go and do business without believing in your culture 
or your philosophy’; implying the importance of the relationship between the business 
plan/strategy and its corporate culture.  
Dimension 5  
 1. Corporate governance
12, 13, 14
, 2. Social responsibility
13
, 3. Consensual culture
12
,           
4. Customer orientation 
14
. 
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Hybrid 1 
Financial Highlights - Amount in US$ millions 
Highlight 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Net 
Operating 
Income 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 54.3 90.2 106.1 53.2 69.4 64.6 61.4 
Net 
Income 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 43.4 61.3 67.8 37.2 19.4 1.3 27. 4 
ROAE% n.a. n.a. n.a. 15.1 17.0 14.8 7.5 3.6 0.3 5.0 
CAR n.a. n.a. n.a. 79.8 48.7 24.7 28.6 24.7 24.9 20.9 
Source: Zawya Financial Services 
Financial Interpretation 
I do not have financial information prior to 2005, since the bank started its operations in 
late 2004.  The bank’s performance was strong, as measured by the ROAE (average return 
15.6%) from 2006 to 2008. After that, the bank delivered inconsistent results (average return 
4.1%) during the period 2009–2011 before bouncing back with net income of US$ 27.4MM in 
2012. CAR is maintained at a comfortable level (20.9% in 2012). The bank is focusing mainly 
on retail operations, but also engages in investment banking activities. Its current retail strategy 
revolves around growth through acquisitions. Based on the bank’s overall financial 
performance, it is ranked Class B. 
Data Interpretation 
The following is based on the feedback of three interviewees. One is the CEO and the 
others are senior managers.  Complete profiles of the three interviewees are provided in 
Appendix Exhibit A5.2. 
Dimension 1 
Respondent 17 stated, ‘The biggest challenge is the deployment of funds - where I can 
invest my money.’  
The key challenging factor is ‘adverse economic conditions’17, 18, 26. 
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Dimension 2  
Respondent 26 indicated that because some banks were early movers to this segment, 
they established a sort of monopoly position. He stated, ‘They have enjoyed a sort of monopoly 
in the market and they established a brand and that helped’. 
The most important factor is the ‘monopoly position’17,18,26, and the second is the 
‘lucrative market’17, 18. 
Dimension 3 
Respondent 26 stated, ‘The main thing is that management should have a vision and 
strategy and then a business plan, and all have to be achievable. We are lucky enough to have a 
clear vision. This vision is to grow non-organically through acquisitions and mergers and to 
grab the opportunities.’  
Respondent 17 stated, ‘Your business plan and strategy have to be realistic, very 
focused, and have a time limit’17. 
The most important factor is ‘clarity of vision, strategy and realistic goals’ 17,  26. 
The bank is implementing a consensual approach when crafting its business plan. 
Dimension 4  
 Respondent 18 from the bank stresses the importance of first defining its goals, as set 
by the management, and then leading by senior managers’ behaviour.  
Respondent 18 stated, ‘Our corporate culture is reflected in our performance - who 
writes the business plan. If the management is writing, then they must lead by example. 
Corporate culture has a high degree of correlation with the business plan’. 
The bank describes the relationship between the business plan/strategy and its corporate 
culture as ‘strong’. 
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Dimension 5 
1. Corporate governance
18, 26
, 2. Open-door policy
17
, 3. Teamwork
17
, 4. Clarity of vision 
and strategy 
26
. 
 
Hybrid 2 
Financial Highlights - Amount in US$ millions 
Highlight 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Net 
Operating 
Income 
351.2 447.9 803.4 1,105.3 1,723.4 1,970.6 1,911.4 2,088.4 2,397.3 2,492.5 
Net 
Income 
206.3 262.3 442.1 668.2 1,191.9 632.7 250.3 255.9 133.2 438.5 
ROAE% 20.8 22.6 22.8 23.2 27 11.3 4.6 4.6 2.4 7.8 
CAR n.a. n.a. n.a. 18.9 23.3 22.0 15.2 14.2 13.7 13.9 
Source: Zawya Financial Services 
Financial Interpretation 
The bank has delivered strong performance for the period 2003–2007. However, results 
are inconsistent over the period 2008-2012 before bouncing back in 2012. Also, CAR remained 
tight, at 13.9% at the end of 2012. The bank increased its capital base by 20% through the 
issuance of rights issues (Zawya, June 3, 2012). Based on the bank’s overall performance, it is 
classified Class B.  
The following is based on the feedback of two interviewees. One is the CEO and the 
other is a senior manager.  Complete profiles of the two interviewees are provided in Appendix 
Exhibit A5.2. 
Data Interpretation 
Dimension 1  
Respondent 4 stated, ‘One is that the Islamic banking industry finds it very difficult in 
dealing with regulatory requirements that come from sources that are not related to the Islamic 
banking industry; e.g., Basel II and III and the different bodies that issue regulations’. 
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The key challenging factor is the increase in ‘regulatory influence’4  and the second is 
‘corporate governance’5.   
Dimension 2  
Respondent 5 stated, ‘No Islamic bank - or the overwhelming majority of Islamic banks 
-can enter into the business of derivatives’.   
Respondent 4 said, ‘There are certain aspects of the Islamic banking model that would 
always protect a bank and make it successful to a degree’. 
The most important factor is the ‘Islamic banking model’4, 5. 
Dimension 3  
Respondent 4 stated, ‘Having the right people, having the right leadership. Actually, to 
start with, creating a strategy that is workable, achievable, and realistic - though demanding, it 
is realistic and can be achieved - taking and understanding the markets and relationships’. 
The most important factor is ‘clarity of strategy and achievable goals’4  and the second is 
‘employee competency’ 5.  
Dimension 4  
Respondent 4 stated, ‘You cannot ask for a plan to be executed if you are not part of it. 
If the leadership is not part of the execution of the plan, no plan can be executed right, so 
involvement from the top is very important; the culture has to be unified when it starts 
executing’. 
Dimension 5 
 1. Ethical banking
4,  5
, 2. Staff socialization 
4
, 3. Confidentiality 
4
, 4. Friendly 
environment
 5
. 
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Hybrid 3 
Financial Highlights - Amount in US$ in millions 
Highlight 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Net 
Operating 
Income 
n.a. n.a. 46.1 167.6 473.7 285.1 85.0 198.1 154.5 178.2 
Net 
Income 
n.a. n.a. 37.6 183.8 188.3 85.2 -251.5 -140.0 -61.9 -26.9 
ROAE% n.a. n.a. 14.9 29.7 16.60 7.0 -24.10 -15.3 -7.30 -3.3 
CAR n.a. n.a. 36.8 18.1 25.8 14.4 12.8 13.2 12.9 12.6 
Source: Zawya Financial Services 
Financial Interpretation 
The bank reported a healthy performance, as measured by ROAE (average 24%), for the 
period 2005–2008. Afterward, the performance was poor, as evidenced by the negative return 
on the bank’s ROAE since 2008. This could be explained by the frequent write-offs against 
investments (mainly in real estate) during this period. The bank is shifting its model from hybrid 
to retail banking operations. 
Based on the above, the bank is ranked as Class C.  
Data Interpretation 
The following is based on the feedback of three interviewees. One is the CEO and the 
others are senior managers. Complete profiles of the three interviewees are provided in 
Appendix Exhibit A5.2. 
Dimension 1  
Respondent 1 stated, ‘Most of the Islamic banks, as you hinted, are not fully 
institutionalized. There might be some institutionalized in terms of infrastructure, but 
implementation is very weak’.  
The key challenging factor is ‘corporate governance’1,25, and the second is a ‘shortage of 
liquidity’3.  
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Dimension 2  
Respondent 25 stated, ‘Let’s look at the National Bank of Bahrain. They are enjoying 
and making easy profits because they have the government’s money. National Bank of Kuwait  
also has a lot of government money and that is giving you cheap money’.  
The most important factor is ‘government support’25, and the second is ‘low cost of 
funds’3, 25. 
Dimension 3  
Respondent 25 stated, ‘You have to have the right strategy. It has to be clear and not just 
a strategy written on paper. It is a strategy that can be executed, and you need to have the right 
team to execute it.’  
Respondent 1 said, ‘If a bank is institutionalized and has a good management and puts 
forth a viable business plan that could be implemented - these factors make it a more successful 
plan.’ 
The most important factor is ‘clarity and viability of strategy’1, 25. 
The bank is implementing a mixed-methods approach when preparing its business plan. 
However, Respondent 1 disagreed with this approach. He stated, ‘There is no commingling 
between the board and executive management and the rest of the employees. There is what it 
should be and what it is! The business plan should be a bottom-up approach if you are a retail 
bank; input to the business plan should be done at the branch manager level’.  
Dimension 4 
The bank is shifting its model from hybrid to retail business.  
Respondent 25 stated, ‘We have also changed from investment to retail, so that also has 
to shift because we were used to investment and it’s different. So we had to adapt to the retail 
operations’.  
Respondent 1 said, ‘So, the business plan usually, in many organizations, is not drawn 
by the concerned employee. Basically, it is imposed on them. Not absolutely there - it is weak’. 
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Two of the interviewees stated that the relationship between the business plan/strategy 
and its corporate culture is ‘important’, while one said it is ‘weak’. 
Dimension 5  
1. Open-door policy 1, 2. Reputation 25, 3. Friendly atmosphere 3, 4. Teamwork 25 
 
Islamic Specialist 1 
Financial Highlights - Amount in US$ millions 
Highlight 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Net 
Operating 
Income 
120.6 178.4 187.5 321.5 358.7 573.2 51.7 -349.1 300.9 n.a. 
Net 
Income 
44.8 70.5 104.3 137.5 190.5 362.2 -87.9 -559.4 50.2 n.a. 
ROAE% 25.5 27.5 27.9 20.4 19.2 29.0 -5.8 -42.1 4.6 n.a. 
CAR 36.0 29.0 27.1 40.0 37.1 18.6 17.1 12.7 15.8 n.a. 
Source: Zawya Financial Services 
Financial Interpretation 
The bank posted a strong performance, as measured by ROAE, during the period 2003–
2008. However, the bank reported poor results from 2009 to 2010 before returning to modest 
profitability in 2011. This is attributed to the 2008 financial meltdown. Since the bank has been 
unable to agree with its creditor banks on a plan to reschedule its US$ 1.1 BN Murabaha 
facility, it was forced to file for bankruptcy in the US in December 2011. 
In view of the above, the bank is ranked as Class C. 
Data Interpretation 
The following is based on the feedback of three interviewees. One is the CEO and the 
others are senior managers.  Complete profiles of the three interviewees are provided in 
Appendix Exhibit A5.2. 
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Dimension 1 
Respondent 20 stated, ‘Our balance sheet started to be challenged big time. Like all 
investment banks, liquidity started drying up and the challenge was to stop doing new deals and 
really trying to protect your balance sheet and your existence. And that has been a challenge 
faced not just by us but by all investment banks’.  
The key challenging factor is ‘access to liquidity’2,20 and the second is ‘regaining 
investor confidence’21.   
Dimension 2    
Respondent 20 stated, ‘What happened during the financial crisis is, greed kicked in and 
that greed made the long-term sustainability of the institution less important to, especially, 
senior management. Also, aligning the incentives of management to be long term in nature and 
not short term in nature, that is very important’. 
The most important factor is the ‘long-term sustainability of the business’2 and the 
second is ‘customer orientation’21. 
Dimension 3 
 
The management stressed the importance of building long-term vision. Respondent 20 
stated, ‘The long-term strategy has to be clear. A business plan shouldn’t look at a year or two 
years. It has to have a very solid strategic framework of ‘Where do you want to see yourself 10 
years from now?’ 
The most important factor is ‘clarity of long-term strategy’20, and the second is 
‘internal communication’21. 
The bank uses a top-bottom approach in preparing its business plan. 
Dimension 4  
Respondent 20 emphasises the need to align management interests with those of its 
stakeholders and the need to preserve the original culture.  
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Respondent 20 said, ‘So I think you need to be very mindful to build a culture that 
believes in the long term. So you have to align management, investors, shareholders, and 
stakeholders to a long-term vision’. 
Respondent 2 stated, ‘I think it is very important and to be honest, in our case it would 
have been very difficult to have navigated the financial crisis if we did not have this culture that 
had been built up over a number of years’. The feedback implies the relationship importance 
between corporate culture and business strategy. 
Dimension 5 
1. Teamwork
2, 20
, 2. Informality
20
, 3. Culture fit
21, 2
, 4. Friendly environment
21, 2
 
 
Islamic Specialist 2 
Financial Highlights - Amount in US$ millions  
Highlight 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Net 
Operating 
Income 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 11.1 7.6 8.2 
Net 
Income 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 6.5 2.3 3.1 
ROAE% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 15.6 4.9 6.6 
CAR n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 20.0 17.4 17.5 
 Source: Zawya Financial Services 
Financial Interpretation 
The bank started operations in 2009, and therefore only three years’ worth of 
comparative audited financial information (2010–2012) is available. 
The bank’s performance has fluctuated from year to year, but remains satisfactory 
overall. Average ROAE was 9% for the three-year period. Similarly, net income also showed 
inconsistent results for the past three years (average net income US$ 4.0 MM). 
Based on the above, the bank is ranked as Class B.   
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Data Interpretation 
The following is based on the feedback of two interviewees. One is the CEO and the 
other is a senior manager. Complete profiles of the two interviewees are provided in Appendix 
A.5.2. 
Dimension 1 
Respondent 19 stated, ‘I think it is regaining the trust of the investors, trust in the 
industry, due to the failures and the collapse of some of the investment banks and their 
experiences with these banks, especially in Bahrain’.  
The most challenging factor is ‘regaining investor confidence’19 and the second is ‘lack 
of liquidity’19. 
Dimension 2 
Respondent 19 stated, ‘Sustainability, of course. And you will meet this only if you do 
the proper asset liability management.’ 
The most important factor is ‘corporate governance’19 and the second is ‘prudence in 
investing and lending’22. 
Dimension 3  
Respondent 19 stated, ‘I would say, first, the board’s vision. The board’s vision has to 
be clear, what do they want and where are they heading. Of course, management’s 
understanding of the vision and management’s understanding of the culture. And then you need 
qualified teams to implement.’ 
The most important factor is ‘clarity of vision and alignment to goals’19.  
The bank uses a bottom-up approach for preparation of its business plan. 
Dimension 4 
The management emphasises the role of aligning performance to remuneration. 
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Respondent 22 stated, ‘Culture needs to be developed - where, again, it comes back to 
alignment of interests and remuneration’.  
Respondent 19 said, ‘We are trying to implement an incentive scheme; so we want to 
align the incentive scheme to what we have been doing in terms of the performance’. 
The bank describes the relationship between business plan/strategy and its corporate 
culture as ‘important’. 
Dimension 5  
1. Performance-related pay
19
, 2. Open-door policy
19,22
, 3. Culture fit
19
, 4. Alignment with 
shareholders’ values22. 
 
Conventional Specialist 1  
Financial Highlights - Amount in US$ millions  
Highlight 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Net 
Operating 
Income 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 39.4 -29.3 2.9 4.8 -19.1 5.9 
Net 
Income 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 36.4 -29.5 -10.1 -6.6 -30.1 -0.800 
ROAE% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 20.8 -17.9 -6.8 -4.6 -23.6 -0.72 
CAR n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source: Zawya Financial Services 
Financial Interpretation 
Only six years’ worth of audited financial information is available, starting from 2007. 
The institution’s performance, as measured by ROAE, indicates lacklustre performance over the 
past five years. The institution reported a negative net income over the past five years. This 
could be attributed to the ongoing decline in the investment portfolio in light of the difficult 
investment environment. As such, this institution is classified as Class C.  
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Data Interpretation 
The following is based on the feedback of two interviewees. One is the CEO and the 
other is a senior manager. Complete profiles of the two interviewees are provided in Appendix 
Exhibit A5.2. 
Dimension 1 
Respondent 15 stated, ‘All asset classes have been hit, and this is the first time in my 
career, which goes back to 1985 in the investment field, that I have seen something like this’. 
The most challenging factor is ‘adverse economic conditions’15,16 and the second is the 
‘increase in the regulatory influence.’16 
Dimension 2 
Respondent 15 stated, ‘The main success and why these banks grew a sustainable 
business is because of government help, a lot of it.’ 
The most important factor is ‘government support’15 and the second is ‘corporate 
governance.’16 
Dimension 3  
Respondent 15 stated, ‘Effectively, the business plan requires teamwork between the 
CEO and senior management in putting it together and relaying it to the board to get their 
feedback.’ 
Respondent 16 said, ‘A more realistic plan, achievable. An implementation process that 
you can go through as well as rely on the strength of the management that you have that would 
give you a proper implementation.’ 
The first important factor is ‘realism and achievability of the plan’ 16 and the second is 
‘BoD and management involvement and implementation.’15 
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Dimension 4 
The management stresses the need to implement professionalism and corporate 
governance in the organization. Respondent 15 stated, ‘I think the alignment is relatively strong 
because I think the plan that we put through is achievable. I think we always had as a culture, at 
least since I have been here - we are trying to implement professionalism in our business 
operations in terms of conducting our business at the highest level of ethical code of conduct. In 
terms of corporate governance, we are trying to be even ahead of the requirement of the Central 
Bank of Bahrain.’ 
The company describes the relationship between business plan/strategy and its corporate 
culture as ‘important’. 
Dimension 5 
 1. Adapting to external environment
15
, 2. Teamwork
15,16
, 3. Open-door policy 
15, 16
, and  
4. Flexibility
15
. 
 
Conventional Specialist 2 
Financial Highlights - Amount in US$ millions  
Highlight 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Net 
Operating 
Income 
22,499 22,908 21,612 28,718 31,151 6,608 34,580 30,532 24,319 25,861 
Net 
Income 
598 4,981 4,380 8,781 8,062 -7,613 6,211 6,301 2,965 1,838 
ROAE% 1.1 7.4 11.6 10.2 15.9 -15.6 13.6 13.6 6.6 4.1 
CAR 17.4 16.6 13.70 18.4 14.5 17.9 20.6 21.9 24.2 22.3 
Source: Zawya Financial Services 
Financial Interpretation 
The bank’s performance showed fluctuations over a 10-year period, but most noticeably 
in 2008. Similarly, the bank’s profitability was also inconsistent, especially in 2008, 2011, and 
2012. The inconsistent performance is most likely associated with difficulties in the global 
investment environment. 
149 
 
In view of the above, the bank is ranked as Class B. 
Data Interpretation 
The following is based on the feedback of one manager. A complete profile of the 
interviewee is provided in Appendix Exhibit A5.2. 
Dimension 1  
Respondent 27 stated: ‘I think one of the key things from a local perspective - and 
absolutely, particularly in the Middle East region - is know your client.’  
The most challenging factor is ‘corporate governance’ and the second is ‘increase in 
regulatory influence.’  
Dimension 2  
Respondent 27 stated, ‘Sustaining profitability, and it’s about long-term value for 
shareholders, clients, and the staff of an organization. And it is, again, ultimately client focus. 
When there is a client issue and when there is something to be done for the client, there is 
incredible teamwork within the organization, which is in part driven by shared big rewards, at 
least in the past.’  
The most important factor is ‘customer orientation.’ 
Dimension 3  
Respondent 27 stated, ‘The thing that is required is vision. The bank strives to be the 
most admired bank - known for its financial performance, its returns to its shareholders, its 
regulators, commitment to its employees, its sustainability, its philanthropic work, its corporate 
governance, etc. That’s the vision of our bank. And how do we want to do that? We want to be 
a proactive, principled partner for our clients.’ 
The most important factor is ‘clarity of vision and building sustainable business.’ 
The bank uses a consensual approach when crafting its business plan. 
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Dimension 4  
The bank emphasises the focus on client needs and strategy integration. 
Respondent 27 stated, ‘For us, culture is about having the client at the centre of 
everything we do and being extremely client focused. We achieve that, as we say, by being a 
proactive, principled partner. So we are proactive, we are going to try and help our clients, so 
the culture there is linked to the business plan. So the strategies have to work across the 
divisions together, and then there are the geographic elements of the strategy, and then there is 
aligning the strategy from front to back.’ 
  The bank describes the relationship between business plan/strategy and its corporate 
culture as ‘strong’. 
Dimension 5  
1. Customer orientation, 2. Corporate governance, 3. Reputation, 4. Confidentiality. 
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APPENDIX EXHIBIT A5.2 - INTERVIEWEE PROFILES 
Interviewee 1- Hybrid 3 (Age: above 50)  
Ex-Chief Executive Officer (ex-CEO) of a major Islamic retail and investment bank in Bahrain. 
He has more than 30 years of banking experience in both conventional and Islamic banking. 
Currently, he is serving as a board member in a number of Islamic financial institutions.  
Interviewee 2 - Islamic Specialist 1 (Age: 40-49) 
Executive Director in charge of Corporate Finance and Administration. The interviewee is a 
chartered accountant, worked previously with Ernst & Young and has been member of this 
institution for more than 15 years. 
Interviewee 3 - Hybrid 3 (Age: above 50) 
General Manager - Retail Banking for a major Islamic bank in Bahrain (Hybrid). His past 
experience includes HR and corporate administration. He has more than 35 years of banking 
experience, including 10 years with this institution. 
Interviewee 4 - Hybrid 2 (Age: 40-49)  
CEO of an Islamic retail and investment bank (Hybrid). The bank is a subsidiary of a major 
Islamic bank located in Kuwait. He has more than 15 years of Islamic banking experience and is 
a certified accountant from the US. He has been with this bank since its inception (14 years). 
Interviewee 5 - Hybrid 2 (Age: 40-49) 
Senior Vice President in charge of the Legal Department. He interacts frequently with Shari’ah 
board members on issues relating to deal structuring. Previously, he worked for the Norton Rose 
law firm. He has been a member of this institution for more than 10 years.   
Interviewee 6 - Conventional Generalist 1(Age: above 50) 
CEO, a seasoned banker of a major conventional retail bank in Bahrain. The bank is one of the 
major commercial retail banks in Bahrain and has branches in the GCC and India. The 
interviewee has more than 35 years of banking experiences, including 12 years with this 
institution.   
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Interviewee 7 - Conventional Generalist 1 (Age: above 50) 
General Manager - Operations and Support. He has more than 30 years of banking experience, 
all with this institution.  
Interviewee 8 - Conventional Generalist 1 (Age: above 50)  
General Manager, in charge of retail and corporate banking activities. He has more than 35 
years of banking experience, including seven years with this institution. 
Interviewee 9 – Conventional Generalist 3 (Age: above 50) 
CEO of a retail bank that offers a window of Islamic banking services. He is part of a new 
management team that was appointed four years ago to change the bank strategy on domestic 
retail operations. He is a chartered accountant and has more than 30 years of banking 
experience, most of which has been in accounting and auditing. 
Interviewee 10 - Conventional Generalist 3 (Age: above 50) 
GM - Support Services. The interviewee has more than 28 years of banking experience, 
including three years with this institution. Most of his banking experience has been in the retail 
sector. 
Interviewee 11 - Conventional Generalist 3 (Age: 40-50) 
Vice President of Corporate Banking. He has more than 20 years of banking experience, 
including 10 years with this institution. Most of the interviewee’s experience has been in the 
corporate banking sector. 
Interviewee 12 - Islamic Generalist (Age: above 50)  
Senior Vice President – in charge of Strategic Planning for a major banking group located in 
Bahrain. The group has a presence in the form of subsidiary banking units and representative 
offices in 15 countries. The interviewee is a chartered accountant, has more than 33 years of 
accounting and banking experience, and has been with the group for more than nine years.  
Interviewee 13 - Islamic Generalist (Age: above 50)  
Group CEO –a very experienced banker, with more than 30 years of banking experience, mostly 
in wholesale banking. He has been with the group for the past 10 years. He was instrumental in 
restructuring and rebranding the group’s marketing strategy. 
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Interviewee 14 – Islamic Generalist (Age: above 50) 
Group Head – Risk Management. A very experienced banker with more than 35 years of 
banking experiences, mostly in wholesale banking. He has been with the group for the last eight 
years. 
Interviewee 15 - Conventional Specialist 1(Age: 40-50) 
CEO - In charge of a medium sized investment institution that invests mainly in the MENA 
region. He has more than 25 years of experience, mostly in investment portfolio management. 
He is a Certified Financial Analyst and has been with this company for more than 15 years, 
including five years as the company’s CEO. 
Interviewee 16 - Conventional Specialist 1 (Age: 31-39) 
Senior Manager - in charge of Direct Investment Unit. She is responsible for the company’s 
private equity and real estate activities regionally and internationally. She is a CFA and has 
been with the company since 2005.  
Interviewee 17 - Hybrid 1 (Age: 40-49)  
CEO of a major Hybrid bank in Bahrain that was established eight years ago. He is a certified 
accountant from the US and worked for Ernst & Young for more than 20 years. He has been in 
this position since the bank’s inception.    
Interviewee 18 - Hybrid 1 (Age: Above 50) 
Chief Operating Officer (COO) – Primarily responsible for risk management policy and overall 
administration. He has more than 20 years of banking and auditing experience and has been 
with this bank since its inception eight years ago.  
Interviewee 19 - Islamic Specialist 2 (Age: 40-49) 
CEO - In charge of a privately-owned investment bank. He is a chartered accountant from the 
US. He has more than 15 years of banking experience, and was the head of banking operations 
at the CBB. He has been with the bank since its inception (six years ago).  
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Interviewee 20 - Islamic Specialist 1 (Age: 40-49) 
CEO - In charge of a major Islamic investment bank that was established in 1997. He is a 
chartered accountant from the US and has been the bank’s only CEO since its inception (15 
years). 
Interviewee 21 - Islamic Specialist 1 (Age: 40-49) 
Executive Director in charge of private equity; he has been with the institution since its 
inception (15 years). He has more than 20 years of banking experience, mostly in the 
investment banking area. 
Interviewee 22 – Islamic Specialist 2 (Age: 40-49)  
Executive Director –in charge of the Direct Investment Unit. He has been with the bank since 
its inception (six years) and has more than 15 years of experience in investment banking 
activities. 
Interviewee 23 - Conventional Generalist 2 (Age: above 50) 
CEO of a major regional retail and wholesale banking group. He is regarded as one of the top 
Arab bankers in the region, and was instrumental in establishing this group nearly 12 years ago. 
He has more than 30 years of banking experience, mostly in the wholesale banking area.  
Interviewee 24 - Conventional Generalist 2 (Above: 50) 
Deputy CEO - Head of Risk & Compliance. He is a chartered accountant, has more than 25 
years of banking experience, and has been with this group for the last 10 years.  
Interviewee 25 - Hybrid 3 (Above: 50) 
CEO - Head of an Islamic retail and investment bank. He has more than 30 years of banking 
experience, and has been with this group for the last 15 years.  
Interviewee 26 - Hybrid 1 (Above: 50) 
Deputy CEO of a major Hybrid bank in Bahrain that was established eight years ago. 
Previously, he worked as a deputy governor for the CBB and holds a PhD in management from 
a UK university.  
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Interviewee 27 - Conventional Specialist 2 (Age: 40-49) 
Executive Director - Head of GCC operations for a major European private bank that is more 
than 100 years old. He has more than 25 years of banking experience, including 12 years with 
this bank. 
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APPENDIX EXHIBIT A5.3 – RESPONSES WITH REFERENCE TO CODING 
MANUAL* 
(refer to Appendix Exhibit A.4.4– Coding Manual) 
* superscript numbers correspond to Respondent numbers 
ACCT International & Regional Accounting Reporting Bodies  
 For example, as soon as a certain product is approved, there is an 
accounting standard to it as per Accounting and Auditing Organization 
for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) guidelines 
1
.  
 The problem with AAOIFI standards is that they haven’t kept pace with 
recent changes in international accounting standards; I think AAOIFI 
needs to do a big push to bring many of their accounting standards in line 
with the latest international accounting standards 
2
.  
 There is no regulation and individual countries need to impose it, it’s not 
like IFRS which has to be followed (not enforceable) 
2
. 
 So I think AAOIFI has done a lot of good I would say developing those 
standards
11
. 
 When the AAOIFI was formed, it started a complete revolution as far as 
Islamic banking knowledge is concerned. They made a more disciplined 
structure and once that happened, in my opinion that was a catalyst for 
many of the known Islamic banking fraternity to recognize that there is 
such a thing as Islamic banking 
12
.  
 Because we are available in too many locations, our accounts are issued 
in compliance with the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) requirements. And then we convert it into AAOIFI standards, 
because when you submit it to the Central Bank of Bahrain, you have to 
submit it based on the AAOIFI standards 
13
. 
 For examples Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and UAE. 
They are now trying to find ways of implementing them. But Bahrain 
was very clear; they said that all Islamic banks should apply AAOIFI 
standard 
13
.  
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BUS Business Strategy 
 We here in Islamic banking, we do it as per the request and shelve it. Just 
to be fair, certain parts of the Business Plan (‘BP’) are achieved and 
implemented. BP should be a bottom-up approach if you are a retail bank, 
the input of BP should be done at the branch manager levels, but, what is 
happening – the approach is top-to-down. So, BP usually in many 
organizations is not drawn by the concerned employee. So, the alignment 
between corporate culture and the BP is not there? Not absolutely there, 
but is basically not founded there – it is weak1. 
 In our bank, there is a strong alignment between the business plan that we 
have and the corporate culture and in a way this has safeguarded a lot of 
organizations 
6
. So there is definitely a strong relationship 
6
. 
 I think it is strong.  The performance of any organization has a lot to do 
with the internal culture as well as proper leadership, reading of the 
market and proper risk management, understanding your risks, 
transparency with everybody including your customers, shareholders and 
regulators 
7
. 
 So, in order to have a culture where there is a full alignment between the 
business plan and the organization, so from day one we don’t impose it 8. 
 I think the alignment of the business plan and corporate culture is very 
important and it plays a key role in the success of any institution, not only 
banks, any company. There is a very clear correlation between the two
9
. 
 So, yes, culture does have a key role in executing the business plan of any 
institution. And I think this is what we are trying to do here 
9
. 
 So we are aligning it up with the local culture here and trying to keep 
individuals responsible. It’s not only the management, it’s individuals 
responsible to come up with innovative ideas 
10
. 
 So your corporate culture should be aligned to your business as well as 
your plans. You can do all the planning you want; you can do all the 
numbers you can do and all the charts to fit in. If those guys can’t deliver 
what you are looking for, then there is no use 
12
. 
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 Well, we have some big clients, but most of our clients are either retail or 
SMEs, individuals who own small businesses and with whom we work 
closely. That culture and that customer base fits our culture and therefore 
fits our business plan 
14
. 
 I think the alignment is relatively strong because I think the plan that we 
put through is achievable 
15
. 
 We develop a forecast on a year by year basis and our performance is 
going to be measured to it and any incentives are based on that. So in 
general I would say it is aligned and it should be aligned 
16
. 
 Your business plan and strategy has to be realistic and very focused and 
have a time limit 
17
. 
 You should have a culture and this must be related to your business plan. 
Example, the compliance culture in an organization is vital. Same as risk 
appetite as defined by the BoD should be reflected in the human 
behaviour based on the risk/culture compliance. This all has to be aligned 
– what will be a reflection of your performance is the corporate culture 
and not the plan 
18
. 
 When we write the business plan, what is reflected in our bottom-line is 
our commitment and culture (management style) to the organization. And 
our corporate culture is reflected in our performance and who writes the 
business plan – if management is writing, then they must lead by example 
18
. 
 Corporate culture has a high degree of correlation with the business plan 
18
. 
 It is usually strong and this is what we are trying to implement - an 
incentive scheme. So we want to align the incentive scheme to what we 
have been doing in terms of the performance 
19
. 
 We are a big believer in that, and I started my first comment on the first 
question you asked about the sustainability of that. We believe everything 
should be long-term related and if the management that you hire has 
short-term objectives, don’t hire them 20. 
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 So you have to align management, investors and shareholders. All 
stakeholders have to be aligned on a long-term vision 
20
. 
 If I read it as is, I would say the relationship is very strong and difficult to 
detach yourself from the cultural part of it. I think it will really have a 
measurable impact on your business plan 
21
.  
 I think in our case the answer to it is that the alignment is very strong 23. 
 I think it is strong because the overall vision is quite understood 24. 
 If people do well then we give them nice bonuses and if they don’t 
perform then we have to know what is the problem and why. Because in 
the end you are responsible towards the board to achieve your business 
plan. The management will be kept accountable by the board 
25
. 
 I think we are lucky enough that we have a clear vision. The vision was 
to grow non-organically through acquisitions and mergers and to grab the 
opportunities, because it will take time to do it through organic add-ons 
26
. 
 So the strategies have to work across the divisions together and then there 
are the geographic elements of the strategy and then there is aligning the 
strategy from front to back. And therefore consistency of vision and 
strategy while yes making amendments, you have to know what you want 
to do 
27
. 
 We have seen business plans (BP) that were not viable ones and I will 
blame the Board of Directors (BoD) as a body responsible for achieving 
the BP. Go back to my earlier statement, whether BoDs are qualified 
1
.  
 I think the number one priority is to have good quality people (qualified) 
if you want to implement a good business 
2
.  
 Actually to start with, creating a strategy that is workable, achievable, 
realistic, though demanding it is realistic and can be achieved, taking and 
understanding the markets and relationships 
4
. Continuously updating the 
plan, face up to the realities of the time of the day, of the changing 
markets, become aware of those aspects and do change; don’t sleep on 
your plans and resist the huge currents. Being very proud, face conflicts 
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and handle them with courage. Don’t hesitate in changing and going to 
the board and saying look we’ve missed it or the circumstances have 
changed and we need to change 
4
. What I mean to say is that when you 
have a plan, if the people who are trying to work out that plan don’t feel 
they are part of it, believe in it and monitor it, they will tend to relax 
4
. 
 The most important factor I would say is to have a clearly set strategy, 
especially in difficult times during crisis. If you don’t have a strategy that 
you stick to, you tend to be operating in a haphazard situation. But when 
you have a clear cut strategy and you know where you want to go then 
you tend to focus 
6. It’s like a blueprint, you may need to adjust according 
to the situation but at least you have a clear cut strategy with a target that 
you want to achieve 
6
.  
 To have a strategy that has been thought out very well and to stick to this 
strategy. If you operate without a strategy you will be going left right and 
centre
6
.  
 It is a bottom up approach rather than top to bottom approach. With 
bottom up, people in the field they know what is going on and they can’t 
be influenced by the wish of a promoter or of a shareholder 
6
.  
 First, defining up front what your strategy is and what is your plan. You 
need to have flexibility where you can adjust your plan based on external 
environment 
7
.  
 Of course we have bottom-up approach where we first analyze the market 
and see where the opportunities exist. Based on that, we define certain 
initiatives that we would like to undertake, but to be frank with you the 
word that you used ‘crafting your business plan’ is very crucial for our 
business 
7
. 
 Even the environment in which we are operating in which I have 
described, I think this does become a necessity and to be successful you 
really have to plan your business plans and future strategies very 
carefully 
8
. 
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 First, for a bank to be successful you really have to be well tuned-up to 
the environment that you are operating in 
8
. 
 Second, you need to have to have very good vision and detection of what 
is going on in your market 
8
. 
 An organization needs to be lean, agile and also flexible 9. 
 Business plan is really based on how can you expand your market share, 
How can you gain more. Our business plan is very aggressive in trying to 
attract newcomers to our products. That’s why we are renovating our 
systems
10
. 
 The strategy of the department has to be in line with the overall strategy 
of the bank. The direction of course will come to the board and then 
cascaded to the CEO and then to the different business units. The strategy 
has to be in harmony with your customers’ needs 11. 
 I would say first is a solid understanding of your existing business model. 
That is the starting point. If you don’t understand your existing business 
model, your business plan will never be successful. Second you 
understand your markets very clearly 
12
. 
 Actually ours is a mix of top down and bottom up. It’s both; it’s a mix of 
both 
12
. 
 In our case because it’s a small company then you would probably 
involve maybe top senior management and the CEO with the board to put 
the business plan together, but this is a unique case 
15
. 
 But what assists an organization to execute its business plan more 
effectively, as I said, it has to be clear. The business plan has to be 
realistic 
15
. 
 Effectively the business plan is kind of a team work between the CEO 
and the senior management in putting it together and relaying it to the 
board to get their feedback 
15
.
 
  A more realistic plan, achievable. An implementation process that you 
can go through as well as rely on the strength of the management that you 
have that would give you a proper implementation
 16
.
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 I would say it’s a mixture of two 16. 
 Your business plan and strategy has to be realistic, and much focused and 
has a time limit and has action plans that really execute any vision 
17
. 
 I would say first the board’s vision. The board’s vision has to be clear, 
what do they want and where are they heading. Of course management 
understanding of the vision and management understanding of the 
culture. And then you need qualified teams to implement 
19
. 
 The long-term strategy has to be clear. A business plan shouldn’t look at 
a year or two years. It has to have a very solid strategic framework of 
where do you want to see yourself 10 years from now 
20
. 
 I am more of a top down type of thing. Where is the big picture? To 
whom are we trying to sell? What is the product? What is the margin? If 
you don’t have these big picture variables identified then it will be 
useless just sitting down and cascading down numbers 
20
. 
 A lot of institutions we saw want to capture the success in the short term 
and they don’t really want to keep it on the long term 21. 
 Be ambitious but aim for achievable goals. Communication of your plan 
to your team is really vital 
21
. 
 I will do it bottom up 21. 
 I really meant is whenever you implement and have your business plan, 
what I’m saying is try to feed it from bottom up 21. 
 Very much so, I think that is also lacking to a great extent. As you said 
mostly it is driven from top down 
22
. 
 The first and foremost and this is something we are trying that one has 
come to appreciate or understand is the interest of the shareholders; 
because that feeds through 
22
. 
 I believe in very close attention to the annual budget and having a vision 
and a business strategy where the bank as a whole wants to go. But a 
business strategy is different from a business plan 
23
. 
 The second thing you need is to have clarity of vision. So clarity of vision 
needs to be defined 
23
. And most people in the good times are over 
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ambitious and in the bad times are over depressed. I think the problem is 
lack of clarity 
23
. 
 The third key point is defining one’s destiny. There are two ways of 
defining the destiny. Either the management or the boards do it or you 
retain outside help 
23
. 
 And why is that very important? Because if the strategy is built between 
the management and the board, the management is accountable for the 
strategy 
23
. 
 So when I say defining one’s destiny, I think there has to be greater 
pressure and obligation by the board and the senior management to define 
this vision and to define the strategy. And strategy is an overused word, 
everybody uses it and what does it really mean 
23
. 
 The third thing is a general rule that we all tend to forget in the banking 
business, which is prudency 
23
. 
 In doing your business plan the first key role is realism in ambitions and 
resources 
23
. Number two is attention to details. Number 3 is focus on 
sustainability. You have to make money this year but how you make 
money this year should help you make money next year. The fourth point 
is alignment of remuneration to goals. You set your goals but make sure 
you pay your people according to the goals you set (‘Meritocracy’) 23. 
 I think one of the problems that can happen in organizations is that the 
plan or the objectives really aren’t understood, they are not clear. Not all 
that is communicated is understood 
24
. 
 In the actual crafting of the plan it is senior management with the board 
and relaying the plan down to the middle management. But it’s a 
partnership between board and management in the actual crafting of the 
plan and the agreement of the plan. The communication of the plan in our 
case essentially goes all the way down in the organization 
24
. 
 We have always believed in something that is sort of sustainable. So our 
compensation packages and bonuses are really focusing on sustainability 
24
. 
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 You have to put the right strategy and you focus on that strategy. It has to 
be clear and not just a strategy written on paper. It is a strategy that can 
be executed and you need to have the right team to execute it 
25
. 
 The main thing is that the management should have a vision and then 
strategy and then business plan. And it has to be achievable. You also 
need to have the resources, the manpower to implement the strategy 
26
. 
 I think we are lucky enough that we have a clear vision. The vision was 
to grow non-organically through acquisitions and mergers and to grab the 
opportunities, because it will take time to do it through organic add-ons 
26
. 
 Yes of course and they are given a target. The target should be 
achievable. The business plan has to address the potential growth of the 
bank. How much will you grow in investments, how much will you grow 
in retail and corporate and what are the expected profits 
26 
. 
 And now for the sustainability going forward it’s about getting that 
business model right, which balances the challenges we were speaking 
about before like Basel 3, national requirements, difficult markets, 
profitability and cost cutting. So you have to have a strategy that balances 
all of that out 
27
. 
 Absolutely, the development of strategy comes in many forms. There is 
the top down vision that has to listen to the bottom up approach as to 
what’s happening on the ground. That has to fit in with the market 
conditions at the time 
27
. 
 So we are proactive, we are going out to try and help our clients so the 
culture there is linked to the business plan 
27
.  
 
CHAL Key Challenging Issues 
 Now we do not have unified Shari’ah guidelines/background 
fundamentals – being acceptable in one bank, does not mean the same is 
acceptable in another bank 
1
.  
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 So, the issue is on the conceptual side – some banks do not accept what 
others approved. This can be regarded as one of the challenges that 
Islamic banks face today 
1
. Of course, on the negative side, you cannot 
produce enough products which are acceptable to all 
1
. 
 For example, if one bank accepts the concept of ‘Tawarq’, the other 
might not
1
. 
 I will hand out many challenges; one thing is just liquidity, the bank 
lending market has really dried up., even the lending in commercial 
banking is much less but for investment banks it’s very difficult at this 
stage 
2
. 
 I think within the control, I think the management teams of many of these 
banks are very thin; they don’t have enough qualified experienced people 
in many of these organizations 
2
. 
 The first one is really the ability to introduce new products because of the 
Shari’ah compliance nature of the product. Each and every product or 
even processes and various Islamic services will have to go through the 
Shari’ah supervisory board 3.  
 So it is also the turnaround time for launching new products and services 
is very slow compared to conventional banks 
3
. 
 We have realized that there are shortages of scholars not in Bahrain but 
worldwide and in the region mostly 
3
. 
 So on one hand, as I said, the deposit funding cost is high; that is because 
they are taking deposit at a higher rate 
3
.  
 Islamic banking cost of funds is higher –because they are paying higher 
profit on deposit and that raises their cost of fund 
3
. 
 I think they still need more talents. What is happening, I have seen over 
the years that majority of those that are now at senior level or middle 
management level, they have come up from within. The influx of new 
blood is very little as compared to the people that are coming from 
within. But we always need experience from the other side 
3
.  
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 There is one challenge with this; the central bank still thinks more of 
conventional banks. They still deal with Islamic banks in the same way 
they deal with conventional banks 
3
.  
 One is that the Islamic banking industry finds it very difficult in dealing 
with regulatory requirements that comes from sources that are not related 
to the Islamic banking industry e.g. Basel 2 and 3 and the different bodies 
that issue regulations 
4
.  
 In the Islamic banking industry especially, normally the practices come 
faster than regulation and if you don’t have sufficient regulation coming 
from different sources you are bound to follow a set of regulations that 
might not really meet your requirements 
4
.  
 The absence of entrepreneurs creates a bigger role for the Islamic banking 
industry to take that money and funnel it through to developing projects 
4
.   
 Now I think one challenge we have as an Islamic bank is what is the legal 
position of the Shari’ah board? Because when you look at their power 
and where they sit in the organizational chart, they are very much at the 
top. They have the power to stop transactions. Now this brings you to an 
interesting issue, accountability 
5
.  
 We expect the Shari’ah scholar to be knowledgeable in Shari’ah, but also 
knowledgeable in banking and you know yourself there are so many 
different types of banking
5. You need the Shari’ah qualification, but also 
you need the banking qualification and sometimes that means saying I’m 
sorry I really don’t have experience in this area, and I’m going to have to 
spend a bit more time looking into it 
5
.  
 Another problem we have here in this region is where do you get the data 
from? How reliable is the data? Are you just looking at annual reports? 
To what extent is the true day to day operation of a bank included in there 
5
. 
 But, if you ask me what are the most challenging factors these days, I 
think banking in general, the interference of regulators even to the issue 
of having a say on executive management rewards 
7
. 
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 We are operating in an environment that is way over-banked and so 
added together to the market volatility, it is increasingly difficult to 
predict future market conditions. So, putting a business plan is becoming 
increasingly more difficult 
8
. 
 The other challenge that we face today is an overly increasing regulatory 
environment, overly increasing processing environment that is primarily 
emanating from the regulatory concerns 
8
. 
 The maintenance of higher than usual liquidity has become a necessity 
and that would also create challenges on your profitability; higher 
liquidity means lower profitability of course 
8
. 
 The challenges today are as I said market size, saturation, 
competitiveness – cut throat interest rates, which is driven by good 
abundance of liquidity in the market 
9
. 
 Significant challenges that are faced by the bank are due to not only 
increase in regulations but the nature of those regulations. The regulator 
has been seen as interfering in the business of the banks 
9
. 
 The main challenges we have faced in Bahrain is the number of 
conventional banks available on the island with the size of the population. 
Trigger it with the recent restrictions that we have from the regulator 
10
. 
 So the real challenge we are facing is how to retain the customers that 
you have and how to increase your market share within such a limited or 
sizeable population 
10
. 
 When the credit rating of a country is affected, our credit rating as a bank 
gets affected. When our rating gets affected, then we are suffering from 
borrowing. Cost of fund becomes very expensive 
10
. 
 I think what banks have been facing since two or three years is the 
liquidity (main issue) and finding acceptable credit risk - customers or 
banks 
11
. 
 Competition is high. Our rivals are competing with us not only on the 
services, but also on margin and tenor 
11
. 
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 The cost of fund for us as a bank is definitely higher than the other local 
banks that have been in the market for 50 years or more. The cost of 
fund, whether like interbank borrowing or customer’s deposits is not 
cheap anymore 
11
. 
 In addition, we are getting pressure from the Central Bank of Bahrain 
(CBB) to lower our commissions charged to customers 
11
. 
 In addition, we need to be ready for Basel 3 requirement which might 
come into effect in 2014 
11
. 
 Now as far as the challenges, it will always have its challenge of 
credibility to start with, that was the first challenge 
12
. 
 One of the challenges we have is corporate governance 12. 
 One of the challenges that we had was communication; we have five 
different languages in the group
 12
. 
 I think the major one is the new Basel 3 requirements, which is now 
being discussed and there is a big debate on this Basel 3. I hope that 
Islamic banks will be able to abide by Basel 3 
13
. 
 The second thing is you know to keep the standard. In the past few years 
Islamic banks spent a lot of money on IT and their corporate image. This 
is to enable them to bring it to the level of the international institutions 
13
. 
 The third issue is that Islamic banks have become big and they are 
expanding regionally and internationally, you have to face new cultures, 
environments, competitions and all these are challenging issues to any 
local Islamic bank 
13
. 
 The fourth one is updating our standards to be in line with AAOIFI 
standards, which is the accounting standard obviously 
13
. 
 You have the challenge of corporate governance, which is always one of 
the main issues 
14
. 
 I will not go into details about what good corporate governance is but this 
is another challenge 
14
. 
 The regulatory environment, yes that’s another one. It has increased or 
it’s still missing in some countries. The Islamic banks in Lebanon, 
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Tunisia and Algeria are still facing very tough times because the 
regulatory environment is not there for Islamic banking 
14
. 
 The first thing I would say is regulations, changing regulations 16. 
 The one important factor I would say is the funding. Whether it comes 
from a strong shareholder base that will provide the support and the 
funding for the growing need of capital 
16
. 
 The biggest challenge is the deployment of fund - I would say where I 
can invest my money – the biggest challenge I have. Second, trying to 
find an acceptable credit risk. Third, is finding growth? These are my 
local challenging issues 
17
. 
 I think it is regaining the trust of investors, trust in the industry, due to the 
failures and the collapse of some of the investment banks and their 
experiences with these banks especially in Bahrain 
19
. 
 Also the downgrading of credit rating on Bahrain. Some of the 
international banks withdrew their credit lines and this again affected the 
liquidity of banks. Not being able to get finance or borrow from 
international banks 
19
. 
 Our balance sheet started to be challenged big time. Like all investment 
banks’ liquidity started drying up and the challenge was to stop doing 
new deals and really trying to protect your balance sheet and your 
existence 
20
. 
 And fortunately the adoption was going very quickly but events around 
us were direr and more tense than we could manage and that’s why we 
have gone to Chapter 11 
20
. 
 And the lesson learned is that whenever a huge issue like this comes up, 
which is the global financial crisis, is that people need to confront it 
quicker. I think we were a little bit slower in confronting the problem 
20
. 
 But we were big and a big bank like us needs access to liquidity. And if 
the Islamic banking industry has limited liquidity access and limited 
hedging techniques, then it is very hard to see sustainable models like us 
if there is no financing market ready to support it. This is very 
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fundamental now we are realizing, it’s not just because we had a 
mismatch, and the mismatch is because we didn’t have tools to work with 
20
. 
 Finding core investors. Those who have in a way lost confidence in a lot 
of institutions because of the crisis 
21
. 
 The liquidity issue is very important and it’s the basis to drive any 
organization. If you take an example when you buy an asset or divesting 
from an asset, the liquidity is playing a big part of it 
21
. 
 The third one is responding to the regulators, I think this is also a big 
challenge because of what happened, Basel 1, 2 and 3 
21
. 
 I think the biggest challenge they face is strategy and focus and the 
reason I say that is I think it goes back to the boom years in the Gulf 
where the bulk of investment companies were setup 
22
. 
 First of all shareholder intervention. Boards that do not represent the 
shareholding structure of the businesses that are overweight, certain 
minority shareholders that have disproportionate influence on the board. 
Extended longevity of directors and boards. Absence of external pressure 
from other shareholders to force the board to look at developing the value 
of the business
23
. 
 This is not just an impediment in the context of a bank like us seeking to 
grow by acquisition; it shows the mentality of the directors, that their 
primary responsibility should be towards the shareholders and not to 
themselves 
23
. 
 The second thing that I see as a key challenge is overreaching and 
sometime excessive regulatory interference 
23
. 
 I think the right balance between regulator interference and management 
accountability is a key challenge and that’s my second point 23. 
 My third point is really the obvious one, in economic conditions and 
market conditions that are quite negative. If the economy is smiling and 
happy and prosperous then banks are too. If it is not then the banks will 
look like the real economy that they have to deal with 
23
. 
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 So those are my three key challenges that I thought are relevant, 
corporate governance, regulatory interference and adverse economic 
conditions 
23
. 
 Obviously the economic conditions, the economic conditions are difficult 
globally and in the MENA region things have been exacerbated 
obviously by the Arab Spring which has created uncertainties 
24
. 
 What we have also seen as banks which are a different type of challenge 
is some more regulation really 
24
. 
 The bank in 2010 everybody thought that this bank will go down because 
of liquidity 
25
. 
 Confidence as well as I think that the banking sector was moving faster 
than the regulators 
26
 
 If you see now Basel 3 has been postponed because there are some 
countries that were not able to cope with it 
26
. 
 I think one of the key things from a local perspective and absolutely 
particularly in the Middle East region is Know Your Client 
27
. 
 So I think the challenge which we are seeing internationally is the 
increase in regulation generally 
27
. 
 
COMP Regulators and Shari’ah Compliance  
 Now we do not have unified Shari’ah guidelines/background 
fundamentals – being acceptable in one bank, does not mean the same is 
acceptable in another bank 
1
. Some scholars see this issue as a healthy 
sign as it leads into more research into this topic and is regarded as 
‘different of opinion issue’1.  
 So, the issue is on the conceptual side – some banks do not accept what 
others approved. This can be regarded as one of the challenges that 
Islamic banks face today. This is also regarded as one of the religious 
‘Shari’ah issues’ as well 1. I do remember that our Shari’ah boards are 
open minded ‘think conventionally and we will do it Islamically’. If you 
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bring a bond issue structure (conventional) and we will look to do it 
Islamically. But, finding the way is not always acceptable by others 
1
. 
 Even the Central Bank of Bahrain at one stage – why we do not establish 
a Shari’ah board within the Central Bank to standardize approved 
products 
1
. However, one well-known scholar (Sh. Nizam Yaquby) 
disagreed because he saw this as Ejtihad – to allow scholars to make 
efforts to come up with new Shari’ah structure and if you want to 
progress the industry, then you should have different view of opinions. If 
you do not have this skill, then the industry will be stand-still and that is a 
positive side to it. 
1
.  
 True, yes that part of it, but even when there are products, investors are 
shying away at the moment. There are always going to be less products 
because of Shari’ah restrictions and especially interbank market, treasury 
products because you can’t deal with fixed income products 2. And also 
going back to your point on the scholars, that also have made some 
innovative rulings, for example Islamic private equity, there is a lot of 
innovation that took place in terms of Shari’ah structuring 2. I think KFH 
and Al-Rajhi because they have good incumbent positions. KFH they 
didn’t allow other Islamic banks to function, they are the only Islamic 
bank and they captured the market in the beginning and there are barriers 
to entry in those markets, I think it has less to do with 
2
.  
 But the first one is really the ability to introduce new products because of 
the Shari’ah compliance nature of the product. Each and every product or 
even processes and various Islamic services will have to go through the 
Shari’ah supervisory board. Unlike the conventional because they don’t 
have restrictions and the sky is the limit for them that side 
3
. So the 
turnaround time for launching new products and services is very slow 
compared to conventional banks 
3
. We also have Shari’ah audit, we have 
auditors, we have compliance and we have risk management. So the 
business is really cornered between these four dimensions 
3
. 
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 I think it is very important as a challenge for Islamic banks to face today 
is how well they adhere to Islamic values. I think we can see that there is 
a potential danger certainly before the current financial crisis that the 
Islamic banks were trying to copy conventional banks and basically come 
up with Shari’ah-style solutions to methods of conventional banking 5. I 
think the challenge for Islamic banks today is actually to have the 
confidence to follow Shari’ah and follow Islamic values 5.  
 I think increasingly regulators are playing more roles in defining what is 
the minimum risk management that should be in place? 
7
. 
 I believe it is to do with more involvement from the regulators, from the 
public, as well as the transparency issue for banks 
7
. 
 I would say the fastest growing department in any commercial bank 
today is the Compliance Department 
8
. 
 Islamic banks today do state upfront the profit rate, which cannot be. If 
you have a Mudaraba account or a Musharaka account, you cannot state 
the interest rate or the profit rate because it depends on how the project 
does. At the end of the day, you find your profit and you share it between 
the Mudaraba and Rab Al Mal. But today some Islamic banks will state 
you a profit rate regardless of the type of investment and how it does. So 
this in its way also is not in my opinion Shari’ah compliant 9. 
 There is an increase in regulation. Recently for example, Central Bank 
came up with some regulation to control the fees and commission 
imposed on individuals in the retail banking market. So they want to 
monitor that, which most of the banks are against it 
10
. 
 For example in Malaysia the banks follow some different fatwas and 
Shari’ah ruling than, say, in Bahrain 14. 
 Better regulation definitely should help the market but at the same time to 
some extent it might also restrict the business so it needs to be balanced 
19
. 
 Now increasing the level of regulation does not necessarily reduce the 
level of risk. It depends if the regulation is effective or bureaucratic 
23
. In 
174 
 
my assessment, regionally the pendulum has gone too far. With the 
regulators in many cases adopting a line which is closer to management 
decisions then it is to regulatory oversight 
23
. 
 It is a bit autocratic. They have not just tried to change the prudential 
regulations of liquidity and capital but also bringing in some corporate 
governance roles. Some of which might not fit in with our particular 
region and the way we are in terms of economic development 
24
. 
 Regulation should be there. I am one that believes that you have to have a 
regulator, because there was no regulator that’s why we had problems 
with some of the banks 
25
. 
 
CORP CUL Corporate Culture 
 In our bank, we always focused on the slogan ‘style of life’ in our 
organization. If a customer comes, ‘we do things differently that makes 
your life much better 
1’. So, we have done few things to be seen as the 
first – possible feature of our organizational culture 1.  
 Other issue of our bank – management style important to attract qualified 
staff and by that – having an open door policy - friendly but yet a tough 
by the rule policy. Co-mingling – emphasising staff socialization, from 
low to high staff,  and support your staff to the full extent by listening to 
their needs 
1
. A few staff left the organization for money, but return back 
because they said ‘I’d rather work for a healthy organizational 
environment, rather than for more money’. In my opinion, yes there is 
innovation/creativity in organizations, but also personal touches in the 
management style 
1
. 
 I think it is very important to be honest, in our case it would have been 
very difficult to have navigated the financial crisis if we did not have this 
corporate culture that had been built up over a number of years 
2
.  
 Obviously a good corporate culture should have accountability, not just 
being friendly; you shouldn’t tolerate bad performance for example. I 
think it is essential that people are held accountable and you have 
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performance benchmarks that you are judged against and you know these 
things in advance. Good culture has to make people accountable 
2
. Yes, 
and also if you want to say something that is slightly critical or 
aggressive to somebody you just call him ‘Sheikh’ and it makes it softer 
and a nicer way of saying things, this is something that is particular to our 
organization 
2
.  
 If you walk into any of our offices, the look and feel is the same so 
people feel at home, so the furniture the furnishings and the carpets are 
all similar, so you feel that you are part of one organization 
2
.  
 I think our culture is very different, if I have to describe our corporate 
culture, we emphasise team work, working collaboratively across 
functions, we are very collegiate, you see that we are very friendly and 
we look after each other 
2
.  
 We like our colleagues and we recruit people who fit our culture 2.  
 People are not working here just for money; they enjoy working with 
their colleagues and even if somebody offered them a higher salary etc., 
they would not necessarily just move for the higher money because they 
are giving up this culture that they may not be able find in other places 
2
. 
 Let me talk about my own institution, we have very high respect for 
transparency 
3
. 
 In any Islamic bank you should see modesty in dressing. Also 
confidentiality regardless of regulation and what is required of you in that 
regard 
4
.  
 We have a dress code where ladies are required to wear head cover and 
people are required to be Islamic in their outlook, not to do un-Islamic 
things 
5
. 
 But I think we are looking at the accountability of that board. And also 
the quality of the advice they give. When I looked into this a little bit 
deeper, how much time do the Shari’ah scholars at some of the financial 
institutions, how much of their time do they spend looking at paper work. 
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But in this time of corporate governance and accountability, where is the 
accountability at that point 
5
.  
 Now you know the CEO is accountable to the board and the board is 
accountable to the shareholders. Who is the Shari’ah board accountable 
to? And I think this is a challenge 
5
.  
 I would describe our corporate culture as Islamic. We try to create a 
family friendly atmosphere and I think you can see this in our business 
plan 
5
. 
 I would say again of all the Islamic banks I’ve been involved with, either 
advising them from a legal perspective or as a private practice law firm, I 
would say there is a need for looking smart, for looking like bankers to 
inspire confidence and respect. I think we like showing respect to others 
and receiving respect for values and culture - ours is the strongest I have 
seen of all the Islamic banks 
5
.  
 We have a social committee which encourages people to go to social 
events but also encourages putting things back into society, helping out 
society. At the same time as well, I think we are quite traditional and 
conservative, we want people to come in on time and we want offices to 
look like bank’s offices 5.  
 I think we attract people who are serious about their religion, who are 
interested in their religion and really want to further Islamic banking. I’m 
not sure of too many other institution that you could go to and really 
practice Islamic banking like the way we do. You’ve got Shari’ah 
adherence embedded in the culture, in the code of conduct, in the dress 
policy, in the decision making 
5
.
 
 We very traditional, very conservative5. I think we are looking at 
professionalism and education. We need more of the Islamic bankers to 
have professional qualifications; we need them to be thoroughly 
ingrained in their educational qualifications 
5
. 
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 So we have strong corporate governance in Bahrain and the culture of 
course is supervised by the corporate governance that we have here in the 
bank 
6
. 
 By the way you know that our bank has for the second time won the 
corporate governance award in the entire GCC 
6
. 
 Poor corporate culture has led banks and organizations to deep trouble. 
But when we have good corporate culture it safeguards your business 
definitely and it makes the process of making decisions in a much more 
professional manner 
6
. But because our corporate culture and corporate 
governance was so strong and strict in our bank and well politicized, we 
have managed to stay away from many problems that we would have 
been dragged into because of poor corporate culture and poor corporate 
governance 
6
. 
 Whenever you can, introduce new culture, professional culture, efficient 
culture, a few matters, I did introduce to this bank as a culture definitely. 
Our slogan now is ‘brighter banking’ but in the past it was ‘together we 
grow’, that was the slogan of the bank. And indeed it has been reflected 
in the culture of doing business 
6
.  
 Our bank is a local bank and we have to stay with our customers in the 
bad and good days. Another unique thing which I think is very much 
appreciated by our clients is the promptness in our response time 
6
.  
 Yes we do have socialization; it is a very friendly environment here. Our 
CEO and our GM and the people under them are easy going and reached 
by others 
6
. It probably could be an attribute for staff motivation 
6
. The 
style followed by the CEO in this organization is truly very unique. He 
gives a lot of freedom to the head of the departments 
6
.  
 The thing that cannot be copied is your internal culture, the way you do 
things in a flexible atmosphere as ours. And I am proud of our bank, we 
are known as the people bank. Very friendly in dealing with customers, 
they like to deal with us, they feel that we are more open and we listen to 
them 
7
.
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 And you know the innovation, this is something that you can have as 
written values for your organization, but the real challenge is how you 
make them happen 
7
.
 
 We are lucky that we have a board that always appreciate the introduction 
of new products/services based on a new technology in the bank. And it 
is our internal culture that pushes us to introduce new products after 
appraising it carefully. Sometimes we are successful, sometimes not 
7
.
 
 You need to develop some plans to adjust to this environment 8. 
 In order to implement it properly, you need to have a very lean and 
flexible organization. If you have a very rigid organization, if you have a 
very rigid culture and structure you are highly unlikely to succeed 
8
.
 
 How quickly you can adapt and sustain that. And that is very key; you 
find that some banks are very good at this where some banks the culture 
is very rigid and not easy to adapt to change 
8
.
 
 Has created a very open environment that is very inductive for 
cooperation and in executing our plans together 
8
.
 
 I think we in Bahrain with our main market here, we are very much 
viewed as user friendly, very easily approachable. We have a very broad 
client base and we are the people’s bank 8. 
 We have one of the best, if not the best user-friendly e-banking. It has 
recently been complemented with SMS and mobile banking and we will 
continue to be open and pro technology and we will invest in innovation 
8
.
 
 So I think overall we view innovation as important for us. We invest in it; 
we take care of our clients 
8
.
 
 I don’t know whether you have seen our corporate values, we have 
pioneering, creativity, reliability and passion. So we have those four 
corporate values 
8
.
 
 My way of doing business is very simple. I call it accessibility. If you 
accept a job, any job, no matter what, even if you are a CEO, you have to 
be accessible to the people you provide services to 
9
. So I think that 
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creates a culture also and you are accessible and so does everyone in the 
organization 
9
.
 
 At Arthur Andersen we had a policy there and I stayed there for 22 years. 
We call it the open door policy 
9
.
 
 Credibility, brand name and history of the bank itself play a key role in 
not only attracting deposits but attracting very good cheap deposits 
9
.
 
 Here we employ the open door culture. We are accessible at any time, 
from the CEO till the lower level 
10
.
 
 Here there is a lot of confidence. A lot of assignment of responsibility 
given to a lower level, who can really decide, take a decision and be 
responsible for a decision 
10
.
 
 So we have to work as a team 11. 
 We have to stay very close with the customers since our relationship with 
them is very important. If you fulfill the customer requirements, and if 
you have clear vision about your plan as a bank, this will pay off 
11
.
 
 I think for corporate culture first you should know your customer and 
their requirements, tailor made or come up with products which suit their 
requirements and try to be close to them 
11
.
 
 And what we found that by staying close to our customers, we benefited a 
lot in terms of new business and sustainability in general 
11
.
 
 So our corporate governance structure is very robust, so now that added 
to the fact that our low risk and added to the fact that we are retail has 
resulted in this kind of performance that we had 
12
.
 
 I think we have one of the finest corporate governance structures in the 
region 
12
.
 
 So the way of doing things is very collegial and I would say the corporate 
culture and the business model we have, it is called consensual. The 
decisions are made on a consensual basis 
12
.
 
 There is a culture where people don’t face up to the difficulty. First there 
is a problem, and secondly who is responsible for it. There is a sense that 
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some of the problems will disappear, they never disappear, and they 
always come back and hit you much stronger then the first time 
14 
.
 
 Taking our group  corporate culture is that we as a retail bank feel very 
strongly and we say in the branding too that we are your partner bank 
14
.
 
 The relationship between the individual account officer and the client is 
close and that is really what is happening all over the branches we have. 
So that corporate culture is positive, somebody referred to it as coffee and 
tea culture 
14
.
 
 People say why our group is so successful? I say because, from the 
General Manager down in the operating units in all these countries they 
are very well connected. They know their markets; they know who not to 
deal with and who to deal with 
14
.
 
 With the rebranding of the group, I think the corporate culture, the 
awareness of the corporate culture, the focus on the corporate culture 
became very strong 
14
.
 
 I think BBK is actually more successful because they keep adapting and 
they keep innovating things because they don’t get as much preferential 
treatment as NBB 
15
.
 
 But overall your culture is like genes, your genetic things, now culture is 
evolving like genetics. How does mutation happen in terms of culture, 
like mutation happens in genes is because you have different people 
coming in whether at the board level or management level. The old 
culture never dies and then the battle happens and then you have to build 
on it 
15
.
 
 My philosophy is to have a balance between very strict and disciplined 
attitude and behaviours and to inducing flexibility and work satisfaction 
15
.
 
 The culture, as I said, is more open door, it’s more team work and people 
out of their own they stay very late if they have a specific assignment to 
finish; so it is that kind of culture 
15
.
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 The other thing that I think our company always had as a culture at least 
since I have been here is that we are trying to implement professionalism 
in our business operation in terms of conducting our business at the 
highest level of ethical code of conduct 
15
.
 
 Also communication I would say between the management and the board 
in terms of what they need to achieve and proper reporting 
16
.
 
 What I would say is that the culture complements achieving the business 
plan. If we are talking about our organization for example I would say it 
is aligned 
16
.
 
 We always maintained a very friendly working environment which I 
would say it is one of the best which I have experienced 
16
.
 
 An open door policy which helps a lot in certain issues 16. 
 The management overall here works together as a team which enables the 
junior staff to learn and develop 
16
.
 
 You have to earn your money (sense of responsibly and accountability). 
This concept applies to all whether you are a CEO or a normal manager. 
Sometimes managers unfortunately work to protect their image rather 
than working hard to justify their salaries by making customers satisfied 
17
.
 
 I implemented an ‘open door’ policy – especially when there is a 
legitimate reason to see the CEO, since I do not believe in hierarchy 
structure of management 
17
.
 
 I do believe to work as a team and not ‘a dictatorship style’. I believe in 
team work and I am still influenced by E&Y culture since I stayed there 
for a period of 20 years 
17
.
 
 Finally, our culture has changed over the years – based on my personal 
experience and job preferences – to do certain things (desired culture) 
based on the ongoing job experience and adaptation to market condition 
17
.
 
 So, risk management is a key function. Therefore, I do not see why 
Islamic banks’ organizational structure is different from those of 
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conventional banks. An organization in general has to be robust and must 
be aligned to functions 
18
.
 
 We have a CEO who places a lot of trust and reliance on the support and 
control functions 
18
.
 
 Selection of management team was very closely done (culture fit) since 
the inception, although we have gone through a lot of changes 
18
.
 
 If you really want to be successful in the market, we must meet clients’ 
expectations, so that we take and prioritize these complaints, filter them 
and try to solve them quickly 
18
.
 
 Yes we want to differentiate between someone who is performing but all 
the team should be rewarded 
19
.
 
 We have a very friendly environment. We make sure when we recruit 
someone he fits the culture 
19
.
 
 It is very open; we have an open door policy with less formality. This is 
something that we want to continue 
19
.
 
 Corporate culture that is truly cultivated and shows at the worst of times. 
We are in Chapter 11, if we were a greedy Wall Street hit and run type of 
mentality, then we would have left by now 
20
. 
 Technically we use collective wisdom and this is important to us 20. 
 The good thing is that where the culture was nurtured, initially it was in 
Bahrain, the culture is still there. The further the offices are the more the 
culture is being eroded. We need to rebuild it if things happen well with 
Chapter 11; we just have to rebuild that culture 
20
. 
 We do things very casually, like the offsite meetings that we have; and 
things really get discussed more seriously over lunch and dinner than the 
presentations that we see. So we used the cultural intimacy that we 
developed to get things resolved and move along 
20
.
 
 So I think you need to be very mindful to build a culture that believes in 
this long term 
20
.
 
 It’s a challenge even as part of our culture, how to downsize 21. 
183 
 
 Each organization has its own uniqueness I would say. We are unique in 
different ways. We are family oriented, we are Islamic 
21
. 
 And you will relate to the client in calling him ‘Sheikh’ or calling him 
‘friend’ or calling him ‘buddy’. That has a good impact actually 21. 
 A general theme would be focusing on client needs is a major thing to 
keep and sustain your business. So you have to adhere to your clients, 
you have to listen to them; you have to know what they are looking for 
and in a way try to drive your business plan 
21
.
 
 It is very important. I think communication in any relationship, if you are 
talking about a domestic relationship or an employee relationship that is 
key because it helps prevent misunderstandings and it’s clear why you 
are doing certain things
22
.
 
 That in terms of openness and in terms of treating everybody as a team 22. 
 And we see our vision as our main strength, our strength is not our size, 
we are not the biggest. Quality, I never argue that I’m better than others 
because there is always somebody better than you 
23
.
 
 We work hard, we are a meritocracy and we have no preferences for 
people based on religion, sex, nationality etc 
23
.
 
 The third point is to work cross border; people have to know and trust 
each other 
23
.
 
 The final point I think is because we don’t have the luxury of being very 
big in size, we don’t have the luxury of being a government bank with 
government money bailing us out or giving us easy profitability as you 
have many banks across the region that are very dependent on the 
government. So we really have to work harder and be professional. And I 
see this as a big strength to compensate for our lack of advantages in size 
or in shareholding 
23
.
 
 Accountability is there and that is reinforced through particularly the 
compensation type of packages and the bonus type of structures 
24
.
 
 The concepts we do have which are a part of the fabric is kind of hard 
work, commitment and dedication and that’s what we try to pass along 24. 
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 It is a meritocratic organization based on hard work and ethics. Perhaps it 
is the nature of the bank we are in but a lot of the success is based on just 
commitment, discipline and a focused approach 
24
.
 
 Then we have an overall review and we keep the people accountable 25. 
  I think in terms of accountability it has improved no doubt. Better 
discipline also. Now I think for the past two or three years staff are aware 
of their responsibilities and their contribution 
26
.
 
 The thing that is required is vision. The management must have a vision 
about what they want to do. And that vision can come in various forms. 
The bank strives to be the most admired bank known for its financial 
performance, its returns to its shareholders, its regulators, commitment to 
its employees, its sustainability, its philanthropic work, its corporate 
governance etc. that’s the vision of our bank 27. 
 And it is again ultimate client focus and when there is a client issue there 
and when there is something to be done for the client, there is incredible 
team work within the organization which is in part driven by shared big 
rewards, at least in the past 
27
.
 
 The senior management of the bank 10 or 12 years ago has absolutely 
focused in on the reputation. For a while we had an internal motto which 
was ‘Stay out of trouble’ and that was it. So we focused and focused and 
focused on that and I think that culture in ingrained in our organization 
27
.  
 For us culture is about having the client at the centre of everything we do 
and being extremely client focused 
27
. 
 So there is a certain element to our brand which we obviously carefully 
manage our brand and our reputation and all this comes together 
ultimately. For me it’s about the client being at the centre and that 
proactive principled partnership. That for me is what’s fundamental 27. 
Now in 156 years of private banking tradition a key thing for Swiss banks 
has been banking secrecy. The banking secrecy rules are extremely tight 
27
. 
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CORP GOV Corporate Governance 
 Conflict of interest within Shari’ah board also exists (by virtue of serving 
two or more competing institutions) 
1
. 
 Most of the Islamic banks as you hinted are not fully institutionalized. 
There might be some institutionalized in terms of infrastructure, but 
implementation is very weak
1
. In Islamic banking, there are some 
infrastructure policies but not comprehensive as you would see them in 
conventional banks. But the implementation of those is not to full-speed, 
full-extent 
1
.  
 There are a lot of loopholes and gaps in these policies if compared to 
advanced conventional banks. I do not see fully institutionalized Islamic 
institutions as yet. Basically, whether this issue relates to board of 
directors (BoD) or management fault. Also, it is usually ‘a one man 
show’ or ‘founder issue’ 1.  
 I will take this further to say that we do not have qualified BoD members 
including independent members who are specialized in the industry 
1
. 
But, this is not facing the Islamic banks only, but also the conventional 
banks. I see a big diversion from the BP because of management – not 
institutionalizing all the organization and there are not sort of measure for 
the implementation of the business plan 
1
. I will answer on this, if a bank 
is institutionalized and has a good management and put a viable BP that 
could be implemented – these factors making it more successful BP 1. 
 Risk management (RM) in Islamic banks, I will call it as ‘substandard’ – 
less than standard. Now, a basic element of RM is the diversification of 
exposure
1
. Asset risk rather than management risk. Lack of 
diversifications in respect of industry, sector, country, maturity and profit 
rate. All Islamic banks ignoring this, and instead focusing on where you/I 
making more money – short sighted 1. There are also certain operational 
risks which are not dealt with: infrastructure, and human capital. 
Therefore, RM is less what it should be 
1
.  
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 You are absolutely right, I have been in this region and sector for the last 
15 years and you still see the same group of scholars still being 
represented in most boards. I’m not sure what the solution is, even the 
scholars they need to take steps to train their students. 
2
  
 The board also needs to be involved and needs to monitor 
implementation progress, etc. I think boards need to be more hands on 
and if things are not going according to plan they need to take corrective 
action even with senior management
2
. We should encourage banks to 
have more independent board members, people with specialist skills, 
because usually they are represented by the shareholders 
2
.  
 Some Islamic banks carry foreign exchange risks or other risks just 
because of lack of hedging instruments, in the same way that are 
available in the conventional bank 
3
. Islamic banks the majority they 
don’t have high rating. That is also another reason why there isn’t 
interbank lending 
3
.  
 You need to strengthen your risk management, your investment 
guidelines, the human resource guide, a strong board, all of that without 
giving up the model, because the model actually is important for society 
and it’s also important as a diversification to the balance sheet 4. A 
diversified pool of assets, Islamic banking is very conducive to having 
that diversified pool 
4
. 
 Those that stuck to the Islamic values in this regard and they said sorry 
that this securitization structure does not work; I think that was not only 
good for them as an individual bank, but also good for the Islamic 
banking sector 
5
. 
 We have policies and procedures that cater for all sorts of business 6. 
 I think one of the challenges for most of the banks in the country is to 
ensure that they have enough liquidity, because liquidity is the safety net 
for any bank during any crisis 
6
. Luckily, I would say that our bank did 
not have the liquidity problem during the crisis, after the crisis and until 
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now. What we have suffered as a commercial bank is excess liquidity and 
not a shortage or lack of liquidity
6
.  
 In Bahrain overall things that are happening is that most of the Islamic 
banks’ management of risks has been a bit weaker than the conventional 
banks. But that is not by design and it cannot be generalized 
6
.  
 When you have cheap sources of funding you can always find good 
avenues of deploying these assets and basically make that margin that 
you desire as a bank to make up your bottom line 
6
. On the other hand in 
Bahrain there is a tendency of lending secured 
6
.  
 But commercial banks always have the source of customer deposits and 
that’s what has safeguarded those 6.  
 In our bank, we have already taken a decision in this strategy that we 
wanted to diversify or to retrench our lending from international markets 
into more GCC markets. Because we believed in the GCC markets, we 
believed in the stability of the GCC markets 
6
.  
 So you need to have proper conservative and clear risk management 
policies where deploying your money and customers’ money should be 
done in a very safe manner 
7
. So for the risk you are taking by lending 
and investing that money, you need to make sure that you have proper 
risk management 
7
. 
 First, I think the capital adequacy is a very important thing, so the 
shareholder needs to put their money first because they are getting more 
rewards than others. So the capital they invested in operations should be 
more than enough for the underlying risk 
7
. 
 Second, the risk management policies should be adequate as dictated by 
regulators 
7
. 
 And I think so many banks in Bahrain have learned it unfortunately the 
wrong way because there was so much heavy concentration in one sector 
of the market namely ‘real estate’, which proved to be not a good 
strategy
7
. 
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 These measures by regulators are necessary to make sure that all 
stakeholders, shareholders, and depositors’ interest are protected. And 
that there are clear and transparent mechanisms to measure financial 
performance of a bank to justify the rewards for management 
7
. 
 When a bank lends money, it must have a clear direction about risk 
appetite, which sector you chose to lend to, there is proper diversification 
of portfolio where a bank does not concentrate on sectors like real estate 
or manufacturing. This of course should be triggered by proper analysis 
of the market, and reading the future 
7
. 
 There are a number of banks unfortunately who made a good fortune in 
the short term, but the real challenge is the sustainability of profitability 
rather than having a short-term profit 
7
. 
 There will be always some pressure to have short-term profit. You need 
to strike a balance from all these aspects to make sure as management to 
properly monitor the risk so you can sustain your business profit for 
longer periods 
7
. 
 Specifically, if you go into what banks do, the reliability of funding is 
increasingly becoming challenging. The funding as a whole, if you are 
relying on interbank or part of it, this source is drying up 
8
. 
 You also need to have a very well diversified revenue stream amongst 
your business sectors or business lines. In our case anything more that 
30% to 35% in one sector means we are running a risk 
8
. 
 We have tried to move from one product relationship to at least three or 
four product relationships 
8
. 
 Yes, core business and they don’t have concentration. I mean if you 
interpret their balance sheet, you will see that they have equal percent 
lending to retail, investment, and commercial, which really they benefited 
from the diversification concept 
11
. 
 So risk management is one of the key reasons for why banks can succeed 
or fail today 
12
. 
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 So the best and most professional way of handling this, the investments, 
the financing and the assets on your balance sheet is always to make sure 
that there is diversity 
14
. 
 Yes the most important thing is that Islamic banks should not just do 
opportunistic business and sort of follow a herd mentality 
14
. 
 So definitely over time this is not sustainable, so you need to downsize 
and reduce the cost from the operations which are not making money 
15
. 
 In terms of corporate governance we are trying to be even ahead of the 
requirement of CBB 
15
. 
 Proper risk controls and measure, proper credit rating and everything; or 
proper conduct of business 
16
. 
 Sustainability of course. And you will meet this only if you do the proper 
asset liability management 
19
. 
 For the proper management of a bank definitely you need strong 
infrastructure, systems, policies and procedures and risk management 
system. All this should be in place 
19
. 
 And I think it is a big issue that needs to be addressed from even a 
legislative, if we look at the US, is to align the incentives of management 
to be long term in nature and not short term in nature and that is very 
important in doing all of that. Sustainability, one thing we have as an 
issue here is really and very important, we never saw it this way but 
lately and even the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) is seeing it 
20
. 
 So we couldn’t match our balance sheet because exits dried up. But some 
of the conventional banks could have sustained themselves by financing 
through secondary markets 
20
. 
 One more thing, having a very effective risk management is important for 
sustainability. And add to that corporate governance 
21
. 
 I think with those two names the first thing that comes to mind is 
conservative
22
. 
 Prudence seems to have gone out of the window in the way some banks 
handle their risk management. I do not subscribe to the theory that 
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modern technology and the emphasis that the regulators have done on the 
risk management have necessarily improved risk management of the 
banks and the proof of what I’m saying is the losses you keep seeing 
across the board 
23
. 
 We were able to kind of adopt a clear strategy and that has helped us 
weather this particular storm and the problems that have been 
experienced 
24
. 
 We felt to be competitive we have to adapt to the market condition 
quicker than our competitors and that was going to give us an edge 
24
. 
 You have to draw your road map - the culture and the corporate 
governance are important; because if you have not set up your corporate 
governance right then you will face these difficulties 
25
. 
 The main thing is that there should be segregation of duties. Proper risk 
management and as I said, visionary proactive management 
26
. 
 Now banking is a risky business and there is risk you take anytime you 
do anything, but trying to maintain your reputation for the bank, for the 
client, for the regulators and for the shareholders is critical 
27
. 
 
DOCTR Doctrine 
  Now, it was around 1975 when the first Islamic bank started (Dubai 
Islamic Bank). At that time, there were only two products: Mudaraba and 
Murabaha. Everything else is not acceptable. In 37 years, the industry has 
advanced and progressed well. We have today sukuks and certain 
hedging products 
1
. 
 Because when you talk about Islamic banking you’re talking about 
ethical banking 
3
. Islamic banks generally are not greedy, you find that 
they are taking their deposit for example, the pricing in their deposit is 
much higher, and the profit rate of the offer is much higher than the 
profits offered by conventional banks that are on the liability side 
3
.  
 Islamic banking, as I said, it is ethical banking, their margin is very small, 
and they are working in turnover, very heavy turnover. So that is my own 
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analysis 
3
. In many cases the bank at times make less money than what is 
expected but never charge it to the customers and they take within their 
own and they give the customer what they have promised him, so it’s 
about ethics 
3
.  
 The third attribute of Islamic banking is people like to move to Islamic 
banking on religious grounds 
3
. 
 And lack of some products for corporate, for retail, such as overdraft for 
example. It is another hurdle that you cannot get a lot of customers 
banking with you because you don’t have that 3. Finance is a ‘Murabaha’ 
in Islamic finance which means it is buying and selling 
3
. 
 On the retail side for any finance transaction for example, it takes longer 
because ‘Tawarq’ and other third parties are involved 3.   
 The Islamic banks really have got an advantage with the Shari’ah board, 
because the Shari’ah board is, this is an important aspect of banking 
under the Islamic model, the Shari’ah board is more pro customers than 
they are, as the perception goes, pro the shareholders. They are very pro 
customer and I have attended many Shari’ah board meetings and the 
fatwas are there, they can’t allow a bank to take advantage of a customer 
because of his absence 
4
. 
 For example, no Islamic bank, or the overwhelming majority of Islamic 
banks, they cannot enter into the business of derivatives 
4
. They have lost 
the underlying mortgage because they have done so many derivatives at 
the end of the day they ended up referring to almost the paper mortgage 
because the value has spread over billions of dollars that there is no 
match between the existing assets and the papers issued. This is not 
allowed in the Islamic banking industry and therefore the big hit that has 
happened to the industry did not come and would have never come from 
the Islamic banking industry 
4
. 
 Actually the Islamic banking model is that of investment. Investment in 
the form of loans, investment in the form of developing a country, 
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developing a society, and developing across the border. Islamic banking 
funds ought to be used to develop societies 
4
. 
 I think the best way to describe Islamic banking in the international arena 
without raising an alarm is ethical banking 
5. So we feel there is ‘Ajur’ in 
this whereas conventional banks don’t think of ‘Ajur’, they just think of 
how much money they are making and how much time 
5
. 
 There are certain aspects of the Islamic banking model that would always 
protect a bank and make it successful to a degree 
4
. 
 Within number one there is abiding to the Islamic Shari’ah principle, 
taking the social responsibilities, taking the culture, taking the philosophy 
with Islamic principles. We don’t just lend for lending. We lend because 
there is some need for it. And we don’t take deposits unless we know that 
we can employ it 
13
. 
 
ECO Economic  
 I think the second thing is, because of the corrections in the global 
investment markets and especially the real estate market in the Middle 
East, a lot of investors have lost a lot of money during the financial crisis 
in 2008 and they have burned their fingers, so even when they need to 
invest and they have money set up, they are a bit reluctant to invest these 
days and that’s on the customer side of the investment banks 2.  
 First of all just talking about banking generally, I think the whole sector 
has got a number of issues and principally a lack of confidence, certainly 
worldwide in the whole banking system and the banking structure 
5
. 
 Today you know in Bahrain after the political crisis that has started in 
February of 2011, the main challenges that are faced by all banks in 
Bahrain, all the commercial local banks in Bahrain, our bank is included. 
It is basically to safeguard the quality of its assets on the one hand. And 
on the other, is to continue the business activity knowing that these 
business activities have slowed down tremendously 
6
. 
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  All the excess cash that the Middle Eastern banks used to place with the 
international banks has now been brought back into the region 
6
.  
 All asset classes have been hit and this is the first time in my career – 
similar incident happened 1985 in the investment field, that I have seen 
something like this 
15
. 
 There are issues that could impede the growth of the world economy like 
the on-going dispute between US and China on trade issues, the Euro-
zone crisis, US debt crisis and the near emergence of China as the biggest 
economy in the world 
17
. 
 Finding a core and good asset or divesting from your current asset 
because of the market conditions today 
21
. 
 If you see Europe today, Europe is economically going through a very 
difficult time. This has impacted the banking sector now which is very 
awkward. Now if you take RBS or Lloyds, the main shareholders are the 
tax payers which shows that the public is lending money to the bank 
while it should be the other way around 
26
. 
 
GEN Generalist (which means Retail Banking) 
 I think among Islamic banks there is cut throat competition between all 
Islamic banks; there are so many players now in the market in the retail 
3
.  
 And it won the trust of the people, so it’s a very trusted organization and 
it weathered the storms of the financial crisis ‘Al Hamdulelah’, because 
the model has been retail and investment and also as we said as an 
Islamic bank you are heavily collateralized. You are heavily backed by 
assets because physical tangible assets are an important article to be in 
any transaction whether it is funding or of course investment 
4
.  
 On the other hand in Bahrain there is a tendency of lending secured 6. Of 
course you have most of the commercial banks, the security they have on 
hand is real estate. At the outset, when we lend to customers, we take a 
margin, for a possible fall in the price of the real estate, even if the price 
of the real estate goes down, because of the long-term relationship there 
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may be corrections and banks may suffer temporarily but they will 
recover later on because of the movement in the real estate prices 
6
. We 
have to lend but more cautiously, more securely 
6
. 
 People are now shifting from investment banks to commercial retail 
because they believe that this is the right banking – sustainable and 
secure. But it has some challenges, competition; international banks are 
moving now and also trying to compete with you in your home markets, 
namely HSBC and Standard Chartered 
7
. 
 I think these banks have been in the market for ages and benefited from 
the new monopoly 
11
. 
 So retail banks are in a better position and also had better assets and 
liabilities structure. This is because their funding is more reliable and 
generally lower cost
14
. 
 Well, in Islamic banking we do not have a similar Islamic bank with so 
many subsidiaries and such international reach. In conventional banks, 
you could say some of the Al Ahli United, I mean talking Bahrain only, 
and Al Ahli United could be a bit similar 
14
. 
 But given the financial crisis, local retail conventional banks were 
probably safer than the investment banks, but in general this crisis has hit 
not only the financial institutions but almost every aspect of the 
economy
14
. 
 Al-Rajhi started as one of the first Islamic banks in the region. Their 
success is initially based on the free fund (float) – this allows them to 
invest this fund on short -term basis and achieve decent return 
17
. They 
are not necessary as very bright or a smart institution. We should also 
point out that Al-Rajhi is located in a lucrative market which accounts for 
nearly 75% of the overall GCC economy 
17
. 
 Meanwhile, KFH – although they are similar position like Al-Rajhi – 
benefited from being first mover to the market, they also benefited from 
the government support, their 49% ownership of the bank 
17
. 
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 The fifth point and final point on why some conventional banks are more 
successful is stable low cost deposits 
23
. 
 So we weren’t adversely affected on the interbank side but even so I 
think banks have fully understood the reliance on interbank is a 
dangerous thing. So customer’s deposits are the answer in all our units 
and not just in Bahrain and that has been our focus 
24
. 
 We are always thinking about what type of business is sustainable, and 
the business which is sustainable is always retail 
25
. 
 It has changed because we have also changed from investment to retail so 
that also has to shift because we were used to investment and it’s 
different. So we had to adapt to the retail operation 
25
. 
 
HYBR Hybrid Model  
 None of the retail Islamic banks have been successful and if some 
institutions made good money in the past 2-3 years, these are not 
sustainable-core business from the market 
1
. Some banks like Al-Rajhi in 
KSA and KFH in Kuwait made a good profit because of the non-earning 
accounts. In general, the big income does not come for example from 
retail product developments, but from the exceptional non-earning 
accounts - usually coming from a single obligor 
1
. 
 Taking about Bahrain, some of the retail Islamic banks – in good times, 
they made good money because of the revaluation of real estate assets 
and they made big losses in bad times. So, no sort of consistency here 
1
. 
Now, but unfortunately, there is no co-mingling between the boards and 
executive management and the rest of the employees 
1
. 
 The good thing about Islamic banking is it focuses on the asset 5. I think 
that will come back, but I think that is the main driver for the success of 
the retail banks in the boom time. They got into the retail mortgage 
business 
5
. 
 Therefore, first movers benefited from this ‘hybrid’ model over the 30 
years and replicating this module by newcomers with limited capital 
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resources may not work. KFH is a time tested model. That’s why they are 
a leader and profitable 
18
. 
 
LEAD Leadership Role 
 Having the right people, having the right leadership. 
 I think it’s the leadership of the bank; it’s difficult to put a cultural test. A 
culture is intangible, it is the way you handle yourself, the way you 
handle your business as you go on. And starting from the leadership, 
luckily we have gone through a number of leaders who had strong and 
positive culture that has been implanted in the bank and the majority of 
the staff have sort of gained or accepted that culture. But when I arrived 
here there was very strong culture in the bank, a very healthy culture I 
would say 
6
. 
 That culture is a main driver of us gaining market share, building the 
brand and being profitable, because without it we cannot do it. And in my 
opinion it always has to come from the top. It can never be bottom up
9
. 
 There was a desired culture – CEO implanted this initially, but maybe 
this desired culture was not achieved immediately. We worked-worked- 
worked and established the desired culture over the 5-6 years time 
18
. 
 If the leadership is not part of the execution of the plan, no plan can be 
executed right, so involvement form the top is very important 
6
. 
 In the bad times that’s really the real test where you get the true 
differentiation between who has the inner strength or not 
23
. 
 
MKT PSY Market Psychology  
 The Islamic banks do not have a good relationship with each other and 
they do compete with each other fiercely rather than complementing each 
other. There are certain personal and ego issues – ‘I want to be a head of 
others’ 1. ‘Why I build a relationship, why I co-invest, co-share if I can 
do it myself’. These are not structural issues but sort of moral or 
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‘intangibles’ 1. Nobody wants to deal with me. Unlike, the conventional 
banks where we see a lot of transactions, all the big banks participate 
with each other even if one bank participate as a lead-manager in a deal, 
others joined the deal as co-lead managers 
1 
.  
 It’s a psychological issue and that going to take some time. People need 
to forget what happened and have confidence that things are not going to 
get any worse, because it started in 2008 and got worse in 2009 and 2010 
and we don’t have real signs that we have permanently come out of the 
crisis, and they hear about Europe and US in recession, all that is creating 
negative sentiments for the investors 
2
. I think the second thing would be 
that we enjoyed good economic success for a number of years, oil prices 
were high, liquidity was available and people had money to invest and 
obviously that led to the success of the Islamic financial institutions 
2
. 
 People are very reluctant to deal with investment banks because they 
perceive that to be more risky 
2
.  
 I think there should be more cooperation between Islamic banks 3.  
 Another challenge is that the public at large is not well aware about how 
Islamic banking works. It is a very unique form of banking though it 
could be similar in some aspects but it is significantly different in spirit, 
as opposed to what really people think that at the end of the day they are 
the same, no they are very different 
4
. 
 Perception versus reality, so the public need lots of education to know the 
real essence of Islamic banking, especially the ethical aspects of Islamic 
banking and the Shari’ah aspects of Islamic banking that pushes it 4. 
Another important difference that people are not very aware of is that the 
Islamic banking industry commingles the funds, and in commingling the 
funds of the depositories and its own assets, the share capital and 
borrowed money are obligations on the balance sheet of the Islamic bank 
through the shareholders. When you bring those monies together, 
whatever is generated of profits, the profits are distributed 
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proportionately after the deduction of the appropriate expenses and 
therefore in most cases if not in all of the cases
4
. 
 So it is an embarrassing situation in the country today, you have a certain 
sector of banks who are too much in need of liquidity and you have 
another sector of banks who are enjoying an ample amount of liquidity 
6
. 
The psychological effect that has affected the Islamic banks in Bahrain 
has made this imbalance in the liquidity between the conventional and 
Islamic 
6
. So they think conventional banks are safe and Islamic banks 
are not as safe as conventional banks 
6
. 
 The ordinary customer in the street cannot distinguish between an Islamic 
commercial bank and an Islamic investment bank. He just groups all the 
Islamic banks in one part and he says, this is an Islamic bank so the risk 
is high because we have seen some Islamic investment banks go through 
trouble. He does not recognize that the commercial bank whether Islamic 
or conventional is under the umbrella of the Central Bank of Bahrain 
6
.  
 Now, I would say the conventional banks are in a better liquidity position 
6
. 
 I think it has a lot to do with the brand and the credibility of the brand 9. 
 See that was one of the problems, they didn’t connect with each other; 
they didn’t talk to each other 12. 
 Banks are going today since 2008 through one of the biggest banking 
crisis we have seen certainly for a long time. Now this crisis is a crisis of 
confidence and banking is a business of confidence 
14
. Now the 
interesting thing and this is what I mentioned in the beginning, Islamic 
banks had no crisis of confidence. They largely escaped this crisis of 
confidence 
14
. 
 But again conventional banks have wider products than us 25. 
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POP Population (which means Customers, Investors, Regulators, and 
Stakeholders) 
 The Central Bank of Bahrain is acting as the vendor of last resort for 
them so the possibility of an Islamic commercial bank to fall down is 
much lower than an Islamic investment bank to fall down 
6
. We handle 
all clients, from small clients to the most important mainstream clients 
6
. 
The other aspect that I think is very unique in our bank which I have not 
seen in other banks is that we stick to our clients, in the bad and good 
times. We don’t try to get away from our customer when they are in 
trouble. We stick with them and hold their hand until they go through 
their problems until they are sort of winning. I have many cases of 
customers who were on the brink of collapse. We went with them and 
almost managed their business for them 
6
.  
 This is very critical for customers in Bahrain and also for the culture of 
business in Bahrain. And you know the culture of Bahrainis, whether 
retail or whether corporate they always want it by tomorrow or by 
yesterday. If you don’t respond quickly, they will go to another bank 
tomorrow 
6
. Customers in Bahrain have the tendency of wanting to know 
and getting the money in their hand as quick as possible, if you take your 
time you will lose market share definitely 
6
. 
 The stability of the shareholders and management relationships 23. 
 Sustaining profitability and it’s about long-term value for shareholders, 
clients and the staff of an organization 
27
. 
 
SPEC Specialist (which means Investment Banking) 
 Banks like National Bank of Bahrain (NBB) and Bank of Bahrain and 
Kuwait (BBK) have been making money in good and bad times. Maybe 
they are making less money in good times. But, Islamic banks are making 
big money in good times and also big losses in bad times 
1
.  
 I will hand out many challenges; one thing is just liquidity, the bank 
lending market has really dried up and people are very reluctant to deal 
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with investment banks because they perceive that to be more risky, even 
the lending in commercial banking is much less but for investment banks 
it’s very difficult at this stage 2. 
 I think there are a number of factors; one of the factors is that they 
brought products that weren’t available to Islamic investors in the past 2. 
 Now you heard about the stories of Arcapita, you’ve heard about the 
stories of many other banks that have either gone to Chapter 11 or have 
gone out of business. Like Bahrain International Bank in the past, why is 
that?  Because the source of funding has dried for them. They could not 
even borrow to fund their assets 
6
. 
 Unlike some other banks, especially the investment banks in Bahrain who 
are suffering from the lack of liquidity 
6
. 
 Yesterday’s so called great investment banks, well performing, they have 
all disappeared now. The only banks that are still remaining are the banks 
that have very deep pockets and very good fundamentals 
12
. 
 All investment banks - stabilizing balance sheets, finding liquidity and 
downsizing your business and trying to stay alive through the process 
20
. 
 What happened during the financial crisis is greed kicked in and that 
greed made the long-term sustainability of the institution less important 
to especially senior management and more important to them was the 
yearly performance target that would maximize their current bonus 
20
. 
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APPENDIX EXHIBIT A5.4 – FACTOR ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL VALUES 
(refer to Appendix Exhibit A4.3 – Organizational Culture Profile (OCP) 
 
Number Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
1 Meritocracy 
 
- 0.843 
Being 
Aggressive 
- 0.081 
Taking 
Responsibility 
- 0.078 
Being 
Reflective 
0.205 
Easy Going 
 
.263 
2 Strict Dress 
Code  
0.825 
Opportunistic 
 
0.031 
Flexibility 
 
-0.214 
Being 
Precise  
0.017 
Emphasizing 
Single Culture 
0.263 
3 Having Clear 
Vision & 
Strategy 
- 0.703 
Being 
Demanding 
 
0.252 
Autonomy 
 
 
0.003 
Informality 
 
 
0.065 
Customer 
Orientation 
 
0.459 
4 Being Careful 
 
0.668 
Innovativeness 
 
-0.444 
Emphasizing 
Growth  
0.192 
Delegation 
 
-0.310 
Team Work 
 
0.158 
5 Stability 
 
 
0.628 
Being 
Competitive 
 
-0.352 
Paying 
Attention to 
Details  
-0.080 
Action Oriented 
 
 
0.125 
Low Level of 
Conflict 
 
0.427 
6 Team Oriented 
 
-0.618 
Job Security 
 
0.244 
Being 
Analytical 
-0.042 
Being Socially 
Responsible 
0.121 
 
7 Being Calm 
 
0.586 
Tolerance 
 
-0.383 
Achievement 
Orieinted 
 -0.170 
Being 
Supportive 
0.155 
 
8 Having  Great 
Reputation - 
0.579 
 Corporate 
Governance -
0.101 
Quality 
Orientation 
-0.182 
 
9 Follower  
 
0.564 
 Decisiveness 
 
-0.220 
Being Result 
Oriented 
0.460 
 
10 Being Rule 
Oriented 
0.559 
  Working for 
Long Hours 
-0.280 
 
11 Passion 
-0.495 
    
12 Having High 
Expectation for 
Performance  
-0.492 
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APPENDIX EXHIBIT A6.1 –  QUESTIONNAIRE DOCUMENT 
 
Confidential         
7
th 
May, 2014 
 
Questionnaire 
 
 
Please respond to the items below based on your self-assessment towards the various statements as 
this may take you few minutes to complete. First, circle the appropriate answer in the profile 
section. Second, circle the appropriate rating as you see fit for each and all the statements. 
 
This questionnaire is part of a DBA research that examines the notion of the effect of corporate 
culture on a firm’s financial performance currently undertaken at the University of Durham, 
United Kingdom.  
 
All responses will be treated with confidentiality. 
 
Thank you for your efforts in advance 
 
 
 
Researcher Name: Riyad Saleh Al Saie 
E mail address: riyadss@gmail.com 
Mobile No: +973 3 968 0021  
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Profile 
 
Nationality::
: 
1.
. 
Bahraini        Gender: 1 Male               
       2. Non-Bahraini    2 Female 
 
         [    ]  
    
 
 
Position: 1. Executive Position 
PpManagement   [    ] 
 Numbers of years 
with  
1
. 
≤ 5 years         
]  2. Senior Management        it  organization 2
. 
6-9 years         
]   3 Middle Management   3 ≥ 10 years 
 
Sector: 1. Retail                                 
] 
 Number of staff 
 re: 
1
. 
  ≤ 5                 
 2. Investment                        reporting to you 2
. 
 6-14             
   
 
  3   ≥ 15 
Type: 1. Islamic                       Age: 1
. 
≤ 30                 
]  2. Conventional                        
[     ] 
  2
. 
31-39 
         [    ]  
     3 40-49  
                      4    ≥ 50   
Kindly use the following scale in your ratings: 
 
5 - Strongly Agree 
4 - Agree 
3 -  Indifferent 
2 -  Disagree 
1 - Strongly Disagree 
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For each of the following statements, please mark ONE response only in the appropriate row to indicate 
the extent to which you either agree or disagree with the statement in question. Please attempt to 
answer each and all statements. 
 
Strongly Agree = 5 Agree = 4 Indifferent = 3 Disagree = 2 Strongly Disagree= 1 
 
 Section A 5 4 3 2 1 
1. Your organization come up with new creative ideas relating to 
financial products and services (Sa1)*  
  
     
2. Your organization fosters an innovative environment where 
staff members are encouraged to generate new ideas (Sa2)* 
  
     
3. Innovations are not encouraged and rewarded in your 
organization (Sa3r)*  
 
     
4. Your organization pays attention to new products/services 
offered by its competitors (Sa4)* 
 
     
5. Your organization considers innovativeness as a strategic 
choice (Sa5)* 
  
     
6. Your organization is a dynamic and entrepreneurial place 
(Sa6)* 
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Strongly Agree = 5 Agree = 4 Indifferent = 3 Disagree = 2 Strongly Disagree = 1 
 
 Section B 5 4 3 2 1 
1. Your organization fosters a sense of competitiveness where 
members are expected to perform at a high level of 
achievements (Sb1)* 
 
     
2. Your organization emphasises competitive actions and 
achievements with measurable goals and objectives (Sb2)* 
 
     
3. Your organization hires individuals with distinguished 
academic/professional degrees and with high personal 
expectation (Sb3)* 
  
     
4. Your organizational reward system is primarily tied to 
individual performance (Sb4)* 
 
     
5. Your organization does not pay careful attention to the annual 
performance review of staff members (Sb5r)* 
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Strongly Agree = 5 Agree = 4 Indifferent = 3 Disagree = 2 Strongly Disagree= 1 
 
 Section C 5 4 3 2 1 
1. Your organization clearly articulates its vision and mission to 
the appropriate levels of organization (Sc1)* 
 
     
2. A successful implementation of your organizational business 
strategy will enhance its financial results (Sc2)* 
 
     
3. Your organizational vision creates excitement and motivation 
for our employees (Sc3)* 
 
     
4. Your organization business strategy is well thought out and is 
based on realistic goals (Sc4)* 
  
     
5. Your organization business strategy is based on a balance 
between ambitions and available resources (Sc5)* 
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Strongly Agree = 5 Agree = 4 Indifferent = 3 Disagree = 2 Strongly Disagree= 1 
 
 Section D 5 4 3 2 1 
1. Your organization clearly defines the internal process 
perspective measures (i.e. risk management, internal audit 
committee, procedures & policies and others) (Sd1)* 
  
     
2. Your organization strives to comply with domestic regulatory 
directives (Sd2)* 
  
     
3. Your organization considers the completion of  Know Your 
Customer (KYC) format as a key part of business compliance 
before entertaining new business with prospective customers 
(Sd3)* 
 
     
4. There is unclear alignment and balance between management, 
customers and shareholders’ interest (Sd4r)* 
 
     
5. Independent board members at your organization provide a 
neutral element  among other members (Sd5)* 
 
     
6. Your organization considers transparency as an important 
element in building and maintaining credibility with the 
various stakeholders (Sd6)* 
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Strongly Agree = 5 Agree = 4 Indifferent = 3 Disagree = 2 Strongly Disagree= 1 
 
 Section E 5 4 3 2 1 
1. Your organization is more customer focused than your 
competitors (Se1)* 
 
     
2. Your customers’ needs are treated with priority (Se2)*      
3. Your organization understands how the entire business can 
thrive through creating customer value (Se3)* 
 
     
4. Customers’ feedback is treated with respect and with careful 
thought (Se4)* 
 
     
5. Your organization considers customers’ interest is very 
important, and a key element in sustaining present and future 
business (Se5)* 
 
     
6. The interest and feedback of the customer often gets ignored 
in our decisions (Se6)* 
 
     
       
* All questions are marked with abbreviation for ease of reference in the researcher’s statistical 
works and the write-up. 
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APPENDIX EXHIBIT A6.2 - FACTOR ANALYSIS FOR FIVE FACTORS  
Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Sa1 0.785 -0.186 -0.054 -0.083 0.063 0.056 
Sa2 0.690 -0.381 -0.178 0.149 -0.226 -0.119 
Sa3r -0.690 0.315 0.196 0.221 0.109 0.298 
Sa4 0.495 -0.188 0.195 -0.294 0.483 0.178 
Sa5 0.727 -0.271 0.131 -0.009 0.012 -0.048 
Sa6 0.673 -0.219 -0.207 -0.064 0.109 0.106 
Sb1 0.585 -0.399 -0.126 0.172 -0.001 0.161 
Sb2 0.532 -0.561 0-.265 0.073 0.160 -0.010 
Sb3 0.640 0.001 0.017 0.286 0.191 -0.113 
Sb4 0.669 -0.452 -0.071 0.067 -0.092 0.147 
Sb5r -0.543 0.350 -0.019 0.483 0.063 0.204 
Sc1 0.666 -0.083 0.380 0.123 0.072 -0.221 
Sc2 0.534 0.283 0.020 0.405 -0.063 0.278 
Sc3 0.761 -0.042 -0.006 0.161 -0.330 -0.041 
Sc4 0.808 0.110 0.202 0.116 0.029 0.065 
Sc5 0.683 0.138 0.174 0.022 0.057 -0.116 
Sd1 0.460 -0.128 0.491 0.104 0.279 0.081 
Sd2 0.404 -0.079 0.491 0.112 -0.366 0.386 
Sd3 0.371 0.238 0.307 -0.467 -0.096 0.361 
Sd4r -0.484 -0.128 0.334 0.193 0.470 -0.246 
Sd5 0.549 0.209 0.345 -0.357 -0.154 -0.223 
Sd6 0.681 0.296 0.119 0.099 0.105 -0.053 
Se1 0.474 0.337 -0.426 -0.185 0.242 0.368 
Se2 0.643 0.483 -0.102 -0.030 0.193 -0.033 
Se3 0.664 0.502 -0.101 0.029 0.056 -0.113 
Se4 0.754 0.316 -0.106 0.132 0.139 -0.127 
Se5 0.475 0.504 -0.057 -0.023 -0.157 -0.334 
Se6r -0.730 -0.249 0.355 0.032 -0.076 -0.084 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 5 components extracted. 
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Component 
Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 5.830 20.821 20.821 
2 5.726 20.450 41.271 
3 1.881 6.717 47.988 
 
 
Factor Analysis - Innovativeness 
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Factor Analysis - Meritocracy 
 
 
Factor Analysis - Clarity of Vision & Strategy 
 
 
  
212 
 
Factor Analysis – Corporate Governance 
 
 
 
Factor Analysis – Customer Orientation 
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